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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-197
Thurssday
12 October 1995

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

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Key Developments

Yeltsin Seen Weighing Election Delay, 'Left' Government

MK1210090795 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian. 11 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Yuliy Lebedev under the "Forecast" rubric: "'Left' Duma as a Guarantee of the President's Endurance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The possibility of delaying the upcoming parliamentary elections has once again become a fashionable subject for discussion in the corridors of power. This may seem strange: The election campaign is in full swing, analysts are already confidently describing the would-be Duma's political features, and, most importantly, these absurd rumors have been convincingly and repeatedly refuted by the "guarantor of the Constitution" himself.

The persistent theory of a possible postponement of the elections can hardly be dismissed as just electoral scheming by the opposition. The same view — though in a vaguer form, with inevitable references to the "opinions of the Federation components" — has recently been expressed by Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin. Other officials, without touching on the subject directly, lead us to this conclusion covertly.

[Defense Minister] Pavel Grachev says that Chechen fighters, who had a good rest during the summer vacation, already have 12 tanks and are about to unleash a war. The government suggests that the president impose a state of emergency on Groznyy, while he, according to his press secretary, "is contemplating such a possibility." If we add the recent attempts on the lives of Oleg Lobov and Anatoliy Romanov, the all-Kuzbass strike scheduled for 12 October, and the all-Russia strike to be held on 30 November, and if we recall the "mass criminalization" of candidates for the Duma and the fact that local electoral commissions lack the requisite funds, it will become absolutely clear that we have more important things to do than elections.

In fact not only the political, but also the legislative legwork has been prepared for canceling the elections. Indeed, if the tenure of local legislative authorities and governors can be extended, why can this not be done for legislators on an "all-Russia" scale? Members of the Federal Assembly's upper chamber have already brought up this question and put forward the initiative that their powers be prolonged until a Federation Council formed on the basis of a corresponding law begins its deliberations. When will this law be passed? God knows.

The lower chamber is unlikely to make a similar move. Political passions run too high there and too many of its deputies have thrown their lot in with the upcoming elections. What is left to be done? To impose a state of emergency on a number of regions and to extend the "transitional period" for some two years, thus saving Russia and oneself from a Communist comeback? In the view of certain sociologists, the "Agrarian-Communist-Patriotic" opposition in the new Duma may win up to 70 percent of all seats.

To all appearances, not very numerous but nonetheless fairly influential advocates of an election delay in the presidential entourage have now started their final big fight. They do not seem, however, to have too many chances of victory. Typically, out of the whole presidential team, Sergey Filatov alone is frightening the public with the Communist threat.

According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's information, a different scenario is currently much more popular in the Kremlin: After the opposition's electoral triumph, the "left Duma" will form a "left government" with the president's consent. Naturally, the Central Bank, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the power ministries will remain under the president's watchful supervision. Messrs. Skokov, Zyuganov, Lapshin, and Glazyev, for their part, will be given a free hand to improve the health of the economy and to steadily increase Russians' well-being as much as they can.

It should be added, however, that recently the mechanism for making the most important economic decisions has changed considerably. Apart from a government decree, a presidential edict is now also necessary in most cases.

The results of the "national accord" government's performance by 12 June 1996 are fully predictable. As a consequence, the leftward slide will be temporarily stopped and, according to the principle of the "lesser evil," most Russians will once again give the incumbent president their votes.

According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's informants, Boris Yeltsin must definitively opt for one of these two scenarios within the next two weeks, before his trip to New York. Mr. Yeltsin is expected to touch on the upcoming — or no longer upcoming — elections in his special message or a news conference.

'Russia Is Our Home' Collects 1.7 Million Signatures

LD1210094595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0848 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — The "Our Home is Russia" bloc (NDR) has collected 1,700,000 signatures in its support, which exceeds the mandatory number of signatures needed to register an election bloc almost ninefold, said deputy chairman of the NDR executive committee Vladimir Ryzhkov in an interview with ITAR-TASS today. The collection of signatures in support of NDR continues in many Russian regions, Ryzhkov said.

The mandatory number of signatures entitling an election bloc to stand for parliament is 200,000.

NDR's Belyayev Reports on Meeting With Yeltsin

LD1110185995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1613 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Konstantin Kolesov and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The election alliance "Our Home is Russia" (NDR) led by Prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin intends to play a notable role ahead of the December 17 elections to the State Duma lower house of parliament.

The head of the alliance's election headquarters Sergey Belyayev announced after today's meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and the alliance's leaders that "Our Home is Russia" will supervise implementation of specific social problems which the government is due to resolve before the end of this year.

"Ours will not be populist measures a government may seek on the eve of elections, we shall engage in specific efforts that must be made," he said.

During today's meeting the President set a concrete task to the alliance — to ensure the payment in 1995 of compensation for the devalued individual deposits in the country's savings banks, Belyayev said.

He added that a similar task was set relating to the stable payment of pensions. The Government is determined to take all necessary measures to ensure that the pensions are paid on time.

Belyayev recalled that the President noted that should the government fail to considerably increase the amount of money paid as pensions, it must at least make sure that the available amounts are paid on time.

Another problem discussed by the President was what could be done for the deceived investors into "pyramid" structures and insolvent banks — there are millions of such people in the country, Belyayev stressed.

He reiterated that the election movement "Our Home is Russia" should not be identified with "a party of power, a party of bureaucrats." "There are very many representatives of different groups of society," Belyayev said.

In particular, the Russian union of pensioners is a collective member of the movement: "A myth that all pensioners would vote for communists and agrarians is being disproved by pensioners themselves," he pointed out.

Belyayev told ITAR-TASS that Viktor Chernomyrdin would announce certain proposals for paying compensation for the devalued deposits in the savings banks and stabilizing the payment of pensions at a conference of the Russian Union of Pensioners on Saturday.

KRO Circulates Election Program Within Army Division

MK1010150395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[V.R.-signed report: "Struggle for Servicemen's Votes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An end to army bashing and attempts to drag the Russian army into political squabbles is what the military section of the electoral program of the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] calls for; the program was distributed in subunits of the Kantemirovskaya Division by officers sympathizing with Aleksandr Lebed last week. Regarding military affairs, the KRO also calls for the retention of the current structure of the Armed Forces, consisting of five armed services; support for the high-technology core of the Russian military-industrial sector; and an increase in the level of material incentives for the officer corps.

Lysenko Warns Political Terrorism Threatens Free Elections

LD0510201095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1641 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 5 (INTERFAX) — Leader of the National Republican Party of Russia (NRPR) Nikolay Lysenko says political terrorism which is becoming a reality poses a threat to holding free elections in the country.

At a news conference on Thursday, he warned that this was a serious threat not only to national forces but also to moderate opposition.

To make his case, Lysenko spoke of an armed raid on the party's head office in St. Petersburg on September 28 during which staff members were tortured and beaten and lists bearing over 30,000 signatures in NRPR's support were seized.

He does not rule out that the attack was linked with the "powers that be who are well aware of the party's tough stand in respect of the ruling regime."

For his part, former vice chairman of the Our Home is Russia (NDR) movement's branch in Stavropol Aleksandr Kastscheyev spoke of being threatened by Our Home activists following his walkout on the movement and hampered from collecting signatures in his own support as an independent candidate.

Kastscheyev also said that NDR officials sent down a written instruction to regional leaders to launch signature collecting campaigns in support of the movement and that local industrial managers were having their arms twisted to try to make them comply with the instruction.

ORT Director Approves Prices for Campaign Commercials

LD1110200295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1803 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian politicians running for the State Duma at December 17 elections will have to pay from 1,500 to 30,000 U.S. dollars [USD] for one minute of campaigning on TV depending on the time of the day and week.

The prices were approved by Director General of the Russian Public Television (ORT) network Sergey Blagovolin on Wednesday and a spokesman of the company told Tass the costs were lower than those for commercials.

However, political parties with small funds will, most evidently, fight for their voters at night as the prices are the cheapest (1,500 USD) on working days from 01:00 to 05:00 AM.

Prime time minutes (from 19:00 to 22:00) will cost 20,500 USD each.

From 18:00 to 19:00 and from 22:00 to 23:30 prices will vary between 11,000 and 19,500 USD.

However, Friday prime time minute will cost a record of 30,000 USD.

TV campaigning will last for one month beginning from November 15 and ending two days before elections.

According to the law, the ORT will grant the registered political parties a fixed campaigning time for free.

Duma Deputy Absconds With 'Several Million' Dollars

MM1010143595 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Larisa Kislinskaya: "Moscow Duma Abandoned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Svetlana Zhuravleva has not attended a single recent Moscow City Duma session. She has left for permanent domicile in the United States, taking several million dollars with her.

The Russian General Prosecutor's Office, to which certain firms that had given Zhuravleva "credit" turned, told your ITAR-TASS correspondent that the deputy had refugee status even before she left. She has used the money that she "borrowed" to buy property in Miami.

According to Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov, so far 85 people with a rich criminal past have tried to run for the State Duma. It is obvious from Zhuravleva's example that they are after a deputy's immunity. According to the General Prosecutor's Office, last year legislative organs of various levels received almost 350 applications from Russian law-enforcement organs asking them to consent to criminal proceedings instituted against the people's elected representatives.

Candidate Lists for Elections Published (Part XI)

964E0035B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 pp 4-5

[Federal list of candidates for deputy to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for balloting in elections by federal electoral district, presented by the electoral bloc, "Russia's Democratic Choice—United Democrats." Appendix to protocol of the conference of the electoral bloc "Russia's Democratic Choice—United Democrats," 26 August 1995, signed by Presiding Chairman of Conference A.N. Yakovlev and Secretary I.A. Kharichev. Copy of list registered with the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 5 September 1995 (Decree No 12/97-II)]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich. Born 19 March 1956. State Duma of the RF [Russian Federation] Federal Assembly, deputy; "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of Moscow.

2. Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich. Born 2 March 1930. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy. RF

President's Commission on Human Rights, chairman. Resides in Moscow.

3. Shukshina (Fedoseyeva-Shushkina), Lidiya Nikolayevna. Born 25 September 1938. Actress. Resides in Moscow.

4. Vorobyev, Eduard Arkadyavich. Born 25 October 1938. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, retired. Resides in Moscow.

5. Chernichenko, Yuriy Dmitriyevich. Born 7 August 1929. Peasant Party of Russia, chairman. Resides in city of Moscow.

6. Zolotukhin, Boris Andreyevich. Born 5 June 1930. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of the Committee on Legislation and Judicial-Legal Reform. Resides in Moscow.

7. Tatarchuk, Valentin Ivanovich. Born 29 September 1937. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Industry, Transport and Energy. Resides in Moscow.

8. Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 2 December 1923. Russian Party of Social Democracy, chairman. Resides in Moscow.

9. Tomchin, Grigoriy Alekseyevich. Born 4 December 1947. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Property, Privatization and Economic Activity. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

10. Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich. Born 12 January 1958. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on the Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finance. Resides in Moscow.

11. Osovtsov, Aleksandr Avramovich. Born 19 June 1957. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of the Committee on Labor and Social Provision. Resides in Moscow.

12. Rudenko-Desnyak, Aleksandr Alekseyevich. Born 6 June 1936. Cultural Center of Ukraine in Moscow, deputy general director. Resides in Moscow.

REGIONAL GROUPS OF CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY

REGIONAL GROUP No. 1

(Republic of Buryatiya, Republic of Tyva, Republic of Khakassiya, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Chita Oblast, Aga-Buryat AO, Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) AO, Evenki AO)

1. Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich. Born 7 January 1942. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, first deputy chairman, specialist-expert. Resides in city of Chita.

2. Kovrova, Nina Borisovna. Born 4 August 1965. Institute of Chemistry and Chemical-Metallurgical Processes, RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences], scientific associate. Resides in city of Krasnoyarsk.

3. Kuznetsov, Oleg Vladimirovich. Born 2 November 1964. Apparatus of the official representative of the RF President in Chita Oblast, specialist-expert. Resides in city of Chita.

4. Garmayev, Lubsandorzhi Tsyrendashiyevich. Born 20 February 1962. Joint-stock company of the closed type "Buryatagro," director. Resides in city of Ulan-Ude.

5. Epp, Genrikh Yakovlevich. Born 18 June 1940. Joint-stock company of the closed type "NILM," director. Resides in city of Kyzyl.

6. Kirilin, Vladimir Ivanovich. Born 28 May 1951. Multi-sectorial production enterprise of the housing-municipal management of city of Divnogorsk, director. Resides in city of Divnogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

7. Anuchin, Mikhail Alekseyevich. Born 4 January 1955. Legal consultation, city of Krasnoyarsk-26, director. Resides in city of Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

8. Zorin, Dmitriy Konstantinovich. Born 1 January 1937. Limited partnership "Nord-Ost," general director. Resides in Moscow.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 2

(Kemerovo Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast)

1. Tetelmin, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Born 19 August 1944. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Ecology. Resides in city of Krasnoyarsk.

2. Starikov, Ivan Valentinovich. Born 16 August 1960. RF Ministry of Economics, deputy minister. Resides in Moscow.

3. Aslanidi, Aleksandr Valentinovich. Born 13 December 1947. Limited partnership "Nasha gazeta," ["Our Newspaper"], executive director. Resides in village of Malinovka, Osinnikovskiy Rayon, Kemerovo Oblast.

4. Krasinskiy, Sergey Lifanovich. Born 25 January 1951. Limited partnership "Sfera," deputy general director. Resides in city of Tomsk.

5. Sychev, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 23 October 1951. Novosibirsk branch of the Khanty-Mansi Bank for Rebirth of Peoples of the North, deputy director. Resides in city of Novosibirsk.

6. Biryukov, Valeriy Viktorovich. Born 12 December 1938. AO [joint-stock company] "Prokopyevskugol," section chief. Resides in city of Prokopyevsk, Kemerovo Oblast.

7. Kuvshinov, Yuriy Borisovich. Born 7 January 1957. Novosibirsk Organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" party, ispolkom [executive committee] chairman. Resides in city of Novosibirsk.

8. Labetskiy, Stanislav Bronislavovich. Born 21 November 1955. AOOT [joint-stock company of the open type] "Firma Barg," director of economics. Resides in city of Novosibirsk.

9. Shumov, Anatoliy Gerasimovich. Born 18 February 1937. Temporarily unemployed. Resides in city of Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast.

10. Krasnikov, Nikolay Grigoryevich. Born 17 April 1955. Administration of village of Koltsovo, head of administration. Resides in village of Koltsovo, Novosibirskiy Rayon, Novosibirsk Oblast.

11. Kobayev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich. Born 3 January 1944. Tomsk Academy of Control Systems and Radio Electronics, head of chair. Resides in city of Tomsk.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 3

(Belgorod Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast)

1. Fateyev, Valeriy Petrovich. Born 2 June 1946. RF State Committee on Administration of State Property, deputy chairman. Resides in city of Moscow.

2. Pridvorov, Nikolay Antonovich. Born 9 January 1935. Tambov State University, dean of juridical faculty, head of chair of legal disciplines. Resides in city of Kursk.

3. Ponomarev, Nikolay Fedorovich. Born 18 September 1945. Administration of the Federal Treasury for Lipetsk Oblast, department head. Resides in city of Lipetsk.

4. Litvinov, Vasiliy Vasilyevich. Born 7 February 1954. Administration of Krasninskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast, head of administration. Resides in village of Gusino, Krasninskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.

5. Izvekov, Vladimir Ivanovich. Born 3 January 1960. Ispolkom of the Kursk section of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" party, deputy chairman. Resides in city of Kursk.

6. Chilikin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 1 January 1954. Lipetsk State University, head of department of psychiatry. Resides in city of Lipetsk.

7. Novikov, Vladimir Danilovich. 3 December 1934. Smolensk Pedagogical Lyceum, director. Resides in city of Smolensk.

8. Oksenenko, Grigoriy Antonovich. Born 15 March 1936. Lgovsk Experimental-Selection Station, director. Resides in village of Selektsionnyy, Lgovskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 4

(Volgograd Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Penza Oblast, Samara Oblast)

1. Feygin, Mark Zakharovich. Born 3 June 1971. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Questions of Local Self-Government. Resides in city of Samara.

2. Yushchenko, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. Born 30 January 1938. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Questions of Local Self-Government. Resides in city of Volgograd.

3. Volkogonov, Dmitriy Antonovich. Born 21 March 1928. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Defense. Resides in city of Moscow.

4. Nasledov, Sergey Borisovich. Born 20 December 1952. Newspaper ORSKAYA KHRONIKA, correspondent. Resides in city of Orsk, Orenburg Oblast.

5. Borisov, Oleg Georgiyevich. Born 15 September 1963. "Enon" firm, chairman of the board of directors. Resides in city of Samara.

6. Timoshenko, Aleksandr Prokopyevich. Born 5 August 1955. Newspaper ORENBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, assistant editor. Resides in city of Orenburg.

7. Smirnov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. Born 12 December 1960. "Oktyabr" House of Culture, sector chief, department of organization of recreation. Resides in city of Volzhsk, Volgograd Oblast.

8. Ibragimov, Rufil Ravilovich. Born 22 January 1963. AOZT [joint-stock company of the closed type] "Concord-Holding," general director. Resides in city of Samara.

9. Krasnov, Igor Vasilyevich. Born 13 May 1949. Volgograd City Administration, head of inter-ethnic relations department. Resides in city of Volgograd.

10. Shcherban, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Born 7 July 1950. City of Volzhsk administration, chief of

Administration of Pre-School Education. Resides in city of Volzhsk, Volgograd Oblast.

11. Voytsekhovskiy, Konstantin Vladimirovich. Born 4 October 1956. Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship of Penza Oblast, general director. Resides in city of Penza.

12. Didenko, Vladimir Vasilyevich. Born 15 February 1950. Penza Oblast Public Committee on Protection of Human Rights, executive director. Resides in city of Penza.

13. Sidorenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 23 February 1953. Committee on Administration of State Property, city of Samara, committee chairman. Resides in city of Samara.

14. Bryantsev, Gennadiy Nikolayevich. Born 1 January 1948. Buzuluk territorial organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of Buzuluk, Orenburg Oblast.

15. Manuylov, Yevgeniy Sergenevich. Born 6 February 1947. Volgograd section of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, deputy chairman. Resides in Moscow.

16. Levanovskiy, Valeriy Nikolayevich. Born 2 January 1947. Invdividual-private enterprise "Tema," director. Resides in city of Buturuslan, Orenburg Oblast.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 5

(Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast)

1. Savelyev, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Born 12 December 1948. "Record-commerce-LTD" firm, chairman of the council of founders. Resides in city of Aleksandrov, Vladimir Oblast.

2. Komogortseva, Lyudmila Kimovna. Born 1 December 1949. Bryansk Agricultural Academy, docent. Resides in village of Kokino, Bryansk Oblast.

3. Kuznetsov, Petr Leontyevich. Born 29 December 1929. AO "Bryanskmyaso," general director. Resides in city of Bryansk.

4. Kazakov, Sergey Valentinovich. Born 7 December 1959. Newspaper TOMIKS, editor-in-chief. Resides in city of Vladimir.

5. Fedorov, Lev Aleksandrovich. Born 10 June 1936. Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry imeni Verdanskiy, lead scientific associate. Resides in Moscow.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 6

(Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), Primorskiy Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Kurgansk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Jewish AO, Koryak AO, Ust-Ordynsk Buryat AO, Chukotsk AO)

1. Anyakin, Vladimir Alekseyevich. Born 10 September 1934. Bratsk city administration, department head. Resides in city of Bratsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

2. Engel, Valeriy Viktorovich. Born 19 June 1961. Investment company "SDM-Invest," president. Resides in Moscow.

3. Zhzhenov, Georgiy Stepanovich. Born 22 March 1915. Mossovet Theatre, actor. Resides in Moscow.

4. Nazarenko, Viktor Ustinovich. Born 6 August 1948. Investment-industrial corporation "FEDZHI," president. Resides in city of Vladivostok.

5. Grigoryev, Yuriy Leonidovich. Born 29 September 1952. Federal Migration Service for Sovgavanskiy and Vaninskiy Rayons of Khabarovsk Kray, department director. Resides in city of Sovgavan, Khabarovsk Kray.

6. Bitkov, Sergey Semenovich. Born 22 January 1953. AO "Avtopromtermoobrabotka," engineer-designer. Resides in city of Kurgan.

7. Malyshev, Boris Sergeyevich. Born 1 May 1936. Amur State University, head of chair of economics. Resides in city of Blagoveshchensk.

8. Barinov, Aleksandr Fedorovich. Born 20 July 1947. Individual-private enterprise "Peasant Company of Sakhalin," director. Resides in city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

9. Petrov, Konstantin Yuryevich. Born 27 March 1946. AO "Finansist," general director. Resides in city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsk.

10. Riga, Igor Grigoryevich. Born 23 October 1937. Chukotsk Okrug Kray Studies Museum, senior scientific associate. Resides in city of Anadyr.

11. Khublarov, Konstantin Ambartsumovich. Born 29 June 1946. Irkutsk Oblast organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, executive director. Resides in city of Bratsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

12. Lusnikov, Mikhail Afanasyevich. Born 3 June 1949. Law office "Kredo," general director. Resides in city of Ussuriysk, Primorskiy Kray.

13. Zernov, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Born 19 May 1961. Trade union of Stockholders and Investors, chairman. Resides in Moscow.

14. Ogurtsov, Vladimir Anatolyevich. Born 3 June 1962. Private firm "REGO," director. Resides in city of Ust-Ilimsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

15. Yusov, Vladimir Naumovich. Born 27 August 1948. AO "Ivolga," deputy general director. Resides in city of Kurgan.

16. Nechitaylo, Lyudmila Alekseyevna. Born 18 September 1948. Rostrudinspektsiya [Russian Labor Inspectorate] on Amur Oblast, state legal labor inspector. Resides in city of Svobodnyy, Amur Oblast.

17. Kamshilov, Ivan Aleksandrovich. Born 14 February 1949. Full partnership "KiK," chairman of the board. Resides in city of Kurgan.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 7

(Republic of Karelia, Republic of Komi, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Tversk Oblast)

1. Smirnov, Vladimir Sergeyevich. Born 30 November 1946. "Military Men for Democracy" Movement, chairman of the Coordinating Council. Resides in Moscow.

2. Danilov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Born 14 July 1937. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Natural Resources and Natural Resources Application. Resides in city of Arkhangelsk.

3. Chukhin, Ivan Ivanovich. Born 13 April 1948. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Security. Resides in city of Petrozavodsk.

4. Gladkov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 11 February 1954. "Rosugol" company, chief of administration on bankruptcies. Resides in Moscow.

5. Nechayeva, Natalya Georgiyevna. Born 8 May 1957. Murmansk Oblast Union of Entrepreneurs, chairman. Resides in city of Murmansk.

6. Frantsuzov, Igor Yakovlevich. Born 23 July 1934. AOOT "Maritime Arctic Geological Survey Expedition," chief geophysicist. Resides in city of Murmansk.

7. Zhuravlev, Konstantin Yuryevich. Born 13 December 1963. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in city of Svereodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast.

8. Nekrasov, Yuriy Klavdiyevich. Born 10 May 1935. Vologda Pedagogical Institute, professor. Resides in city of Vologda.

9. Bobrakov, Igor Alekseyevich. Born 26 December 1954. Newspaper MOLODEZH SEVERA, assistant editor-in-chief. Resides in city of Syktyvkara.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 8

(Ivanovo Oblast, Kirov Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Perm Oblast, Komi-Permyak AO)

1. Pokhmelkin, Viktor Valeryevich. Born 3 February 1960. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of the Committee on Legislation and Judicial-Legal Reform. Resides in city of Perm.

2. Zelenkin, Viktor Vasilyevich. Born 27 January 1947. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Questions of Local Self-Government. Resides in city of Ivanovo.

3. Isakov, Mikhail Nikolayevich. Born 27 November 1952. "Permnefteorgsintez," laboratory of practical social psychology, head of laboratory. Resides in city of Perm.

4. Kochoi, Samvel Mamadovich. Born 11 November 1961. Kirov branch of Moscow Juridical Academy, dean of faculty. Resides in city of Kirov.

5. Smirnov, Stanislav Grigoryevich. Born 27 March 1929. Ivanovo Medical Institute, professor. Resides in city of Ivanovo.

6. Kryukova, Riata Georgiyevna. Born 3 April 1938. School No 20, school director. Resides in city of Gubakha, Perm Oblast.

7. Gelfenbuym, Boris Viktorovich. Born 15 May 1949. Branch of the Permkhimbank, manager. Resides in city of Perm.

8. Volkov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 18 October 1954. Ivanovo Medical Academy, docent. Resides in city of Ivanovo.

9. Sedinina, Vera Aleksandrovna. Born 7 June 1945. Motovilikhinskiy Rayon administration, city of Perm, head of administration. Resides in city of Perm.

10. Yuzefovich, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 26 May 1932. Perm State Technical University, docent, construction faculty. Resides in city of Perm.

11. Martynov, Rudolf Leonidovich. Born 3 February 1939. AOZT "Farmako-Polis," director. Resides in city of Ivanovo.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 9

(Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Mari El, Udmurt Republic, Chuvash Republic—Chavash Respubliki, Nizhegorodsk Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast)

1. Zaslavskiy, Ilya Iosifovich. Born 31 January 1960. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Economic Policy, resides in city of Moscow.

2. Skrynnik, Vitaliy Nikolayevich. Born 9 March 1955. Udmurt State University, senior instructor in chair of philosophy. Resides in city of Izhevsk.

3. Yakupov, Zamir Safinovich. Born 18 March 1952. Individual-private enterprise "Vira," director. Resides in city of Ufa.

4. Povalyaev, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 13 November 1962. Limited partnership "Delta-2," deputy director on legal questions. Resides in city of Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk Oblast.

5. Zagryadskiy, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich. Born 31 October 1929. "NBD" bank, department head. Resides in city of Nozhniy Novgorod.

6. Kubarev, Eduard Alekseyevich. Born 28 September 1939. Control administration of the RF President's Administration, deputy chief. Resides in city of Cheboksary.

7. Kozhevnikov, Valeriy Viktorovich. Born 3 November 1953. "Novator" plant, test driver. Resides in city of Yoshkar-Ola.

8. Galikeyev, Faiz Mukhametsafiyevich. Born 4 March 1935. Retired. Resides in village of Nizhnyaya Tersa, Chishminskiy Rayon, Republic of Bashkortostan.

9. Vishnepolskiy, Vladislav Morisovich. Born 22 April 1937. "Pomoshch" society, director. Resides in city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

10. Timofeyev, Valeriy Dmitriyevich. Born 24 October 1947. Production-artistic association "Termen," general director. Resides in city of Cheboksary.

11. Polishchuk, Oleg Vasilyevich. Born 29 March 1965. AO "Polikron," director. Resides in city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

12. Ramazanov, Marat Davidovich. Born 28 April 1939. TAN Institute of Mathematics, head of department of computational mathematics. Resides in city of Ufa.

13. Kopsov, Anatoliy Yakovlevich. Born 6 April 1942. Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on the Budget, Finance, Currency and Credit Regulation, Monetary Emission, Tax Policy and Customs Regulation. Resides in city of Ufa.

14. Ryabtsov, Boris Ivanovich. Born 1 December 1940. Limited partnership "Santekhmontazh," director. Resides in city of Chkalovsk, Nizhegorodsk Oblast.

15. Sasyuk, Oleg Dmitriyevich. Born 17 January 1949. Udmurt regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, ispolkom chairman. Resides in city of Izhevsk.

16. Khayrulina, Dina Munirovna. Born 7 July 1959. Editorial staff of newspaper IDEL-URAL, correspondent. Resides in Dmitrovskiy Leskhoz [timber farm], Ufimskiy Rayon, Republic of Bashkortostan.

17. Bagdasaryan, Levon Bagdasarovich. Born 8 March 1948. AO "Koverininskoye RAYPO," director. Resides in village of Kovernino, Nizhegorodsk Oblast.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 10

(Omsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Khanty-Mansi AO, Yamalo-Nenets AO)

1. Minzhurenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 24 October 1946. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on International Affairs. Resides in city of Omsk.

2. Bondar, Vadim Nikolayevich. Born 7 June 1963. AOOT "Zapsibgeofizika," director. Resides in city of Tyumen.

3. Basov, Igor Gennadyevich. Born 7 January 1963. Fund for Protection of Socio-Economic Rights and Freedoms of Citizens, general director. Resides in city of Omsk-73, Omsk Oblast.

4. Tikunova, Zinaida Vasilyevna. Born 11 August 1947. PTU-21, instructor. Resides in city of Omsk-84, Omsk Oblast.

5. Stepanov, Valeriy Veniaminovich. Born 25 July 1955. Non-state pension fund "Germes-Soyuz," director. Resides in city of Noyabrsk, Yamalo-Nenets AO.

6. Kolosov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 7 October 1955. Tyumen Oblast Committee on Administration of Property, deputy chairman. Resides in city of Tyumen.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 11

(Republic of Altay, Altay Kray)

1. Rayfikespt, Vladimir Fedorovich. Born 15 April 1951. AO "Logovskoye," director. Resides in village of Logovskoye, Pervomayskiy Rayon, Altay Kray.

2. Yemeshin, Konstantin Nikolayevich. Born 19 June 1945. State enterprise "Meditsinskaya profilaktika," director. Resides in city of Barnaul.

3. Kiryanov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich. Born 15 October 1946. AOZT "Bystroistokskiy Butter-Cheese Making Plant and Peasantry," executive director. Resides in village of Bystriy Istok, Altay Kray.

4. Kolobova, Albina Ivanovna. Born 25 September 1938. Altay State Agrarian University, head of chair. Resides in city of Barnaul.

5. Zubakin, Semen Ivanovich. Born 4 May 1952. Control-Inspection Administration of the RF Ministry of Finance, head controller-inspector for Republic of Altay. Resides in city of Gorno-Altaysk.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 12

(Republic of Adygeya (Adygeya), Ingush Republic, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Republic of Kalmykiya-Khalmg Tangch, Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic, Republic of North Osetia, Krasnodar Kray, Rostov Oblast)

1. Titenko, Boris Mikhaylovich. Born 6 March 1954. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Affairs of the Federation and Regional Policy. Resides in city of Rostov-on-Don.

2. Cherkashin, Nikolay Vladimirovich. Born 24 April 1956. Newspaper YUG, editor-in-chief. Resides in city of Kurganinsk, Krasnodar Kray.

3. Bolov, Vladislav Ramazanovich. Born 25 June 1949. Scientific-production center "Antistikhiya," director. Resides in city of Nalchik.

4. Gabachnev, Dzhabrail Ismailovich. Born 1 June 1947. Corporation of the food and processing industry of the Republic of North Osetia, deputy chairman on legal work. Resides in city of Vladikavkaz.

5. Bembetov, Vladimir Petrovich. Born 14 October 1953. Cossack agro-industrial company "Khazg," president. Resides in city of Elista.

6. Khabicheva, Asiyat Akhiyayevna. Born 29 December 1945. Karachayevo-Cherkessk section of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in Cherkessk.

7. Parchiyev, Magomed Ibragimovich. Born 21 July 1969. AOZT "Altair," director. Resides in city of Nazran.

8. Kereytov, Ramazan Khusknovich. Born 26 September 1943. Karachayevo-Cherkessk Institute of Humanitarian Studies, head of department. Resides in city of Cherkessk.

9. Archakov, Magomed Kambulatovich. Born 14 May 1963. Ingush State Dramatic Theatre, head of music section. Resides in city of Nazran.

10. Kurpetskiy, Sergey Lvovich. Born 17 January 1953. Scientific-technical center "Sonar," director. Resides in city of Krasnodar.

11. Raspopov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. Born 16 April 1955. Tax inspectorate for Rostov Oblast, deputy chief. Resides in city of Rostov-on-Don.

12. Tikhomirov, Vsevolod Rostislavovich. Born 7 April 1932. Kuban State University, docent, chair of theoretical physics. Resides in city of Krasnodar.

13. Fedoseyev, Nikolay Mikhaylovich. Born 16 December 1948. City of Novocherkassk administration, head of ecology department. Resides in city of Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.

14. Chereychik, Mikhail Mikhaylovich. Born 17 May 1947. Construction-installation association "Sochizhilstroy," deputy general director. Resides in city of Sochi, Krasnodar Kray.

15. Shalimov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 7 February 1954. Volgodonsk Institute of Novocherkassk State Technical University, docent. Resides in city of Volgodonsk, Rostov Oblast.

16. Istomin, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 12 October 1943. Newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI NA DONU I KUBANI, editor. Resides in city of Yeysk, Krasnodar Kray.

17. Sadovnikov, Aleksey Firsovich. Born 23 December 1946. AOOT "Donvodstroykomplekt," general director. Resides in city of Rostov-on-Don.

18. Zenyuk, Yuriy Vladimirovich. Born 12 January 1929. Newspaper YUG, observer. Resides in city of Krasnodar.

19. Girenko, Yuriy Anatolyevich. Born 8 August 1961. Rostov State University, senior instructor. Resides in city of Rostov-on-Don.

20. Kiyazhev, Boris Ivanovich. Born 10 October 1947. AO "Faust," general director. Resides in city of Krasnodar.

21. Pasechnikova, Irina Aleksandrovna. Born 6 March 1952. Regional socio-political newspaper NASHE ZERKALO, editor. Resides in city of Donetsk, Rostov Oblast.

22. Bochkarev, Vladimir Lvovich. Born 7 November 1941. Peasant farm "ARKOP," head of peasant farm. Resides in stanitsa [village] of Platnerovskaya, Korenovskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.

23. Yamina, Margarita Nikolayevna. Born 22 February 1941. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in city of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 13

(Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, city of St. Petersburg)

1. Sychev, Vitaliy Anatolyevich. Born 14 September 1957. AO "Holding Company 'Arsenal'," general director. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

2. Vasilashvili, Oleg Valeryanovich. Born 26 September 1934. Bolshoy Dramatic Theatre, actor. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

3. Soshnikov, Igor Ivanovich. Born 3 July 1956. Ispolkom of St. Petersburg regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, deputy chairman. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

4. Rybakov, Yuliy Andreyevich. Born 25 February 1946. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Legislative and Judicial-Legal Reform. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

5. Mineyev, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 24 November 1937. Leningrad Oblast organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast.

6. Medoyeva, Zalina Grigoryevna. Born 5 February 1949. Gatchin Public Committee for Russian Reform, chairman. Resides in city of Gatchin, Leningrad Oblast.

7. Yeremeyev, Stanislav Germanovich. Born 15 January 1952. Center for Russian Language and Culture, St. Petersburg State University, director. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

8. Godunov, Andrey Vladimirovich. Born 8 March 1952. Ispolkom of the St. Petersburg regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

9. Gladkov, Yuriy Pavlovich. Born 22 September 1949. Fund for Support of Democratic Reforms, vice-president. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

10. Rybalchenko, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Born 27 January 1957. "New Business of Russia" corporation, president. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

11. Novolotskiy, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. Born 29 March 1951. City of St. Petersburg justice administration, chief of administration. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

12. Gubanov, Boris Sergeyevich. Born 14 November 1944. St. Petersburg regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman of okrug organization. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

13. Zhikharevich, Mikhail Yefimovich. Born 5 August 1948. Pskov Oblast Institute for Advanced Training of Workers in Education, docent, chair of philosophy. Resides in city of Pskov.

14. Temkin, Aleksey Borisovich. Born 27 November 1960. St. Petersburg regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman of okrug organization. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

15. Borisov, Fedor Andreyevich. Born 13 April 1973. ispolkom of the St. Petersburg regional youth union of Russia's Democratic Choice," chairman. Resides in city of St. Petersburg.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 14

(Republic of Dagestan, Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan))

1. Mikhaylov, Valentin Vakhtangovich. Born 31 January 1944. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Federalism of the Committee on Affairs of the Federation and Regional Policy. Resides in city of Kazan.

2. Gasanov, Nagomed-Kadi Nabiyevich. Born 21 November 1962. AO "Adam international," president. Resides in city of Makhachkala.

3. Shtanin, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 10 June 1942. Kazan State University, docent. Resides in city of Kazan.

4. Baronchuk, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich. Born 20 October 1947. Dagestan regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, ispolkom chairman. Resides in city of Makhachkala.

5. Galyautdinov, Damir Cilmutdinovich. Born 24 March 1939. State Institute of Applied Optics, lead designer. Resides in city of Kazan.

6. Lyutakhin, Vladimir Pavlovich. Born 5 April 1949. Leninogorsk Petroleum Technical School, instructor. Resides in city of Leninogorsk, Republic of Tatarstan.

7. Filimonov, Andrey Yevgenyevich. Born 19 October 1951. Vysokogorsk Secondary School No. 2, teacher. Resides in village of Vysokaya Gora, Republic of Tatarstan.

8. Bikulov, Rinat Abdulalayevich. Born 20 December 1959. Kamsk Polytechnical Institute, docent. Resides in city of Naberezhnyye Chelny, Republic of Tatarstan.

9. Magomedov, Ruslan Dzhalilovich. Born 24 November 1980. Regional Trade Union of Workers of Medium and Small Business, chairman. Resides in city of Makhachkala.

REGIONAL GROUP No. 15

(Moscow Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast)

1. **Shabad, Anatoliy Yefimovich.** Born 8 May 1939 State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Education, Culture and Science. Resides in city of Moscow.

2. **Chernova, Irina Aleksandrovna.** Born 16 October 1946. City of Serpukhov Committee on Administration of Property, chairman. Resides in city of Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast.

3. **Godzhayev, Zakhid Adygezal Ogly.** Born 8 August 1951. Scientific Motor Tractor Institute, leading scientific associate. Resides in city of Moscow.

4. **Burunskiy, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich.** Born 17 May 1961. "Medved" association, general director. Resides in city of Yaroslavl.

5. **Luchin, Viktor Aleksandrovich.** Born 9 February 1943. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in village of Staraya Kupavna, Noginskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

6. **Fatkulin, Yuriy Kamilevich.** Born 20 July 1943. International society "EKOTEKHNOPOLIS," consultant. Resides in city of Troyitsk, Moscow Oblast.

7. **Lykhin, Nikolay Petrovich.** Born 1 April 1952. Evening School No 1, history teacher. Resides in city of Pavlovskiy Posad, Moscow Oblast.

8. **Peftiyev, Vladimir Ilyich.** Born 25 October 1935. Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University, professor, chair of economics. Resides in city of Yaroslavl.

9. **Khutsiyev, Melko Arkadyevich.** Born 10 July 1950. Independent Trade Union of Workers of the Shcherbinskiy Sheet Metal Plant, technical inspector. Resides in city of Shcherbinka, Moscow Oblast.

10. **Koveshnikov, Sergey Nikolayevich.** Born 27 April 1954. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in city of Lytkarino, Moscow Oblast.

11. **Petrova, Irina Leonidovna.** Born 21 April 1936. TSNII [Central Scientific-Research Institute] on Expert Evaluations of Work Capacity and Organization of Invalid Labor, senior scientific associate. Resides in city of Khimki-2, Moscow Oblast.

12. **Bozenenkov, Aleksey Yuryevich.** Born 29 July 1970. Limited partnership "Pallada," deputy director. Resides in city of Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast.

13. **Yegorova, Dina Ivanovna.** Born 6 September 1935. GORONO, city of Podolsk, pedagog in continuing education. Resides in city of Podolsk, Moscow Oblast.

14. **Butta, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich.** Born 10 October 1938. Master-modeller in casting products. Resides in village of Pirogovskiy, Mytishchinskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

15. **Vaynberg, Lev Iosifovich.** Born 6 May 1944. International association "Solev," president. Resides in city of Moscow.

REPUBLIC OF MORDOVIA

1. **Kruglov, Nikolay Ivanovich.** Born 9 November 1953. Apparatus of the State Assembly of the Republic of Mordovia, head of department of social policy. Resides in city of Saransk.

2. **Naumkin, Aleksey Mikhaylovich.** Born 20 October 1945. State Inspectorate of Labor for Republic of Mordovia, state inspector on labor protection. Resides in city of Saransk.

3. **Ulitin, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich.** Born 29 January 1963. Inter-regional non-state pension fund "Semya" ["Family"], chairman. Resides in city of Saransk.

STAVROPOL KRAY

1. **Naumov, Oleg Georgiyevich.** Born 17 December 1953. Center for Humanitarian Studies, council chairman. Resides in city of Stavropol.

2. **Oganov, Roman Surenovich.** Born 15 April 1950. Limited partnership "Sovtrade," general director. Resides in city of Stavropol.

3. **Sereda, Nikolay Andreyevich.** Born 21 May 1955. Association of Peasant-Individual Farms, executive director. Resides in village of Donsk, Trunovskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray.

4. **Ilyukhin, IVan Timerzukovich.** Born 25 April 1952. Stavropol regional section of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, ispolkom chairman. Resides in city of Stavropol.

5. **Zonov, Mikhail Fedorovich.** Born 2 August 1941. Peasant farm "Yevribrid," head of peasant farm. Resides in village of Stepnoy, Shpakovskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray.

ASTRAKHAN OBLAST

1. **Banskalinskiy, Nikolay Leonidovich.** Born 2 August 1948. Ispolkom of the Astrakhan section of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of Astrakhan.

VORONEZH OBLAST

1. Sobstyl, Galina Andreyevna. Born 17 March 1951. AOZT "Regul," chief engineer. Resides in city of Voronezh.

2. Morgunova, Yekaterina Vasilyevna. Born 11 November 1968. Apparatus of the representative of the RF President in Voronezh Oblast, specialist-expert. Resides in city of Voronezh.

3. Tyagunov, Vladimir Andreyevich. Born 19 September 1955. "Astra" trade firm, director. Resides in city of Voronezh.

4. Byrdin, Arkadiy Petrovich. Born 1 May 1945. Voronezh State Technical University, docent, chair of applied mathematics. Resides in city of Voronezh.

KALININGRAD OBLAST

1. Nikitin, Vladimir Anatolyevich. Born 27 Octobet 1961. Kaliningrad Oblast College of Barristers, chairman of the presidium. Resides in city of Kaliningrad.

KALUGA OBLAST

1. Maltsev, Yevgeniy Petrovich. Born 5 November 1940. Apparatus of the representative of the RF President in Kaluga Oblast, specialist-expert. Resides in city of Kaluga.

2. Zhilkin, Arkadiy Semenovich. Born 26 February 1938. State Scientific Center for Physical-Energetics Research, senior scientific associate. Resides in city of Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast.

RYAZAN OBLAST

1. Mikhaylov, Yuriy Vladislavovich. Born 20 December 1978. Ispolkom of the Ryazan regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chairman. Resides in city of Ryazan.

2. Novinskiy, Valeriy Mikhaylovich. Born 23 November 1942. Union of Ryazan Entrepreneurs, chairman. Resides in city of Ryazan.

SARATOV OBLAST

1. Yuzhakov, Vladimir Nikolayevich. Born 23 October 1951. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Affairs of the Federation and Regional Policy. Resides in city of Saratov.

2. Sergeyenkov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 28 June 1955. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Economic Policy. Resides in city of Balakov, Saratov Oblast.

3. Zatsepilin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Born 29 November 1948. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in city of Saratov.

4. Golovachev, Vladimir Georgiyevich. Born 19 April 1937. Administration of the President, Representative of the RF President in Saratov Oblast. Resides in city of Saratov.

SVERDLOVSK OBLAST

1. Mishustina, Larisa Pavlovna. Born 25 December 1949. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Affairs of the Federation and Regional Policy. Resides in city of Yekaterinburg.

2. Popov, Vladimir Ivanovich. Born 4 November 1949. Sverdlovsk section of the Historical-Enlightenment and Charity Society "Memorial," executive director. Resides in city of Yekaterinburg.

3. Grebenkin, Anatoliy Viktorovich. Born 5 June 1948. Urals State Universkty, head of chair. Resides in city of Yekaterinburg.

4. Lendenev, Valeriy Sergeyevich. Born 1 August 1945. Individual-private enterprise "Yava-Ltd," section head. Resides in city of Novouralsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

5. Kochnev, Leonid Valterovich. Born 11 September 1949. Insurance company "Fermer-podderzhka," member of the board. Resides in city of Yekaterinburg.

6. Tagiltsev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich. Born 6 February 1948. Production association "Oktyabr," physician. Resides in city of Kamensk-Uralsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

7. Doniy, Vladimir Fedorovich. Born 11 November 1950. AO "BAZ," fitter brigade foreman. Resides in city of Krasnoturinsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

TVERSK OBLAST

1. Semenov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich. Born 18 October 1959. Individual-private enterprise "Kniga-Servis," director. Resides in city of Tver.

2. Rozhkov, Boris Ivanovich. Born 14 September 1948. Association of Farmers, director. Resides in city of Torzhok, Tversk Oblast.

TULA OBLAST

1. Pashchenko, Eduard Aleksandrovich. Born 7 March 1939. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Property, Privatization and Economic Activity. Resides in city of Tula.

2. Matveyev, Nikolay Aleksandrovich. Born 2 January 1949. Apparatus of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, assistant deputy. Resides in city of Tula.

3. **Strekalov, Igor Yuryevich.** Born 20 July 1949. Tula Oblast Committee of the Russian Trade Union of Workers of Medium and Small Business, chairman. Resides in city of Tula.

4. **Butovskiy, Aleksandr Yuryevich.** Born 2 December 1953. Association of Sporting Hand-to-Hand Combat, director. Resides in city of Tula.

CHELYABINSK OBLAST

1. **Zheltikova, Galina Aleksandrovna.** Born 10 February 1954. Chelyabinsk Oblast Committee on Administration of State Property, chairman. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

2. **Belekhov, Igor Leonidovich.** Born 17 September 1960. Chelyabinsk Oblast Property Fund, chairman. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

3. **Vorobyev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich.** Born 27 November 1955. Chelyabinsk Fund Center, general director. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

4. **Golovlev, Vladimir Ivanovich.** Born 11 May 1957. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on Property, Privatization and Economic Activity. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

5. **Volchanov, Vladimir Petrovich.** Born 14 August 1957. Chelyabinsk Oblast Committee on Administration of State Property, deputy chairman. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

6. **Borisov, Lev Dmitriyevich.** Born 3 February 1941. Television and Radio Committee of Chelyabinsk Oblast, television commentator. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

7. **Buyevich, Viktor Antonovich.** Born 19 April 1946. Department of Federal Treasury for Traktorozavodskiy Rayon, city of Chelyabinsk, chief, income section. Resides in city of Chelyabinsk.

CITY OF MOSCOW

1. **Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich.** Born 27 June 1950. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, chairman of the Committee on Defense. Resides in city of Moscow.

2. **Ulyukayev, Aleksey Valentinovich.** Born 23 March 1956. Institute of Economic Problems of the Transitional Period, deputy director. Resides in city of Moscow.

3. **Radzikhovskiy, Leonid Aleksandrovich.** Born 1 November 1953. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of Committee on Information Policy. Resides in city of Moscow.

4. **Medvedkova, Yelena Markovna.** Born 25 March 1950. Ispolkom of the Russian Party of Social Democracy, chairman. Resides in city of Moscow.

5. **Vorontsov, Nikolay Nikolayevich.** Born 1 January 1934. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of the Committee on Education, Culture and Science. Resides in city of Moscow.

6. **Zadonskiy, Georgiy Ivanovich.** Born 31 October 1940. State Duma of the RF Fedreal Assembly, member of the Committee on Property, Privatization and Economic Activity. Resides in Moscow.

7. **Baranova, Lyudmila Mikhaylovna.** Born 24 August 1942. "Lil-house" firm, general director. Resides in Moscow.

8. **Garipov, Nur Mukhametdinovich.** Born 1 October 1937. Ao "Oboronkontrakt," chief bookkeeper. Resides in city of Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

9. **Gerber, Alla Yefremovna.** Born 3 January 1932. State Duma of the RF Fedreal Assembly, member of the Committee on Education, Culture and Science. Resides in Moscow.

10. **Murashev, Arkadiy Nikolayevich.** Born 2 December 1957. State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly, member of the Committee on International Affairs. Resides in Moscow.

11. **Kuznetsov, Vladimir Valeryevich.** Born 24 May 1965. Society on Foreign Tourism "Inturist-Holding Company," secretary of governing board. Resides in Moscow.

12. **Molostov, Venedikt Viktorovich.** Born 9 July 1941. Scientific-production association "Avtomatpriborstroy," section chief. Resides in Moscow.

13. **Bykov, Vladimir Nikolayevich.** Born 28 September 1951. Apparatus of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, section head. Resides in Moscow.

14. **Khokhlov, Aleksandr Grigoryevich.** Born 21 December 1946 Peasant Party of Russia, deputy chairman. Resides in Moscow.

15. **Kotolevskiy, Denis Yevgenyevich.** Born 28 March 1970. Apparatus of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chief specialist. Resides in Moscow.

16. **Filimonov, Anton Petrovich.** Born 18 February 1968. Apparatus of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party, chief specialist. Resides in Moscow.

17. **Shneyder, Mikhail Yakovlevich.** Born 19 September 1948. Moscow mayor's office, advisor to the mayor and to government. Resides in Moscow.

[Signed] Presiding Chairman at Conference A. N. YAKOVLEV
Secretary I. A. KHARICHEV

Regional Activities

KRO's Skokov Visits Primorye Territory

LD0610132895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, Oct 6 (INTERFAX-Eurasia) — Leader of the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] and Chairman of the National Council of the Union of Russian Peoples Yuriy Skokov, in Vladivostok, the Primorye Territory, Friday, called for "Russian society to be made normal and power dependent on the people."

Skokov told an exclusive INTERFAX-Eurasia interview he had come to Vladivostok, his hometown, "for his motherland's blessing for a hard struggle aimed at restoring Russia's might."

"In fact, Russia is dying out, and the authorities do not want to do anything. Privileges, stratification of society and violations of social justice are such as no one has dreamt of," said Skokov.

He described the Congress of Russian Communities as "a party for all spheres of life." According to him, the Congress' ideas are being supported by the Democratic Party of Russia, the Socialist Party of Working People, the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen, the Independent Trade Union of Students, 44 regional branches of the Socialist Trade Union and various movements. "We are open to anyone who cares for Russia," stressed Skokov.

Cossacks To Include Candidates on KRO's List

964F0010F Nalchik GAZETA YUGA in Russian 29 Sep 95 p 1

["Own Information" report: "Yuriy Kalmykov: From the Congress of the Kabardinian People to the Congress of Russian Communities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yuriy Kalmykov, who was a deputy of the Russian Parliament from Shakhray's party, will run at the coming elections to the State Duma on behalf of the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO—Kongress russkikh obshchin]. The federal slate of this social and political movement is headed, as we know, by Yuriy Skokov, Aleksandr Lebed, and Sergey Glazyev. On the brochure distributed by the KRO, Yuriy Kalmykov has obtained No. 13.

The KRO has found support in Kabardino-Balkaria among the Cossacks. It is on its lists that they intend to include their candidates.

Daily Details Yavlinskiy's Campaign in Krasnodar Kray

MK1210080995 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Irina Shkarnikova: "Kuban Residents Meet With Yavlinskiy for the First Time. Sides Come Away Pleased With Each Other"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week, "Yabloko" Duma faction leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy went on his first electoral campaign trip to the Kuban region.

According to preliminary September-early-October data, the Krasnodar Kray electorate, 50 percent of whom are not going to vote at all, will vote as follows: the majority will vote for the Communists, with the Agrarians trailing them, and Zhirinovskiy's party in third position, whereas the NDR ["Russia Is Our Home"] and "Yabloko" will tie for the fourth position.

Those prepared to vote for "Yabloko" are the most efficient people aged between 30 and 50. As a rule, they are state apparatus staffers, heads of privately-owned structures, and specialists in the humanities with learned degrees. This category mainly draws a pay of between 200,000 and 500,000 rubles or more. In Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's words, the electoral platform of the public association led by him is geared precisely to this audience.

Grigoriy Yavlinskiy met as part of the trip with members of the kray administration, Krasnodar journalists and voters; he went to Novorossiysk, the Cossack villages of Severnaya and Mostovaya, and met with the president of Adygeya. Mr. Yavlinskiy also tentatively agreed with the local administration on the possibility of holding a reform in the Kuban region similar to the one in Nizhniy Novgorod. Henceforth, a representative of EPI-tsentr [Economic and Political Research Center], also headed by Yavlinskiy, will work in Krasnodar on a permanent basis to study the distinctive features of the economic situation in the Kuban region.

According to some estimates, "Yabloko's" popularity rating is expected to rise following Mr. Yavlinskiy's visit to Krasnodar Kray because the people of the Kuban saw him for the first time and liked him: Unlike the other candidates, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy is attracting voters by his personality rather than by promises.

Rybkin Registers as One-Mandate Constituency in Voronezh

LD1110123195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1105 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Anatoliy Starukhin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VORONEZH, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin has been registered a candidate standing for parliament from the Anninsk one-mandate constituency in the Voronezh region.

Over 10,000 signatures in his support have been collected by the local electorate. The mandatory number of signatures needed to register a candidate from a one-mandate constituency is 5,000.

DVR's Gaydar Campaigns in Rostov-na-Donu

MK1010064895 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Bezmenov: "Party Life of Russia. Yegor Gaydar Thinks Communists' Victory Realistic and Predicts Failure for LDPR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If it comes to power, the "Russia's Democratic Choice" [DVR] party intends to change radically the [nation's] economic policy. All types of entitlements would be abolished, control over natural monopolies would be strengthened, and state support would be given to military conversion instead of to the oil and gas industry. This was disclosed by party leader Yegor Gaydar to Rostov entrepreneurs on 3 October. The DVR expects to win the elections because its popularity, in Gaydar's words, is steadily climbing.

Yegor Gaydar arrived in Rostov at the invitation of the Don Association of Privatizing and Private Enterprises. He is popular among the intelligentsia, but the local authorities do not support him because Gaydar insists that heads of administrations be elected [rather than appointed].

In his speeches in Rostov, Gaydar came out clearly for limiting the influence on the economy of natural monopolists (rail transport and the power and gas industries) by imposing tough government regulation; in particular, by seeing to it that monopolists' tariffs do not exceed 70 percent of the quarterly base inflation rate. In the opinion of the DVR leader, it is natural monopolies that are the prime cause of the crisis in some sectors of the Russian economy.

Gaydar called granting entitlements to such sectors as the gas and oil sectors a mistake. Priorities should be changed to favor primarily those sectors of the military conversion industry that have entered world markets. They are aircraft-construction (production of transport planes), shipbuilding (output of civilian vessels), and the production of equipment for the oil-and-gas and manufacturing sectors and for communications.

Gaydar thinks that government support should be extended to exporters, all exporters to an equal degree. Protectionism is simply essential to ensure easier access for Russian commodities to world markets. Therefore, Gaydar proposes to create a system of export credits. The distribution of resources intended as investments should be done on a competitive basis. Gaydar regards as unacceptable a situation where resources are provided "according to the principle of personal relationships." The DVR will try to see to it that the majority of capital investments in the economy are on a competitive basis next year.

Gaydar's party cannot hope to win the sympathies of the peasants: the DVR says it advocates private ownership of land. Gaydar named support to small agricultural-processing businesses and the formation of market infrastructure as priorities in the party's agricultural policy.

In the DVR leader's mind, a victory for the communists in the upcoming elections is rather realistic, whereas failure awaits the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]. But whoever wins, a new State Duma should drop the principle of deputy immunity; otherwise, Gaydar stated to exclamations of approval from those gathered, the Duma will turn into a club of criminals hiding from jusuce.

Lebed Campaigns in Vladivostok, Criticizes Bureaucrats

LD0610132195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, Oct 6 (INTERFAX-Eurasia) — Aleksandr Lebed, ex-commander of the Russian 14th Army and a leader of the Congress of Russian Communities, thinks that "a handful of bureaucrats have absolute power in Russia. They have formed state-apparatchik capitalism for themselves at a time the overwhelming majority of Russians are living a miserable life."

Lebed came to Vladivostok Friday [6 October] as part of his election campaign.

The ex-army commander sharply criticized the activities of the Russian federal government in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX-Eurasia. "These authorities have led us to Chechnya, where we were stuck wasting plenty of money at the expense of other Russian regions," he said.

According to Lebed, he likes the Congress of Russian Communities for its members' ability "to give a kick to the rotten wash-tub of power."

Derzhava's Tula Party Head Accused of Extortion

964F0019A Irkutsk SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 1

[RIA report: "The Biter Bit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tula Oblast Internal Affairs Administration has sent Aleksandr Rutskoy, leader of the Derzhava social-patriotic movement, notification that Nikolay Novikov, leader of the Tula Revival of the Fatherland party, who is running on the Derzhava party slate in State Duma elections, has been charged under Article 5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation of, inter alia, extortion and a person's illegal imprisonment. His case will be heard very shortly in the court of Tsentralny Rayon of the city of Tula, an RIA correspondent was told by Press Department of the Tula Oblast Internal Affairs Administration.

Forecasts & Commentary

Daily Views National-Patriot Parties' Chances

964F0030B Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Lyudmila Aleksandrova: "From Zhirinovskiy to Limonov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Quite a few parties and associations, among whom a critical competitive fight will inevitably unfold, will lay claim to the electorate of national-patriots during the current pre-election campaign. While in 1993 national-patriots were actually represented by one force—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], now several associations will compete simultaneously for this part of the potential electorate, which is estimated by specialists to be 15-20 percent of all voters.

Schematically, all of those who advocate a national-patriotic and power-state ideology for the organization of Russia can be divided into three groups: left-wing, right-wing, and right-wing extremists. At times the border between these groups can be drawn rather conditionally. Those who can be named among the left-wing national-patriots (that is, those who combine power and national ideas with elements of socialist ideology and nostalgia for the past) are the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] of Yuriy Skokov and Aleksandr Lebed, the electoral association Power to the People!, which was headed by Sergey Baburin, the leader of ROS [Russian All-People's Union], Nikolay Ryzhkov, the former Union prime minister, and Stanislav Terekhov, leader of the Union of Officers, and also what is left of the once-threatening National Salvation Front, which at present intends to go into the elections independently. All of these blocs plan to participate in the elections. Only the KRO, which united with the Socialist Workers' Party and a part of the Democratic Party of Russia, has real chances, perhaps, of overcoming the 5-percent barrier. At present the KRO looks like a potential ally in the Duma of the Communists and agrarians and is the main competitor in the elections for the LDPR and the State Power [Derzhava] Party of Aleksandr Rutskoy.

To put it bluntly, the LDPR and the State Power social-patriotic movement fall in the category of the right-wing national patriots and anticommunists. Aleksandr Rutskoy, the former vice president, places particular stress on anticommunism in his propaganda. As for the LDPR, no one expresses any doubts that the Zhirinovskiy followers will not get into parliament. A majority of the experts, it is true, suppose that Zhirinovskiy's party this time will receive considerably fewer votes than in 1993, including because of the presence of competitors in the national-patriotic camp. The fate of State Power is in greater doubt: Many analysts think that Rutskoy's movement, nevertheless, will not succeed in overcoming the 5-percent barrier. Aleksandr Sterligov's Russian National Council [Russkiy natsionalnyy sobor] can be more readily considered right-wing; however, it is not clear yet in what form it will participate in the elections.

To a certain extent, the national-patriotic orientation is characteristic of Boris Fedorov's Forward, Russia! movement, which belongs to the democratic camp and which also inevitably will draw part of the votes from other national-patriots.

Finally, there is a group of extremist parties and organizations of a national-patriotic orientation that is not very large in number, but that is very active. Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity [Russkoye natsionalnoye yedintsvo] can be named among those that are most important. The experts do not rule out that the Barkashov followers will be able to carry several of their candidates in single mandate districts. This also applies to Nikolay Lysenko's National-Republican Party, which announced its intentions to go into the elections independently. Apparently none of the other national-extremist organizations can aspire to a seat in the Duma—unless writer Eduard Limonov will risk proposing his candidacy in some district.

Thus, the main campaign for voters who share patriotic-great power ideas will go on between the LDPR, KRO, State Power, Power to the People!, and the Forward, Russia! movement. However, if all of these organizations carry deputies into parliament, this will not at all mean that a firm national-patriotic majority can take shape in parliament. Obviously neither the KRO, nor State Power will form a bloc with the LDPR, especially with Boris Fedorov, and it is unlikely that there will be harmony among them.

PRAVDA Views Status of Election Campaigning

*MM1110155995 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Oct 95 p 1*

[Report by Boris Slavin and Valentina Nikiforova under the "Political Diary" rubric: "Astride What Horse Do They Want To Enter the Duma?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election race continues for the various parties, movements, and associations which want to get into the Russian legislature at any price. Semilegal methods are being put into operation with increasing frequency, with the mass media being used by politicians to discredit each other. You continually get the feeling that the well-known program "Face to Face" is smearing all its participants. Only the presenter remains, as they say, "untainted."

The candidate deputies themselves also do not refrain from slinging mud at each other. What about, for example, B. Fedorov's constant accusations of lying against V. Shcherbakov. Or Zhirinovskiy's deliberately misinforming viewers by suddenly announcing that the famous microsurgeon S. Fedorov had almost misappropriated $17 million, which were actually spent on the construction of a state hospital. And how should we interpret the public row between A. Nevzorov and G. Yakunin over the "plastic plates which were swiped from the Duma snack bar."

At the same time the electoral associations want to acquire a positive image for themselves. Recently, "Russia Is Our Home" came out with an initiative to hold a referendum in support of the press and called on other parties and movements to join in. You might think that the press is leaving this movement and its leader alone. But he recently denied rumors about his alleged differences with the president. At the same time, he said nothing about his clear rival Yu. Skokov, who, in the opinion of people in the know, is being encouraged by the president — possibly as a defense against his excessively energetic premier. For all this, he did in his time control 22 percent of the world's gas extraction.

In spite of the fact that S. Shakhray has quit V. Chernomyrdin's "Home," he is continuing to try to stymie the land referendum in concert with his former boss. IZVESTIYA recently gave away their secret when it wrote that "to be a landowner without the right to pledge your land as security and sell it is the same as being half-pregnant." The Agrarians' leader, M. Lapshin, states in reply to this: "Agriculture in many countries flourishes without the purchase and sale of land." For our own part we must add that the freedom to buy and sell land will give rise in Russia to new superrich land barons and poverty-stricken farm-laborers. This is the best-case scenario, but if the worst comes to the worst, this "land seizure" will end in bloody warfare.

At the same time as the "party of power" is trying through the elections to strengthen its own power, the opposition is working calmly to ensure that the authorities' destructive policies end on 17 December. As we know, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has already collected its signatures and been registered as an electoral association.

The People's Salvation Front's fight with the Central Electoral Commission has ended in success for it, and, in accordance with a Supreme Court decision, it has also set about collecting signatures.

Experience of the collection of signatures shows that the Russians cannot sustain 70 electoral associations. It is becoming ever more clear that 10-15 associations will reach the finish line. This is, of course, no small number. The voter should consider well for whom he will cast his vote.

Daily Analyzes Implications of Caspian Oil Route Decision

MK1210084495 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Oct 95 pp 1, 4

[Analysis by Georgiy Bovt: "In Politics, a Draw Often Means Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This most intricate geopolitical game has been going on for more than just a month. It is called "Caspian oil." In this game the greater part of the struggles occur behind the scenes, while the disagreements between the strong players are so deep that a decisive role in defining the winner can be played by weaker parties. There are many chances and coincidences in this game, but the stakes are so high that it is almost impossible to believe in the accidental nature of some coincidences. Yesterday the first half ended: The Azerbaijan International Working [Operatsionnyy] Committee (AIWC) defined the export routes for early oil. Until the very last moment the efforts of the main players seemed to be aimed at maintaining the utmost intensity of intrigue. But the logic of struggles, where it is often difficult even to understand who is on whose side, suggested that there is no way this can be done without a compromise, while at this stage no one will gain a decisive edge. So it was decided that the early oil, expected to start flowing in late 1996 in the amount of 75,000 barrels a day, will be exported via Russia and Georgia.

The struggles around the export routes for early Caspian oil have been going on for a long time. Its decisive phase coincided with Moscow's beginning its pressure on the Dudayev regime in Chechnya by force of arms and the attempt to bring the so-called opposition to power, which led to war. This coincidence pointed to some far-reaching conclusions: The aspiration to pacify Chechnya is dictated by the wish to prove the reliability and safety of the Russian route for exporting oil from Azerbaijan (via Budennovsk-Groznyy). True, all lofty statesmen and humble civil servants who were in any way involved in these events denied, as though in collusion, both in their public statements and in private, the existence of such a cynical link between the war and oil. The impression most of the time was that these people were not acting against their conscience: The reckless military adventure of December 1994 in Chechnya was an improvisation, not a well-thought-out plan. Everything was tragically simple: Not enough thought was put into it, although perhaps deep in the state subconscious lurked the word combination "Azerbaijan oil." This is from the subjective vantage point of those involved in the decisionmaking process. Objectively, however, the Chechen war and Caspian oil were linked very closely just the same.

The war continued for half a year. At some point there was even a threat of Russia's international isolation looming on the horizon. Of course, at the time there could be no serious talk about any oil route via Russia, despite all the arguments by Moscow — both economic (The requisite modernization of the existing oil line via Budennovsk-Groznyy would be cheap — $25-50 million, according to various estimates — while the Georgian route would require at least five times as much), and political (Moscow, via its Foreign Ministry, sought to make a trump card out of the issue of the Caspian's legal status in contradiction to the idea of dividing its shelf into national sectors). True, the alternative option — via an unstable Georgia — did not look particularly attractive to those wishing to eliminate Russia's control over the oil spigot: The agreement on creating Russian military bases in Georgia had already been signed by that time. Two other theoretical options were dropped quite quickly: Armenia was not good enough because it was fighting Azerbaijan and neither was Iran because it was in a state of diplomatic war with the West, primarily the United States, which has already proclaimed the Caspian a zone of its vital interests.

The AIWC was to have made a decision about the oil export route in early summer. It did not. The decision was postponed first until August and then until 9 October. All this time Turkey, hoping for receipts from oil transit fees, as well as for purely geopolitical dividends — reorientation of regional energy exports routes from Russia — was actively "working" on the Georgian option. And here is why: The Georgian oil pipeline (for the time being oil will go to Batumi, from whence it will be carried by tankers) is expected to be continued to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the main oil export route will be defined. A series of negotiations took place, including with Georgia. Eduard Shevardnadze at times said that he supported the Western, i.e., Georgian route, and at others (addressing Moscow) sought to calm the northern neighbor, indicating that he would not like to fall out with Russia over oil.

Meanwhile, Russia was actively "working" on the northern, i.e., Chechen, option. A major role in contacts with Azerbaijan was played by the Lukoil company, which has been gaining increasingly tangible positions both in the republic's economy as a whole and in its oil projects (Lukoil's share in the Caspian consortium was increased, and the company had its way in a number of other oil projects). The Russian Foreign Ministry meanwhile attacked Baku over the issue of the sea's/lake's legal status, but had no particular success stories to its credit in this endeavor, because it failed to enlist the support of other Caspian states: They did not at all like Moscow's idea to "do everything together" — although one initiative by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which entered sharp (and mainly behind the scenes) polemics with the Fuel and Energy Ministry and Lukoil (criticizing them for "abetting" Azerbaijan in undermining Russia's national interests in dividing the Caspian into sectors), nonetheless was in some respect translated into life. And also in connection with Chechnya. It is known for a fact that approximately a year ago Andrey Kozyrev proposed to Viktor Chernomyrdin (in spite of the premier's well-known friendliness toward the fuel and energy complex) to impose some sort of economic sanctions against Azerbaijan. And it so happened that these sanctions were in effect imposed: In the interest of preventing infiltration of weapons and other assistance to Dudayev in Chechnya, the borders between Russia and Azerbaijan were closed and transport communications sharply reduced. They are still closed at present. It is hard to overestimate the damage it has caused Azerbaijan, whose infrastructure is oriented toward Russia.

Now, on the threshold of the AIWC decision, Moscow has presented a new case in favor of its export route. A halving of tariff rates for the transit of early oil via Russian territory has been announced. In response Tbilisi said that it is ready to lift almost all transit charges. Then Moscow threw yet another trump on the table: Last week Yeltsin issued the edict "On Measures To Develop Oil Complex Enterprises in the Chechen Republic." Some observers see the main substance of the edict in that the Chechen oil producers will be granted exemptions on the export of Chechen oil at the expense of the Russian budget. This, however, does not exhaust the edict's substance: Its broader significance is that an attempt is now being made to come to terms with those "interests" that stand behind Chechnya's oil and its oil complex, with which it proved impossible to agree in 1994.

Politically, the "neither peace nor war" situation in Chechnya today is somewhat reminiscent of Georgia, torn apart by criminal structures. Moreover, toward fall the Abkhaz issue was exacerbated in Georgia. On one hand, in September Moscow decisively supported (probably for the first time so decisively) Shevardnadze in his struggles against Abkhaz separatism, but on the other, it did not resort to any direct military assistance to Tbilisi against Sukhumi (as was hinted at by many). The sore spot remains. Another seat of tension is smoldering — in Karabakh. Earlier Baku indicated more than once that the "Karabakh card" has often been played by Moscow as a means to pressure Azerbaijan. And then recently there was the attempt on Shevardnadze's life. Again rumors about the "hand of Moscow" emerged — especially given that, after recovering from the assassination attempt and purges of his own state apparat, the Georgian leader stated: His country is not against the idea of exporting early oil from Azerbaijan either via Georgia or via Russia. [sentence as published] Mamradze, chief of staff of the Georgian head of state, added: "If you take a realistic view, it is clear that without taking Russia's interests into account, the oil export problem cannot be solved." Of course, everyone denies the link between Caspian oil and the attack on Shevardnadze — and these denials sound quite convincing. But it was in the context of such rumors that the "realists," mentioned by Mamradze, pondered the decisions announced yesterday, just as they did in the context of the reemerging threat of a destabilized Chechnya following the attack on General Romanov (yet another coincidence?).

Meanwhile, the real past masters of realism are the Americans. They have also understood that there is no way Russia can be easily crowded off the field of this geopolitical game. On 2 October Bill Clinton himself phoned Geydar Aliyev to give him a friendly piece of advice: It would be a good idea to approve two routes: both western and eastern. The point is not only to please Russia but also, in line with American pragmatism, not to put all eggs in one basket. It is better to have two non-ideal routes than one. What matters to Washington is that the route does not pass through Iran. And following Clinton's advice, two days later Baku organized a leak through the TURAN news agency. According to anonymous government sources, the northern and western routes appear almost equal from the point of view of economic effectiveness. In terms of profit volume, assuming a 10-percent discount ($430 million on the northern route and $400 million on the western route), the volume of capital inputs and operating costs, the venture capital and the volume of net profit, the Russian option is preferable to Azerbaijan. The main advantage of the northern route is admittedly the technical possibility of increasing the pipelines' carrying capacity to 17 million tonnes a year, while all capital inputs and operating costs will be incurred by Russia on its territory on its own account. Moreover, Moscow will, in all likelihood, sharply ease the pressure on Baku over the issue of the Caspian's legal status. The main shortfalls of the Russian route are the limited carrying capacity of the Bosphorus (through which oil will go from Novorossiysk) and the fact that superior Azerbaijani oil will be mixed with Western Siberian and other grades of oil. Furthermore, Baku is strongly discouraged by political factors involved in the Russian option: Turkey's jealousy, instability in Chechnya, and the general post-Soviet syndrome of mistrust in the Kremlin.

As for the Western, Georgian option, the maximum carrying capacity there can be increased to 7 million tonnes. One obvious advantage is the absence in Georgia of any customs duties or tariffs for transit; in this case Azerbaijani crude oil will go to the world market without being mixed with other grades, and Turkish support will be guaranteed, including in project financing. But here developers are in for far higher capital inputs and, moreover, Georgia is not politically stable enough, what with Abkhazia and the mafia. According to sources in the Azerbaijan Government, it is believed that the northern route has 13 advantages and nine shortfalls, while the western route has 11 and 11 respectively.

Under these conditions, Moscow decided to reserve the right for a final talk with Geydar Aliyev. At the end of last week Deputy Premier Aleksey Bolshakov was sent to Baku. His negotiations with the Azerbaijani president were confidential. But something about Bolshakov's mission is known, however; for instance, that he brought a personal message from Viktor Chernomyrdin. It is known that the whole complex of bilateral relations was considered at the negotiations in linkage with oil transit matters. Apart from oil itself, Aliyev's trumps were as follows. Moscow has long, and so far unsuccessfully, been seeking the right to use the Gabalinskaya radar station, one of the largest in the former USSR, which is assigned the most important strategic role on the southern flank of Russia and the CIS. When he was coming to power, Aliyev promised Moscow to unfreeze the radar. But then for some reason he forgot about his promise. He also forgot about the promise to close the border with Iran jointly with Russian border guards. Russia does not believe in the non-transparency of the CIS southern borders, guarded at this section only by the Azerbaijanis. However, it believes in the potency of an argument such as transport links between Russia and Azerbaijan. It is naive to suppose that Bolshakov would discuss the question of opening the Russian-Azerbaijani border or the resumption of transport links without concessions from Baku over oil exports. The importance of this subtext in the negotiations was emphasized by the personal presence in the Bolshakov team of Lukoil head Vagit Alekperov (who opened a Lukoil filling station in Baku) and Ivan Chernov, director of Rosneft (it will handle transportation of oil via Russia). There is also reason to believe that Aleksey Bolshakov gave Geydar Aliyev some guarantees that the Karabakh factor will not be used against Azerbaijan.

The AIWC's dual decision about the Russian and Georgian transit routes is of an interim character. Now the main struggles will focus on the route of the main export pipeline. So far the signs are that the Georgian oil pipeline will be extended to Turkey, which hopes as a result to get the lion's share of receipts from charges for the main transit route — in the volume of 700,000 barrels a day by the year 2010. However, it would be wrong to believe that Russia has already accepted its defeat, and the reorientation of the whole regional system of energy transportation from Russia to Turkey would be a defeat pure and simple. It is hard to surmise exactly which levers of influence will be the most effective in this struggle and which regional allies can be counted on to bring about successful results. True, with such a complicated lineup of forces it could again be the case that no one will be able to achieve a decisive edge. But in politics a draw often is closer to victory than to defeat.

Baltic Border Guard Commanders Sign 1996 Cooperation Plan

LD1110150195 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The commanders of the border guard forces of the Baltic states signed a cooperation plan for 1996 in Vilnius yesterday. According to the plan, joint training for officers of the staff of the Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian border guard forces will be organized at the beginning of next year. The aim of the training is to draft cooperation principles for search and rescue operations and emergency situations on the border. It is planned that prior training of this kind will be held in each country with the participation of observers from other Baltic states.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 12 Oct

LD1210070595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0650 GMT 12 Oct 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — IZVESTIYA on the situation in Chechnya.

The newspaper runs an article headlined "Groznyy in suspense". "Everything seems to indicate that the war in Chechnya enters a new stage. Hopes for a peaceful settlement are minimal. The Dudayev men have considerably consolidated their positions and obviously do not intend to surrender," the article says.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that at a time when the Chechen side has suspended its participation in the peace talks and reports from Chechnya again resemble those that usually come in from the frontline, "the Kremlin's indistinct statements look more than strange. One has the impression that the aggravation of the situation has caught the country's top leaders unawares and that they do not know what to do".

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on local self-government.

An article to this effect deals with the problems of the formation of local self-government and the discussion of the matter at the first meeting of the Local Self-Government Council, a consultative body to the Russian President.

"The essence of the law on local self-government is in a redistribution of power. This is what the difficulties in its enactment in practice are accounted for. But nevertheless participants in the discussion view this Law as a guarantee of the transformation of Russia."

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA runs an interview with State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, leader of the centre-left bloc. He regards the revival of the system of local self-government as the key matter for Russia.

"Without strong, independent regions, there would be neither a strong central authority nor a strong united Russia. It is essential to give maximum independence to the regions. At the same time the Federal centre should be preoccupied with the pursuance of a common policy for the entire state," Rybkin told the newspaper's political news analyst.

In response to questions about the electoral association headed by him, Rybkin expressed confidence that the bloc will succeed in overcoming the five-percent barrier, and shared his plans to set up his own party in the future "to represent and uphold the rights of the workingman".

IZVESTIYA on Patriarch Alexy's addressing the Orthodox draftees.

The newspaper frontpages an article by Yuri Feofanov who views the remarks by Patriarch Aleksey II of Moscow and all Russia before the Orthodox draftees as a questionable step. Referring to the Christian principle "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's", the writer of the article points out that in this case, in the current political situation the Church blesses and sanctifies by its authority the not indisputable actions of the powers-that-be.

The newspaper is of the opinion that by complying with such social requests the Church, which throughout the years has been a certain pure symbol to society, can only lower its authority.

IZVESTIYA on the Federal crime-fighting programme.

An article by Vasily Kononenko reviews the implementation of the Federal crime-figthing programme which was adopted by a Presidential decree in 1994.

On the strength of data provided by the Security Council, the Finance Ministry and the Federal Security Service, the writer of the article concludes as follows: "A lion's share of funds assigned for the Programme was used for the war in Chechnya.

"Our lack of protection remains a budget item financed on the residual principle. Everyone must know that it is futile to seek protection from the State," Kononenko writes.

IZVESTIYA on international consortium's dual route decision for the transporation of oil.

On the strength of Western and Turkish press reports, Elmar Guseynov questions "a triumph of Russian diplomacy", which some national media have hurried to announce in view of the international oil consortium's decision to pump Azerbaijan's early oil along two routes — across Russian territory and through Georgia.

However, the newspaper carries an article by Sergey Leskov who takes a different view on the situation. He expressed confidence that it is precisely Russia which continues to play the leading role in the Caspian oil transportation issue. However, in a keen competition, Russia is yet to prove that it can work effectively and is capable of upholding its political and economic interests.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries a letter by the detained air pilots from Khandahar where the Talibes keep the crew of a Russian transportation plane. The letter asserts that the flight from the beginning to end was legitimate and the downing incident was act of aerial terrorism pure and simple. "However, Russia has not up to now made an official evaluation of the seizure of a Russian civilian plane and did not even give a reply to the demands put forward by the Taleban leadership," the letter says.

A comment by a Foreign Ministry spokesman in point of fact confirms everything that the pilots write about. "Do we have nothing left but envy the Americans when their country rises up in defence of everyone of them?" asks the writer of the article, Yelena Ovcharenko.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 1996 defence budget.

The newspaper frontpages the article to this effect under the headline "The 1996 budget plan does not meet the requirements of the defence sector. To adopt it is to push the army into an abyss".

"A decisive stage for the future of the Russian army begins — a struggle for a real defence budget for 1996. Should the efforts fail, the need to form a defence budget for 1997 in unlikely to arise. Why maintain an army which has lost the ability to defend the country," the writer of the article maintains.

Reportage on Foreign Minister Kozyrev's Helsinki Trip

Cited on Bosnian Cease-Fire, Gas Supplies

LD1110213395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2107 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov, Vladimir Mostovets]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] HELSINKI, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Wednesday [11 October] reaffirmed Russia's commitment to promote Bosnian ceasefire as the major step to regional settlement. Speaking to reporters upon completion of his Helsinki visit, Kozyrev said:

"Russia will keep making all possible effort to convince warring parties to the Bosnian conflict to cease fire and thus pave the way for the process of negotiations. I am convinced that a truce is a step of extreme importance which can mark the beginning of the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia."

Bosnian Serbs were prepared to sign a ceasefire long ago, Kozyrev said. But the Moslem government has started setting new conditions, including a demand for Russian gas supplies to Sarajevo. The Russian minister continued:

"We had informed the Bosnian government on our preparedness to provide gas, but Sarajevo experts reached Moscow late on October 9, just before the ceasefire which was scheduled for October 10. They (said they) were prepared to talk with Russian experts only a day later.

"Even this incident alone cannot but raise questions. The situation looked paradoxical. We are going to supply gas to Sarajevo free of charge and we have to insist that the talks are not postponed and conducted at night. It is the Russian side which works to ensure that Russian gas reached Sarajevo as soon as possible and which immediately fulfills its obligations."

Now, gas is coming to Sarajevo but the signing of ceasefire is being postponed under various pretexts, Kozyrev remarked. "But I still hope that this situation does not result from the political course of the Bosnian government but is related to technical problems and that all warring sides will shortly cease fire thus paving the way for the ultimate settlement to the conflict," he said.

Touching upon prospects for Russia's involvement in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Kozyrev said that "Russia has given a broad hint that it is interested in a successful peacekeeping mission at the Balkans after a ceasefire agreement is achieved.

"Russia is prepared to make its specific contribution to peacekeeping operations if these are conducted in a balanced manner, not by NATO and not under NATO's guidance. The North-Atlantic Alliance does not include many countries — not only Russia, but also neutral European states. I can hardly imagine them agreeing that their servicemen appeared to be under command of NATO — a military alliance of which they are not members. It is important that we reach mutual political understanding on this issue with the United States and other countries."

The Russian minister said that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton had already exchanged opinions on this problem. The topic was also discussed during Kozyrev's recent visit to Washington. In Kozyrev's words, both President Clinton and State Secretary Warren Christopher agree that peacekeeping operations should be held in cooperation.

"But this political understanding should be transferred to a practical military dimension. One needs to define how troops will be commanded and what troops and where will be deployed," the minister said.

In this connection, Kozyrev stressed the importance of a Geneva meeting between Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and his U.S. counterpart William Perry. "It is contacts between the military which will produce a formula which will be acceptable for all," he said in conclusion.

Cited on NATO, Bosnia While in Finland

LD1110135795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1215 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Yuriy Kozlov and Vladimir Mostovets]

[FBIS Translated Text] Helsinki, 11 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev started a one-day working visit to Finland today with a meeting with Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. The agenda for the Russo-Finnish talks includes bilateral relations and problems of European security.

Russia and Finland have longstanding strong ties as neighbors, Andrey Kozyrev told ITAR-TASS before the talks started. He said: "Our countries have very good political relations. We are cooperating closely in regional organizations like the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Council and the Council of Baltic Sea states."

The minister said that Moscow and Helsinki have similar approaches to the building of a new model of European security. He did not rule out the possibility that apart from discussing problems of this nature the bilateral talks may also touch on issues linked to the non-expansion of NATO.

Speaking about Russia's attitude to the possibility of Russia taking part in the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia under NATO command, Kozyrev said that the Russian side rejects the opportunity to settle the conflict only under NATO command. Moscow insists that "joint, collective peace-keeping forces" should be set up and is prepared to make a significant contribution to the planning and carrying out of joint peace-keeping operations.

During his visit Kozyrev is also expected to meet with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen.

Russia To Participate in Peacekeeper-95 Exercise

LD1210095695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0851 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Anatoly Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — In a change of policy, Russia has finally announced that it will participate in Peacekeeper-95 exercise on U.S. territory at the end of this month.

"Russia will take part in joint Russian-U.S. command post peacekeeping exercises on U.S. territory," a spokesman at the Office of the Russian Defence Minister told ITAR-TASS on Thursday.

The Peacekeeper-95 exercises, which are to take place at Fort Riley, Kansas, on October 16-31, will involve 300 servicemen from each side. The objectives and tasks of the exercises will be similar to last year's ones that were held at Totsk near Orenburg: joint patrolling of terrain, the pitching up of "refugee camps" and guarding deliveries of humanitarian aid.

Previously, Russia contemplated cancelling its participation in the exercises over the complicated situation in Bosnia and NATO air strikes in the region.

Making the Peacekeeper exercises regular is called upon to become a basis for future jointly-conducted U.S.-Russian peacekeeping operations.

Talks on Gas Supplies to Sarajevo Continue in Moscow

LD1110141095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1400 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Igor Ivantsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Talks on the terms of a contract for the delivery of Russian gas to Sarajevo were continued here today. Their participants are discussing the volume of gas deliveries, time limits for them and the form of payment, Yuriy Zaytsev, Acting Director-General of Gazexport, told TASS today. Gazexport represents the Russian side at the talks, in which representatives of the Serb and Bosnian sides are taking part. The talks began on Tuesday, after commitments on the transit of Russian gas across their territory had been signed by all the parties concerned at Gazprom on Monday.

According to Zaytsev, many routine problems, connected with the filling of documents on future gas deliveries and forms of payment for previous ones, remain to be resolved at the talks. The Bosnian and Serb sides agreed with a total sum of their debt for Russian gas deliveries. It has reached 100.8 million dollars since the beginning of 1991. Now the sides should decide what share of the debt goes to each of them and work out ways of repaying it.

"At present the condition of the gas pipeline, by which Russian gas will be transported to Sarajevo, makes it possible to fully meet the demand for it," Zaytsev said. "We hope to deliver some 300 million cubic metres before the end of the year."

Last year Russian gas deliveries amounted to 390 million cubic metres. Starting from January 1995, until the suspension of gas deliveries in August, Sarajevo received 180 million cubic metres of gas.

The talks are expected to last throughout this week.

Karasin: Russia Welcomes Bosnian Cease-fire

LD1210101395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0950 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Viktor Khrekov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — "Russia welcomes the reached agreements that the ceasefire between the warring parties in Bosnia goes into effect", Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told TASS Thursday adding that it "gives a possibility to progress along the path of the peaceful process" in Bosnia.

He stressed that "it was important that the (Bosnian) parties finally showed realism and managed to refrain from attempts to achieve a military victory".

"The most important thing at present is to observe the reached agreements. The chance should not be lost", the spokesman stressed.

"We count that the upcoming Moscow meeting of the Contact Group will give a new impetus to the (peaceful) process, will allow to reach concrete agreements on joint work and, in particular, on holding an international peace conference", Karasin said.

He added that the ceasefire agreement "was the result of efforts of the Contact Group, of the international community for the sake of a peaceful settlement of the crisis".

Yeltsin's Envoy Hopes Cease-Fire Will Be Observed

LD1110181195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1638 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian presidential envoy to the former Yugoslavia said Russia will work to ensure that the Bosnian ceasefire is finally observed on Thursday [12 October].

"Russia counts that the new ceasefire term will be observed", Aleksandr Zotov told TASS Wednesday commenting on the second postponement of the deadline.

"The Russian side, naturally, is using its international weigth and capabilities so that the participants in the conflict fix the reached agreements and observe them. The Russian persistence and exactingness in the issue is well-known", he stressed.

However, Zotov admitted that numerous ceasefires in Bosnia have been reached during the conflict and ignored. "In practice it never happens that such a crisis results in an agreement which is immediately and strictly observed", he said and added: "Evidently, all the conflicting parties are interested in improving their affairs at this last stretch. Moslims and Croats are especially active in that", he stressed.

Commenting on the resignation of UN envoy Yasushi Akashi, Zotov said that the Japanese international mediator is "a diplomat of top skills and with immense experience".

"I believe he had done everything he could and even more than any other international official could have done", Zotov said.

However, he admitted that certain countries may have a different opinion on Akashi's activities. "There is some hidden motive and certain countries with influence in the organisation (the UN Secretariat) can have their own points of view on certain aspects of his activities", Zotov said.

Moscow Seen Having Its Say in Bosnian Peace Process

MK1110142295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 1

[Report by Andrey Smirnov: "The Russian Factor in the Balkans Is the 'Gazprom' Joint-Stock Company"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnian cease-fire, scheduled for Tuesday [10 October] morning, has been postponed by a day — for a reason far from political or military. Russian gas simply did not make it to Sarajevo at the designated time (by midnight of 10 October). Gas supplies to the Bosnian capital, on which the Muslim side predicated the cease-fire, will apparently be resumed in the very near future. Yesterday, Gazprom officials at the negotiations with the Bosnian delegation managed to remove the last technical obstacles in their way. In the present conditions, such a prosaic thing as the provision of light and heat to Sarajevo is becoming almost the main trump for Moscow in the diplomatic game called a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

The difficulties with gas supplies to the Muslim-controlled part of Bosnia consist in the fact that the gas trunk line passes through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb Republic. The Serbs, on a meager energy diet due to international economic sanctions, have constantly "borrowed" part of the gas designed for Bosnian Muslim areas. In August, on UN demand, Hungary shut off the gas pipeline on the border with Serbia. This move followed a protest by the Bosnian Government, which said that no gas had been delivered to Sarajevo since May through the fault of the Serbs. Yet, the threat that on the threshold of winter the capital would be left without heat forced the Muslim authorities to change their position.

Allegations that, by making the cease-fire conditional on the resumption of gas supplies, the Muslims only sought to drag out the negotiations, hoping to rout the Serbs, weakened by NATO air strikes, are groundless. Supplying energy to Sarajevo is vital for the Bosnian Government, which was confirmed by the recent visit to Moscow of Bosnian Premier Haris Silajdzic. Relations with Russia have not been a priority for Muslim leaders, orienting their policies exclusively toward the West, primarily the United States — especially given that Russia, although with some reservations, can be regarded as the Serbs' ally. As is known, in August Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic ignored Boris Yeltsin's invitation to come to Moscow for negotiations with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Now the situation has changed noticeably. Russia finally found itself in a position to have its say in the Bosnian peace process. So it did. Yesterday, at approximately 0300, the valve on the Hungarian-Serb border was opened. This was preceded by strained negotiations between Gazprom and a Bosnian delegation that had arrived in Moscow hours before the announced cease-fire was to take effect. This, sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry believe, is actually the reason for the decision to postpone the cease-fire. According to a spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Croatia, the attempts by the Bosnian Government to hold Moscow responsible for delaying the cease-fire are inconsistent. According to him, the Russian side has issued no guarantees that the gas will start coming to Sarajevo on 10 October.

Be that as it may, the question of resuming gas supplies was certainly used by Moscow to strengthen its role in the Balkan settlement. Yesterday's statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on the agreement between Gazprom and the Bosnian Government notes that this is the way Boris Yeltsin's initiative on an immediate cease-fire in Bosnia is being implemented. Such remarks are difficult to assess other than as an attempt to play down the role of the United States, whose efforts were the main factor contributing to the cease-fire. According to UN officials in Bosnia, yesterday the conflicting sides agreed that the cease-fire would enter into force at midnight on 11 October. It remains to be hoped that this time it will not be disrupted by new political maneuvers by some parties to the Balkan drama.

Yugoslav Deputy Premier Meets With Presidential Aide

LD1110192995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 11 October (TANJUG) — Jovan Zebic, Yugoslav deputy prime minister, and Nikolay Yegorov, presidential aide of the Russian Federation, had talks in Moscow today on a large number of questions in the field of Yugoslav-Russian relations and they devoted special attention to the development of economic cooperation.

Zebic had talks today in the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and in the Foreign Trade Bank, which the government has authorized to conduct foreign currency transactions and establish international debts owed to Russia and by Russia to others.

In the talks, consideration was given to the question of cooperation between Yugoslav and Russian banks, and especially to the way in which the Russian side might help represent Yugoslav interests in the IMF and the World Bank.

Special attention in the talks was devoted to finding ways of resolving the issue of Russia's debt to Yugoslavia.

Deputy Prime Minister Zebic is in Moscow for the opening of a Yugoslav trade exhibition.

Karasin Praises UN Envoys to Former Yugoslavia

LD1210125695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1141 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia today praised Japanese diplomat Yasushi Akashi's activity as a special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General to the former Yugoslavia. A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS that Akashi did much to ensure that "political and not forcible methods were used to settle the crisis in the former Yugoslavia."

The spokesman, Grigoriy Karasin, expressed the hope the Yasushi Akashi "will continue to make useful contributions to the U.N. activity in his new capacity."

As reported earlier, the U.N. Secretary-General told the Security Council a few days ago that the Japanese diplomat has been transferred to the office of a senior adviser to Butrus Butrus-Ghali in response to his personal request. Kofi Annan (Ghana) was appointed to replace Akashi, pending the endorsement of the appointment by the Security Council. However, no serious objections are anticipated.

The Russian spokesman said Kofi Annan was known in Russia as "a highly skilled and qualified diplomat," and that everybody here wished him "full success in his new, difficult mission."

The spokesman reiterated that Russia insisted on "the preservation of the U.N. leading role in peacemaking efforts in the former Yugoslavia and in its consistent search for ways of political settlement of the conflict."

Chernomyrdin on Elections, Moscow Not Joining NATO

LD1210052295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2058 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 11 October (ITAR-TASS) — "We cannot explain to our people why NATO, in the form in which the organization exists today, should be at our frontiers," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stated, when speaking to students and lecturers at Moscow State University on Wednesday [11 October]. He visited the university with the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov. The head of the Russian

Federation government stressed that Russia does not intend to join NATO in its present form.

To a question put by a member of the audience as to what the government would do if the communists gain victory at the forthcoming parliamentary elections in December, Chernomyrdin replied that one should not anticipate things. "When we get the results, we'll determine the tactics, too," he noted.

Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed once again that he is not spoiling for the post of president. "We have a president and, I think, he has every opportunity to go on working," he stated.

Speaking about the government's understanding of the problems of the higher school, the prime minister reported that a new scale of tariffs will already come into force from 1 November, in accordance with which the wages of lecturers at institutions of higher education will considerably increase.

Shumeyko Urges FRG Against NATO Expansion

AU1110151995 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by "C.G.": "Shumeyko Against NATO Enlargement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn, 10 October — On 10 October in Bonn, Shumeyko, chairman of the Russian "Upper House," the Federation Council, presented economic arguments against NATO's expansion to the east to FRG Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel. Without the market economy and an improvement of the living conditions, the development of democracy in Russia is inconceivable. "There is no financial stabilization in a period of economic stagnation." Germany can help to develop a democratic political system in Russia without financial expenses if the FRG Government uses its influence in the West against NATO's expansion. For Russia, it is important "to maintain the achievements in high technology." The armament enterprises need time and money for the conversion to civilian goods. All eastern European states obtained Soviet armament goods and now buy spare parts from Russia. If those states are admitted to NATO, Russia will lose this market. Germany is to explain this point of view to its partners: "NATO's enlargement is completely unacceptable for the development of democracy in Russia." Shumeyko paid tribute to the FRG chancellor's understanding of the development in Russia and the open atmosphere of the talks.

Army Paper Criticizes NATO Enlargement Study

MM1110142195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Observer Aleksandr Golts: "NATO Expansion: Time Out or a Slow Run Up? 'Research' by the Atlanticists Fails to Answer that Question"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the discussions on the prospects for the expansion of NATO have acquired a comic element. When NATO representatives encountered a difficult question (for example, about the fate of the CFE treaty in the event of the alliance's expansion) they said: Yes, there are quite a few points to clarify. But they immediately added: To clarify those points an in-depth research study is being conducted deep within the bloc which will first answer the question why the expansion of the alliance is necessary and, second, how this process will be implemented. Everyone was asked to wait for this research which, like the word of God, was supposed to convince doubters and direct non-believers toward the true path. When the attention of opponents was drawn to the fact that such an approach is pedantic, to put it mildly, diplomats from the leading NATO countries hinted that this is not the purpose of the document. Politically speaking there are two aims here: to reassure Russia, which has been voicing its own fears in very brutal terms, and to dampen the ardor of those states which have been knocking so vigorously on NATO's door.

However, the 28-page study which has been published will hardly satisfy anyone apart from its authors. Because the NATO people did not give clear answers to the questions that they themselves posed. First and foremost to the question "why." The whole argument here is based on the premise that NATO's rules are so good and the alliance itself so noble that any state which joined it would almost automatically be transformed into a bastion of European security.

At the same time it is pointed out that the supranational character of defense activity within NATO, decision-making on the basis of consensus, reliance on cooperation and integration, and the transparency and openness of military policy are all factors transforming the North Atlantic alliance into a stronghold of stability on the continent. Consequently, as the alliance expands across the European continent so stability and security will spread too.

However, it is hard to accept this premise. And in particular it is impossible to accept the attempt to portray NATO as the only true and infallible church which is not accountable to anyone. It is possible to cite numerous examples here of how the North Atlantic alliance has adopted decisions, quite openly and on the basis of a perfectly democratic procedure, which have harmed European security and stability. Take, for example, the recent decisions connected with the strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile, virtually every page of the research contains passages on broad interaction with the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] which unambiguously stress: "The alliance will never be subordinated to any other European security institution." This is undoubtedly evidence that NATO's leading circles still dismiss out of hand the idea of creating an integrated pan-European security system. Consequently, the document's oft-repeated thesis that the aim of NATO's expansion is to create a Europe without a dividing line remains no more than mere words. After all, the document itself divides the European countries into current NATO members, those which are trying to become members, and those which will never join the alliance. Such a distinction is made even at a purely theoretical level.

But when the whole document is imbued with the idea of NATO's self-sufficiency as a European security structure, it means that there are undoubtedly other generally correct premises which are also unacceptable. This applies first and foremost to everything that it says about mutual relations with Russia, and a whole chapter is dedicated to that topic. Essentially, NATO's research highlights our country's unique and crucial place in ensuring security on the continent. It stresses that relations between NATO and Russia are one of the most important foundations of European stability. It declares a desire to develop dialogue with our country on the basis of mutual respect and to "refrain from surprises capable of harming the interests of each side." However, these undoubtedly correct tenets are effectively nullified by another statement. Namely, the statement that NATO's decisions cannot be dependent on the veto of other states which are not alliance members and cannot be revised by them. In that case it turns out that the dialogue with Moscow amounts to no more than informing it about this or that NATO decision. In practice this means that the most important decisions affecting Russia's interests will be adopted without any input on its part. This is the real source of Russia's concern and not what NATO tries to present as Moscow's unfounded fears. And that concern will not be dispelled by mere statements that NATO's expansion does not threaten Russia.

There are problems with the details, too. For example, it is pointed out that relations between the sides are based on strict observance of the main international agreements. The latter include the CFE treaty. However, it does not bother the NATO people that this treaty in particular will become meaningless if the North Atlantic bloc expands. After all, NATO as an organization has not signed the OSCE treaty, as the authors of the "research" state without a trace of embarrassment. Admittedly, this question is premature, they say reassuringly. After all, NATO's expansion has not happened yet so there is nothing to worry about. If we upset the OSCE-enshrined balance by admitting new members we will think about it then.

The same degree of certainty is also typical of the answer to the second question — "how" NATO's expansion will take place. Those who are hoping to become full members of the North Atlantic alliance soon and are hoping to find in the research study clear and unambiguous requirements which if met will definitely open the alliance's doors to them are in for a disappointment.

Yes, certain requirements are set out there. The criteria of democracy, the unconditional control of a civilian society over the military sphere, and the openness of the applicants' entire military activity. There is another set of demands which require the applicant country to "share the financial and other burdens connected with joint defense." A state's military potential and its ability to integrate with NATO's structures and pay for that integration will undoubtedly be taken into account. Problems of troop and nuclear weapon deployment have been left for later. Certain political demands have been put forward. The candidates for membership must settle both their own conflicts with other states and internal ethnic conflicts. Finally, NATO insists that new members of the bloc should not try to shut the alliance's door to other countries.

But even the fulfillment of all these requirements does not guarantee membership. The document repeatedly stresses that the decision to begin the very lengthy admission procedure will be made on a purely individual basis. This can mean anything that you like. It could mean, for example, that in a complex political situation NATO will take a long time-out on the expansion question. Indeed, if you take the most scrupulous approach to the terms of admission, hardly any of the prospective members meets those requirements.

On the other hand, however, it is not ruled out that a purely formal approach will be taken to compliance with the requirements. In that case the NATO study marks the start of a lengthy run-up to the bloc's expansion. Essentially, if the document does state anything explicitly it is merely that in an uncertain strategic situation in Europe and the world NATO would like complete decision-making freedom. But was it necessary to conduct a special research study just for that?

Council of Europe Seen Ready To Accept Russia

LD1110153495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Despite recent setbacks to the settlement of the Chechnya crisis, most Council of Europe member-states are prepared to accept Russia as a full-fledged member in this organization, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's All-European Department Yuriy Ushakov told INTERFAX Wednesday.

In his words, Moscow expects the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to decide on Russian admission in January 1996. This decision will have to be approved by the Council's Committee of Foreign Ministers.

"Only 9-10 deputies of the Parliamentary Assembly from a number of Central and Eastern European states, including the Czech Republic and the Baltics, oppose Russian admission to the organization. All in all, the Parliamentary Assembly has 496 members. Thus, the opponents of Russian membership are not what counts," said Ushakov.

Still he admitted "the organization has used double standards for Russia in the time since it officially applied for membership. Super-excessive demands were set for Russia," he added.

In the words of Ushakov, many old members of the Council of Europe do not correspond to the requirements of this organization if one approaches this matter strictly. "For instance, France does not have to be expelled from the Council of Europe only for the blast in the Paris metro. The only difference between this and Chechen developments is the scale of the terrorist acts," he added.

Ministry Receives Taleban List of Missing Afghans

LD1210112995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1013 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Viktor Khrekov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — On Wednesday the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received from the "Taleban" movement lists of Afghans registered as missing after the war, and who, "Taleban" asserts, are interned in the former Soviet Union. An ITAR-TASS corresponent was given this information today by Grigoriy Karasin, director of the press and information department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The "Taleban" movement said that finding out the fate of their compatriots figuring on the list was a condition for releasing the crew of the Russian cargo plane held captive in Qandahar since 3 August.

Grigoriy Karasin said that there are 6,749 names of Afghan citizens on the lists, with their dates and places of birth. The lists are handwritten in Pashto and Dari.

"We are taking urgent measures at present to translate this document. Various departments and volunteers who speak these languages and have offered their services are doing this job," the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs department said. "The parts that have been translated are rapidly passed to the migration services so that they can find out the circumstances."

The diplomat said he is confident that this job will be done "in the shortest possible time." On the basis of the results an appropriate representation will be made to the Afghan side.

Soskovets Critical of Cuban Embargo

LD1210094495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0826 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] HAVANA October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — "Russia adheres to a strategy of cooperation with its traditional partners," First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets stated on Wednesday during a meeting with Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina.

Soskovets emphasised that the Russian leadership comes out against attempts to establish trade embargo against Cuba. "Nowadays, it is no longer sensible to dictate through embargoes how a state should organise its life," he pointed out.

Roberto Robaina believes that from the political point of view Russia and Cuba have restored the level of their contacts. "Relations with Russia are strategic to us. We would like them to be the same to Russia as well," the Cuban Foreign Minister said.

Lebed Cited on Russo-Japanese Ties, Russia's Future

MM1210104195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "Lebed Considers Union of Former Soviet Republics Realistic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tokyo — YOMIURI, the leading Japanese newspaper, has published an extremely curious report by its correspondent Toshikadzu Seguchi who as part of his professional duties accompanied General Lebed, retired, now a politician, on a tour of Kaliningrad Oblast.

The Japanese reporter highlighted the most characteristic of Lebed's own-brand "theses": There is no country wealthier than Russia and we do not need foreign aid; Russia needs an administration capable of making quick decisions; it is necessary to restore order in the country by force; if I become president I will guarantee Yeltsin 100-percent security — he must spend the rest of his days at his dacha fishing.

The retired general also told YOMIURI that "in the near future the unification of the former Soviet republics will become a reality — they will transfer their powers to the central authorities — and furthermore NATO's eastward expansion will accelerate that process."

Lebed had his own position on Russo-Japanese bilateral relations which impressed the Japanese by its simplicity and forthrightness — according to the report in YOMIURI the general believes that Russia has no territorial claims on Japan and that there are altogether no obstacles to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Tokyo. Consequently, unless Japan wants to lose a highly promising market, Lebed believes, the Japanese Government should pursue this goal more actively.

It is a very long time since the Japanese last heard such succinct and stark comments about the futility of the territorial debates and this form of shock therapy made a deep impression on the audience here.

According to the tradition of Japanese journalism which generally highlights the factual side of things, YOMIURI cites no commentaries on Lebed's remarks, but commentaries are hardly necessary once you have acquainted yourself with quotes from Lebed's remarks. They reveal very clearly the general's view of Russia's future and even the Japanese can find no scope for interpretation.

Obstacles to Russian-Ukrainian 'Relations' Viewed

LD1110194895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others; From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — The current state of Russian-Ukrainian relations cannot fully satisfy either Moscow or Kiev. However, neither side will be able to change the situation for the better in the near future, a Russian expert who had worked in Russia's Foreign Ministry for a long time, told INTERFAX Wednesday.

There are three obstacles hampering the normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine — the Black Sea, Crimea and the problem of national self-identity in the republic which gained sovereignty recently, he said.

"The latter is telling on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet which is making Kiev advance more and more terms in fear of becoming a loser," he continued.

The expert said these problems were unlikely to be settled in the future. He said: "Those statesmen who say the opposite either are not very honest with themselves or try to take what they want for what already exists."

Speaking about the problem of Crimea, he said that Russia is not going to lay territorial claims on Crimea. "However, judging by all accounts, the Russian leaders do not think that the Crimean problem has been fully solved," he added.

At the current stage, Moscow will obviously abstain from signing a border agreement with Ukraine, said the expert.

"The two countries' leaders will evidently limit themselves to talks during CIS summits or major international forums," he said.

Lobov Receives Mongolian Security Official

LD1110220695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1508 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 11 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, today had a meeting with (Enhsayhan), secretary of the Mongolian National Security Council, and members of his delegation.

(Enhsayhan) is in Moscow on a working visit to hold consultations in the framework of the Protocol on Cooperation between the security councils of the two countries.

During the meeting, held in the atmosphere of traditional friendship and mutual understanding, future development of cooperation between the security councils of Russia and Mongolia in the protection of the environment and the population's health were discussed and the positions of the two countries on the key issues of international life were compared, a release by the press service of the Security Council of the Russian Federation passed to ITAR- TASS says.

Oleg Lobov told the Mongolian delegation about the situation in Chechnya and the president's and the government's plans to restore the republic's economy.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Receives Premier 'Hospitably' on Return From Ufa

MM1110165295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 1

["Own Information" report: "Chernomyrdin Heads for Yeltsin Posthaste"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On his return from Bashkortostan Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, leader of the "Russia Is Our Home" electoral association, went straight from the airport to a meeting with President Boris Yeltsin. The Russian head of state hospitably received the bloc leaders in the Kremlin yesterday.

We will provide a more detailed account in our next issue of the subject of the president's hour-long discussion with the leadership of one of the leading associations in the electoral race. We will just point out here that Boris Nikolayevich earnestly listened to his interlocutor and gave practical advice.

Yeltsin Meets Leaders of North Ossetia, Ingushetia

LD1110185895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday [11 October] met the presidents of the Russian republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and the head of a provisional committee appointed to deal with problems caused by an Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October and November 1992, Yeltsin's spokesman Sergey Medvedev said.

The meeting with the North Ossetian and Ingush presidents, Akhsarbek Galazov and Ruslan Aushev, and provisional committee chairman Vladimir Lozovoy, held in the Kremlin, was not "extraordinary," Medvedev told INTERFAX.

"As progress is being made in solving the refugee problem and issues that exist between Ingushetia and North Ossetia are being settled, the leaders of those republics which are parts of the Russian Federation put those problems before the president of Russia for discussion," he said.

The same day Yeltsin received the governor of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region, Boris Nemtsov, at the latter's request.

Nemtsov told the president on how his region was preparing for the coming parliamentary election and on the social and political situation in the region. Among the subjects raised were some social and economic programs the governor proposes for the region.

Yeltsin had still another meeting on Wednesday, one with key figures in the Our Home is Russia electoral bloc, including its leader, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The meeting was part of a series of Yeltsin's consultations with leaders of various parties and associations.

The Our Home is Russia leaders informed the president on the bloc's election campaign strategy and tactics and on what positions the bloc holds in various parts of the country.

Text of Yeltsin Edict on Federally Owned Shares

MM1110101295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 986 "On the Procedure for Adopting Decisions on the Management and Disposal of Shares in Federal Ownership," signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin on 30 September; from the "Documents" section]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to strengthening state discipline in the management and disposal of federal property and providing the conditions for the implementation of the federal budget insofar as the receipt of funds from the use of federal property is concerned I decree that:

1. It shall be established that decisions of the Russian Federation Government, federal executive bodies, organizations, and establishments on the management and disposal of shares in federal ownership, including decisions on the transfer of shares to the control of corporate entities and individuals, on the registration of shares in organizations' incorporation capital, and also on the use of shares as security and other encumbrances are to be adopted on the basis of Russian Federation presidential edicts stipulating the timeframes for and forms of management or disposal of the specific shares.

2. It shall be established that draft Russian Federation presidential edicts on the management and disposal of shares in federal ownership are to be submitted for signing by Russian Federation Government decrees.

3. It shall be established that shares in federal ownership are to be transferred to the management of corporate entities and individuals, as well as used as security, on the principles of public reporting and glasnost in accordance with the procedure laid down by Russian Federation presidential edict No. 869 of 31 August 1995 "On the Procedure Governing the Use of Shares in Federal Ownership as Security in 1995."

4. The Russian Federation Presidential Control Administration is to be made responsible for monitoring the implementation of this edict.

5. This edict comes into force on the day it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 30 September 1995
No. 986

Yeltsin Aides Criticize Ministries' Performance

MM1110165695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Viktor Ilyushin: "President Opposes Attempts To Destabilize Situation in Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between the Russian Federation president and his aides discussed in a frank atmosphere a broad spectrum of Russian domestic and foreign policy issues, Boris Yeltsin's number one aide Viktor Ilyushin said.

"The dynamics of the sociopolitical process currently under way in Russia compel us to gauge our position against that of the president, be aware of the head of state's views, and refine our assessments," Viktor Ilyushin indicated. According to him, the president heard his aides' opinions "and voiced his view of the situation in the economy, the country's foreign policy activity, and the situation in Chechnya in the light of the latest deterioration in the situation there, as well as on the election campaign and the prospects for progress on the question of forming the Federation Council."

"Boris Yeltsin will not adopt hasty decisions to introduce a state of emergency in Groznyy, but the president is still keeping an attentive eye on the development of events and in the event of serious changes in the situation no one would rob him of that right," Viktor Ilyushin noted. According to him, the president thinks that "federal bodies have not yet used all their potential to stabilize the situation in the Chechen Republic and transfer the negotiating process to peaceful lines without adopting any abrupt decisions."

Boris Yeltsin is keeping an attentive eye on the State Duma's activity aimed at possibly beginning the procedure of impeaching the president and voicing no confidence in the government. "The president opposes any attempts to destabilize the situation — work is what is needed now," the head of state's number one aide stressed.

"The situation regarding the government worries the president, and his aides spoke extremely critically of the activity of a number of ministries and departments, of major shortcomings in executive discipline in certain government structures," Viktor Ilyushin continued.

During the conference "highly concerned opinions were exchanged regarding the Russian Foreign Ministry's activity," Viktor Ilyushin noted. When asked by your ITAR-TASS correspondent whether today's discussion would be followed by rapid cadre reshuffles in the foreign policy department leadership Viktor Ilyushin said: "The president takes a softly-softly approach on cadre issues."

Chernomyrdin Addresses Conference on Nationalities Policy

LD1210124595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1230 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — The right of Russia-inhabiting nations to self-determination should be exercised with due account of the country's specific conditions, should not undermine its unity. This was the main idea of the report, which Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin delivered today to the all-Russia scientific-practical conference on the present lot of the nationalities inhabiting Russia and prospects for its improvement, on the territorial pattern of the country, which opened at the Parliamentary Centre here today.

Chairman of the Council of the Federation Vladimir Shumeyko was expected to deliver the opening speech, but he could not come, because he is currently paying a visit to Austria. The conference was attended by Vice-Speaker of the Council of the Federation Ramazan Abdulatipov and Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhaylov.

Chernomyrdin told the conference that an important document, namely the "Concept of the Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation", was now being drawn up under the President's direct supervision. "The government is working hard on the elaboration of agreements and treaties with subjects of the Federation to share powers and property with them. Packages of such documents have already been signed with several subjects of the Federation, including Tatarstan, Bashkiria and Kabardino-Balkaria," the Premier stressed. "We are ready to sign them in due time. All this is to rule out inter-ethnic conflicts in Russia." The Russian Premier laid special stress on the role of the Russian people in guaranteeing the country's unity.

Ramazan Abdulatipov, who chaired the conference, noted that this was the first time that the government was devoting such close attention to the work of the scientific-practical conference on problems of inter-ethnic relations, as well as to the movement, known as "National Creativity for the Sake of Life" (the Senezh Forum).

The first scientific-practical conference on problems of inter-ethnic problems was held four years ago, in November 1994, at Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region, on the shores of Lake Senezh. It was convened by the "National Creativity for the Sake of Life" (the Senezh Forum). The forum was then attended by many prominent Russians scientists, parliament members, politicians, and businessmen. After that, the Senezh Forum exerted much efforts to render scientific and methodological assistance to the elaboration and implementation of research projects, pertaining to national problems, to regular public opinion studies, and to public and governing bodies in their efforts to implement scientific recommendations. The Senezh Forum is also exerting peace-making efforts. It is now working on a programme to promote the "National Development and Inter-Ethnic Creativity of the Peoples of Russia".

Chernomyrdin said that the Forum's and Movement's recommendations would be discussd at a special meeting of the government, devoted to a set of problems linked with the nationalities policy.

Kozyrev Pledges Loyalty to Yeltsin; Reviews Past 5 Years

LD1110181595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1734 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Yuri Kozlov and Vladimir Mostovets]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] HELSINKI October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev, who is widely rumoured in Russia to be heading for replacement, pledged loyalty to President Boris Yeltsin saying he would continue to implement his foreign policy.

"My plans are to continue to work for the policy which we link to the name of Yeltsin — the policy of openness and cooperation", Kozyrev said at a press conference Wednesday [11 October] upon completing his visit to Finland.

Kozyrev, the record-holding veteran in Yeltsin government, celebrated today five years as Foreign minister and said he was "happy to have the possibility to work in Yeltsin's team".

He, however, admitted that during the five years he had to work hard so that the foreign policy did not change because of political ambitions of the presidential entourage.

"These were hard years. I had and have to work hard so that the presidential foreign policy did not get under the influence of incompetence, improvisation, departmental mess, ambitions and, to put it bluntly, apparatchik games", Kozyrev said.

He admitted that it was especially hard to conduct a consistent foreign policy on the eve of elections.

All the difficulties get "multiplied by the fear before a possible takeover by other political forces which are ready to push Russia onto the path of confrontation, mostly, with the West under the pretext of dropping the so-called "pro-western policy", Kozyrev said and warned Russian hard-liners that the 70 years of Soviet history proved that confontation policy is fruitless.

"I believe that the seventy years have shown that the path leads into a deadend and if someone wants to try it again they will find it out earlier than in 70 years", the minister said.

FPS Director Nikolayev Briefs Yabloko Duma Faction

MK1210080795 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Plotnikov: "Border Service Head Begins Meetings With Parliamentarians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service [FPS], met with members of the "Yabloko" Duma faction in Moscow yesterday. Questions pertaining to the situation along the Russian border and the CIS borders were discussed. Andrey Nikolayev briefed the parliamentarians on implementation of the Russian Federation law "On the State Border"; development of additional legal instruments; talked about the basic concepts of Russia's border policy; the forms of federal border protection; and the possibilities for performing the tasks set for the border troops by the country's leaders. Col. Gen. Nikolayev plans to hold similar meetings with other State Duma factions.

ITAR-TASS Interviews Acting Prosecutor General Gaydanov

LD1110132795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1257 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Oleg Gaydanov, Acting Prosecutor-General of Russia, does not believe that his provisional post is an excuse for sitting and doing nothing. He is going to use to the full the time that he is going to hold this post and the authority, given to him by the Constitution, for stopping "the disintegration of the public prosecution system of Russia, for restoring public confidence in it and pooling the efforts of all the law enforcement agencies of the country in the struggle against crime, which is the main evil," Gaydanov told Tass in an exclusive interview.

"I shall do my job and, first of all, fulfil the plan of priority measures, drawn up at our collegium, which are aimed at reviving the public prosecution system. I have other plans too," he said, responding to the question about the chances of President Yeltsin appointing him to the post of Prosecutor-General. "The results of this work will make it clear to the president whether or not he should appoint me to this post." Gaydanov decided for himself that he was ready to assume the responsibilities, connected with the post, but said he knew many people who were also suitable candidates to it.

The proposals, approved on Tuesday by the collegium of the Prosecutor-General's Office, are the result of much thinking about the situation in the public prosecution system and an analysis of the public and political situation in the country in general. Gaydanov is going to put those plans into effect and look for new ways to improve the work of the public prosecution system. He is going to do it as long as he works in that system, no matter what post he holds. Of course, a higher post gives greater opportunities.

He answered questions of Tass about those opportunities, about the restoration of public prosecutor's offices in Chechnya, the situation with the Vlad Listyev case and his relations with Telman Gdlyan [name as received] — an investigating officer, who was moved to the limelight during the investigation of the case of Uzbek leaders.

Conference Held on Work of State Security Bodies

LD1110185395 Moscow NTV in Russian
1600 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] A conference on the work of the state security bodies took place in Moscow today. The venue was not just anywhere, but in the Taganka theater. The meeting was organized by the Spiritual Heritage [Dukhovnoye naslediye] public association, which has published the "White Book of Russian Federation Special Services" [Belaya kniga rossiyskikh spetssluzhb]. The book describes the history and present state of Russian counterintelligence services. Nikolay Gubenko, head of the Taganka actors' society, is one of the co-chairmen of Spiritual Heritage. Nikolay Nikolayevich is not embarrassed that the state security bodies at one time, to put it mildly, kept his theater under strict surveillance.

[Begin Gubenko recording] I think people exaggerate this. Perhaps someone personally had bad relations with the special services, but to judge from world experience, every state needs special services and I am very glad indeed that the security elite have assembled here today. I hope they will agree on something, or at any rate, clarify the situation in the country and outline some prospects. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The invited guests included retired special services officers, such as, for instance, General Leonid Shebarshin, who at one time headed the KGB foreign intelligence directorate, as well as past and present Communist leaders — Ivan Polozkov and Gennadiy Zyuganov. Zyuganov was one of the first to speak, giving a wide-ranging political and economic analysis of the situation in the country. On this occasion, he did not indulge in harsh criticism of the current government, but described the country as being in a state of crisis. The conference organizers want to change the suspicion with which their compatriots regard the state security bodies. The way they present it, the special services should protect the country from internal and external attacks, but not engage in political investigation.

Police Estimate Parliamentary Immunity Costs $50,000

LD1110204695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1824 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Larisa Kislinskaya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — A top Moscow police official said Wednesday [11 October] that a seat in a Russian legislative body, which grants parliamentary immunity, costs at present 50,000 US dollars.

"The mandate of a deputy is estimated at present at 50,000 US dollars on the 'black market'", Viktor Bulgakov, head of the department of the Moscow police for organised crime, told Tass, but did not elaborate.

He only said that many criminals had already "laundered" their money and are now working to get political authority.

Russian Interior minister Anatoliy Kulikov earlier said that some 85 people with a criminal record or dubious reputation are vying for a seat in the State Duma.

Draft Tax Code Envisages No Punishment for Tax Violations

LD1110122295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1033 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (FIA-INTERFAX) — The draft Tax Code reviewed by the Russian Finance Ministry for second consideration by the government will not provide for criminal responsibility for individuals or legal entities if they breach tax legislation, Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Shatalov told FIA on Wednesday.

Shatalov, who led the group of experts working out the document, said the Finance Ministry has prepared its own proposals on changes and amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

He pointed out that the draft code will be considered by a working group led by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays within the next 7-10 days. The group includes representatives of all relevant ministries, deputies of the Federal Assembly and tax experts.

After thorough consideration and review the document will be re-submitted to the government, Shatalov said.

Media Issues

Yeltsin Edict To Revamp Infrastructure of State Radio, TV

MK1210080895 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Russian Television To Be Reconstructed by Foreigners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin has decided to carry out technical reconstruction of state-run television and radio companies on a competitive basis.

MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has learned that an edict signed by the president the other day tasks the government with defining a form in which foreigners could be pressed into service to complete and put into operation a program production center (at 35 Shabolovka Street in Moscow), an All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company station for the reception and transmission of programs (being built in Klin), as well as to complete the reconstruction of the ITAR-TASS Space Communications Center (in the town of Petushki, Vladimir Oblast).

Furthermore, Yeltsin has exempted the Russian national television and radio company from the mandatory sale of hard-currency earnings to the state. True, he has permitted the use of hard currency earned from sales of programs and services only for the development of the companies' material and technical base.

The president has also tasked the government with completing the drafting of a federal special-purpose radio and television broadcasting development program.

Military & Space Issues

Rybkin Submits Bill on Changes in Military Service

LD1110155995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Speaker of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin submitted a law on introduction of changes and amendments to the Russian law "On Military Service and Military Duty" to the president last Friday. The law was recently rejected by the Federation Council, Rybkin told an exclusive INTERFAX interview.

According to him, the Federation Council, which called for a two-year term of military service for all categories of recruits, "grossly violated the constitutional period for discussion of this law." The law was adopted by the State Duma back in late July.

Under the Constitution, the upper parliament chamber shall discuss a law adopted by the State Duma within two weeks. If the Federation Council fails to do so, the law shall be submitted directly to the president, who within two weeks shall either sign it or reject and return to the State Duma for repeated consideration with due account of his remarks.

As known, the State Duma adopted amendments to the Law on Military Service and Military Duty in July and made an exception of 1.5 years of military service for recruits drafted in spring 1995 and serving in conflict zones. The law establishes a two year term of military service for all other recruits.

Military Space Forces Launch 'Luch-1' Satellite

LD1110170795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1658 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Viktor Gritsenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian military space forces launched a new generation satellite on Wednesday evening from the Baykonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.

The Luch-1 satellite blasted off on a heavy Proton-K booster at 19:26 hours Moscow time (14:26 GMT) and is to reach the orbit close to the geostationary one in seven hours.

"After that it will reach the static point where it will be used according to its designation", the press service of the space forces told Tass.

No other details were available.

Federal Assembly

Duma Sets Priorities For Debating Bills

LD1110114495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1100 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma (Russian parliament lower chamber) established priorities for debating bills up to the end of the current session. This was done at a plenary session of the chamber on Wednesday. The Duma approved a list of 58 top priority bills.

It will examine, above all, the bill on the 1996 federal budget submitted to parliament by the government late in August. Its first reading will be held in October, possibly next Friday.

The chamber plans to debate the Land and Family codes in the second reading in the same month.

The law-making programme of the State Duma is packed for November. Legislators will consider such pressing bills as "alternative civilian service (Eds: for conscripts)", "prohibition on switching off electricity" and "mandatory declaration of incomes and property by candidates to the State Duma and the Federation Council (Eds: upper chamber) as well as by cabinet members".

In November-December, deputies plan to give "the green light" to the second part of the Civil Code, one of the most important bills, and, thereby, to complete work on it.

Lawmakers will also examine a package of important social bills between October and December, including some legal documents on pensions. Deputies will devote the lion's share of their time to bills regulating operations in the economic sphere, including bills on "peculiar features of state regulation of coal production and use", "societies with limited liabilities" as well as "science and state scientific and technical policy".

Examination of the following bills will be also of great importance: "struggle against corruption", "political parties" and "a plenipotentiary on human rights in the Russian Federation". They will be debated in the first and second readings already in October.

Duma Bosses Hit Defense Industry Cash Squeeze

MM1210095595 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 95 pp 1,3

[Letter from leaders of State Duma Factions and Deputies' Associations to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin: "Defense Industry on Brink of Abyss" — first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The following letter was sent to the editorial office by Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee. It is characteristic that the leaders of the Duma factions signed it with a rare unanimity. Whether left, right, or centrists, they all understand how tragic the situation in the defense industry is today. There is no time left for discussion.... Urgent and effective measures are needed to save the leading sectors of the country's industry. Ultimately the question is this: Is Russia to exist or not as an economically independent and securely protected state?

To V.S. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

Esteemed Viktor Stepanovich!

The State Duma factions and deputies' groups express extreme concern at the situation that is developing over the payment for work carried out under the defense order.

Out of the 15.2112 trillion rubles [R] allocated in this year's federal budget for the purchase of arms and research and development work, R3.866 trillion have been spent on clearing the 1994 arrears. Thus in effect the appropriations for these purposes have been reduced by over one-fourth and represent 22 percent of defense spending.

By 1 September this year the Russian Federation Government had allocated just R1.5502 trillion out of the R11.3452 trillion intended for the purchase of arms and research and development that remained after debt payments had been made — in other words, just 13.7 percent.

According to the preliminary assessments of the 1996 draft federal budget, the arrears for arms purchases and research and development next year could be one-third of the total budget appropriations planned for those purposes.

The continuing instability of budget funding completely discredits the activity of all state organs of management and effectively attests to the Russian Federation Government's failure to comply with article 114 of the Russian Federation Constitution which stipulates that the Russian Federation Government shall draw up and ensure the implementation of the federal budget.

The long delays over the payment for military output are creating social tension in areas where the defense industry is concentrated and are having an adverse effect on defense enterprises' production of output for the national economy the cost of which includes spending on the upkeep of fixed assets of in the defense sphere.

This method of financing will inevitably lead to the complete degradation of the defense industry and related advanced technologies in the machine building complex, electronics, and other leading sectors of the country's industry which will completely lose their ability to produce modern weapons and sophisticated competitive output for the national economy. Even now State Duma deputies are particularly alarmed at the protracted process of structural reorganization of the defense industry and the formation of new viable cooperatives of modern Russian arms producers.

To avert the crisis processes in the defense industry and enhance the prestige of state organs of power it is proposed that from 1996 the practice whereby arrears for arms purchases and research and development are transferred to the corresponding items of the following year's budget be halted and that the 1995 funding targets for those areas be met in full given the possibility of a certain increase in the revenue section of the budget or the use of a targeted loan from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Such an approach is an important stage in the gradual transition to normal budget financing and will justify the sharp increase of budget appropriations for servicing and clearing the state debt in 1996.

The State Duma factions and deputies' groups are also compelled to draw your attention to the further deepening of the fundamental imbalance, built into the 1996 draft budget, between spending on troop upkeep and their equipment

Appropriations for arms purchases, research and development, and capital construction are due to be reduced by 30 percent while the level of funds set aside for the upkeep of the Armed Forces is maintained and spending on the upkeep of other power structures is increased (with an actual increase of 35 percent respectively in appropriations headed "Law enforcement activity and ensuring security").

At the same time the existing discrepancy in provision to servicemen of the Armed Forces and the other power structures, which favors the latter, is going to increase with the adverse consequences that this will entail for organizing their interaction. At the same time, as events in Chechnya showed, it is the military formations of the Armed Forces which will bear the main burden in the critical conditions of combat situations.

In our opinion it is advisable to set standard norms of pay for servicemen in 1996 in accordance with their official duties and conditions of service irrespective of the department to which servicemen belong. At the same time there is an urgent need to raise the level of provision for junior officers who form the foundation of the Army and other military formations. At present there is a certain potential for such an increase connected with the adoption of the federal law on increasing the length of service of draftees so long as the previous policy of gradually reducing the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and other power structures is continued.

The implementation of these proposals will help to make the federal budget more balanced and create the conditions necessary for supporting the defense industry and fulfilling the plans for the resettlement of troops withdrawn to Russian territory. According to the preliminary estimates of the relevant State Duma committees appropriations for these aims must rise by at least R15 trillion over the 1996 draft budget targets.

The State Duma factions and deputies' groups ask you to identify opportunities for eliminating the aforementioned shortcomings in the draft budget and support your proposals on clarifying the existing federal laws necessary to strengthen our state's defense and security.

[Signed] Leaders of the State Duma factions and deputies' associations.

Duma Adopts Yeltsin-Brokered Council Formation Bill

LD1110142095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1409 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma (Russian parliament lower chamber) adopted a bill on forming the Federation Council (upper house) right in three readings. The bill is based on the president's version and supplemented with the chamber's amendments.

It was voted in on Wednesday by 242 deputies, against 13, with four abstentions. The presidential version of the bill, which was also put to a vote, won only 91 supporters. The document adopted by the lower chamber will be relegated to the Federation Council for confirmation.

The essence of amendments made by deputies to the presidential version of the bill, is that the upper chamber should consist of the heads of administrations and the heads of legislative (representative) power, elected by people.

Under the document, the head of a legislative (representative) body of state authority, elected in compliance with law in an appropriate member of the Russian Federation, may become a member of the Federation Council.

The head of an executive body of state authority, elected in compliance with law in an appropriate member of the Russian Federation, may become a member of the upper chamber.

If the Constitution or a law of a member of the Russian Federation provides for the institute of presidency or for any other supreme office holder, this officer holder, elected in compliance with law, may become member of the Federation Council.

Persons who were not elected by people are not permitted to represent appropriate members of the Russian Federation and may not be members of the Federation Council.

Elections are appointed in members of the Russian Federation, which have no legally elected heads of bodies of executive power. These elections are to be held within eight months from a day when a Law on Forming the Federation Council comes into force.

The bill establishes that any decisions on extending powers of deputies of legislative (representative) bodies of state authority or the heads of executive power bodies (supreme office holders) beyond a deadline, to which they were elected or appointed, have no legal force.

The bill provides that the Federation Council of a new convocation gathers on the tenth day after the expiration of the term of powers for which the Federation Council of the previous convocation was elected.

Shumeyko Rejects Council-Formation Law

LD1110183695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BONN, Oct 11 (Interfax) — Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko said he saw "as a direct and gross violation of the Russian constitution and the inalienable rights of the federation's constituent members" the law on forming the parliament's upper chamber.

The State Duma, national parliament's lower chamber, adopted the bill in three readings at once today.

"Such a bill cannot be approved by the Federation Council," Shumeyko told Interfax in an interview in Bonn today.

Shumeyko heads the Federation Council's delegation on its visit to Germany which began on October 9. The delegation will leave Bonn for Vienna tonight.

The Duma-approved bill on forming the Federation Council stipulates that only the heads of the regional legislative and executive power bodies can be elected to the parliament's upper chamber. The heads of executive power bodies have to be elected to their posts by popular vote.

Shumeyko said "neither the Russian president nor the State Duma or anyone else has the right to dictate to the federation's constituent members when they should hold elections."

Shumeyko said the federation's constituent members would hold the election of the heads of executive power bodies "after the conditions are created for this, after they adopt a constitution or a charter, bills on gubernatorial elections and on the separation of powers between the branches of powers."

Shumeyko said 28 regions and areas and three Russian republics had not so far drawn up such legislative acts.

Legislative Delay Seen Discouraging Foreign Investors

MM1110193595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Doctor of Economic Sciences Andrey Konoplyanik: "Senators Against Major Foreign Investments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation Council has rejected the law "On Output-Sharing Agreements" which had been adopted by the State Duma. In the opinion of most experts, this decision could turn major foreign investors away from Russia for a long time to come.

According to Economy Ministry figures, since 1991 Russia has managed to obtain foreign investments to the tune of $5 billion. More than modest for a country like ours. The reason for the investors' "modesty" is banal — the poor legislative base.

The law on output sharing could have been a breakthrough in this respect. By itself it could have increased the inflow of investments into the Russian economy to $7-8 billion per year. Moreover, around 70 percent of this sum would have been received by Russian enterprises in the form of orders for equipment and other commodities. But the senators who rejected the Law on Output- Sharing Agreements are probably not concerned over either the creation of new, well-paid jobs or the problems of providing full employment to existing Russian enterprises well-supplied with funds and contracts.

It is curious that back on 27 July the Federation Council adopted a decision to vote on the law by filling out questionnaires [oprosnyye listy]. By the beginning of the current session the completed forms had been returned to the comptroller's office by half the Federation Council's members, It would have been logical to expect for the senators either to bring the decision to a conclusion (which required only a few more days), or to have officially rescinded the decision of 27 July. However, a decision was adopted to vote according to the normal procedure.

In the upshot, instead of ascertaining the opinion of the entire upper house, the senate secured the opinions of only a part of it (64 for, 41 against, with four abstentions). At the same time 71 governors, the majority of whom actually support the Law on Output-Sharing Agreements, did not take part in the ballot.

The voting procedure was preceded by an absolutely unambiguous commentary by Vladimir Shumeyko, who declared his "dual" attitude to the law. He said, in particular, that "on the one hand Russia's immediate interests require its adoption, since it will facilitate the attraction of foreign investments, and consequently, supplement the federal budget. However, from the viewpoint of Russia's long-term interests, I would not risk adopting it."

It is not hard to imagine how such an "introduction to the vote" affected those who had not delved very far into the essence of the law.

But precisely how could the Law on Output-Sharing Agreements harm "Russia's long-term interests," when the detailed public discussion of the draft in the press demonstrated the indisputable long-term advantages for the country stemming from the possibility of sharing output? Probably, the upper house speaker's experts got into some kind of confusion. There are no grounds for speaking about immediate interests. Everything is quite the reverse, because the major sums will be obtained by the treasury not in the form of immediate, one-off payments (bonuses) but over the long term. First, there is state revenue through the placement of orders and the tax income from enterprises producing mining equipment and so forth. Then, when the extraction of minerals begins, there is the mechanism of payments for the use of the minerals, the tax on profits, and the state's share in the output-sharing.

The Federation Council's decision to return the Law on Output-Sharing Agreements to the State Duma for further review means basically that the adoption of the law is to be postponed for at least one year. The negative reaction of the investment community to the protracted examination of the Law on Output-Sharing Agreements is becoming increasingly obvious, and it could lead to major investors' abandoning the Russian market. At least, until a normal legal base for long-term, major investments is finally created in the country.

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage: Military, Negotiations, Politics

Shkirko Appointed Force Commander

LD1210142695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1354 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Olga Semyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — Deputy Comander of the Russian Interior Troops Anatoliy Shkirko has been appointed commander of Russia's joint forces in the Chechen Republic. He is due to arrive in Groznyy in the near future, a source in the press centre of federal troops in Chechnya told TASS on Thursday.

The former commander of federal troops in Chechnya, general Anatoliy Romanov is still in a deep coma in the Moscow Burdenko military hospital after last Friday's assassination attempt against him.

The source denied that a new appointment is getting ready to replace Romanov in his capacity of the commander of Russia's Interior Troops.

Romanov combined three posts of Russian deputy Interior Minister, commander of Interior Troops and commander of joint forces in Chechnya.

Federal Commander Denies Accord Violation

LD1210152295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1332 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 12 (INTERFAX) — The commander of Russian Defense Ministry troops in Chechnya, General Aleksandr Naumov has dismissed claims by Dzhokhar Dudayev's supporters that Russia violates the military package of agreements.

Public relations officer of the Russian Defense Ministry's troops in Chechnya, Yevgeniy Ryabtsev, has quoted Naumov as saying that combat aircraft had made no attacks against the Chechen village of Roshni-Chu over the weekend.

At the same time Naumov confessed that when a unit of the 205th Motorized Infantry Brigade was fired on near the village of Masker-Yurt, Russian troops returned fire. In the attack one Russian serviceman was killed.

Naumov called for continuing the peace talks within the framework of the special observer commission. At the same time he said that illegal armed formations had done everything to put the talks on the brink of collapse.

"Not a single item of the military package of agreements has been implemented. In the first place this applies to the surrender of small arms and heavy weapons and an end to terrorist attacks and fire exchanges," Naumov said.

He recalled that several days after the assassination attempt against the commander of federal forces in Chechnya, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Romanov nine Russian soldiers had been killed and more than 30 others injured by explosions of land mines or as a result of terrorist and fire attacks by Dudayev's militants.

Internal Troops Report Casualties

LD1110193795 Moscow NTV in Russian
1600 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Since the start of the Chechen conflict, the internal troops have lost a total of 334 dead and 1,705 wounded. Every day these terrible figures keep rising. [passage omitted]

Chechens Condition Resumption of Talks

LD1210105795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1010 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Nikolay Zagnoyko and Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — Chechen separatists are ready to resume negotiations with federal authorities, but demand that "the Russian side fulfills earlier pledged commitments", OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission head Sandor Meszaros told a press conference in Groznyy on Thursday expressing hope that "full-scale military activities in Chechnya will be averted".

He quoted Chechen representatives Aslan Maskhadov and Movladi Udugov as saying that the statement of Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev about a unilateral disruption of talks was prompted "by recent actions of Russian troops".

Dudayev accused Russia of bombing Chechen villages in violation of the military peace agreement.

Meszaros stressed that the work of his mission in Chechnya will not be stopped, however admitted that "a temporary reduction of personnel was going on for safety reasons".

"Two employees were recommended not to return from vacations so far", he explained.

He quoted Russian presidential envoy in Chechnya Oleg Lobov as saying that all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the OSCE mission in Groznyy will be taken.

On October 7 the mission building came under mortar fire which was qualified as an intimidation act. Luckily, no one was wounded.

Dudayev Suspends Talks With Russia

NC1110174695 Baku TURAN in English
0859 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/11.10.95/TURAN — Today the state Defense Committee of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeriya sent the statement to TURAN agency, which reads: "Due to continuing shelling and bombardment of the settlements, which brought numerous casualties among Chechen's civilians, and regular provocations of the Russian troops and brutal violations of the engagement taken by the Russian side, the Committee announces:

1. All responsibility for further escalation of military activities in the Russian-Chechen war rests with the Russian administration.

2. The process of implementation of agreement on the military bloc of issues is suspended.

3. Participation of the Chechen side in the negotiation process is suspended until arrival of the international observers and the UN security forces, which will guarantee observation of the international norms and commitments."

[Signed] The chairman of the State Defense Committee of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeriya, Dzhokhar Dudayev. [Dated] October 9, 1995.

Dudayev: 'I Have Never Sunk to Terrorism'

LD1110115395 Moscow NTV in Russian
2120 GMT 10 Oct 95

[Report by Sergey Dorenko on the situation in Chechnya, including recorded remarks by Doku Zavgayev, chairman of the former Supreme Soviet of Chechen-Ingushetia, interviewed by Natalya Pochenina; and by Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, interviewed by Vugar Khalilov; place and date not given — from the "Versions" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The problem of the situation in Chechnya now that the peace process is under threat remains a topic for active discussion in Moscow and Chechnya. On 9 October, we discussed the question of a possible introduction of a state of emergency in

Groznyy with Kremlin analyst Emil Pain. He predicted that a state of emergency was unlikely and would serve little purpose. We continue the Chechen theme with Doku Zavgayev, chairman of the former Supreme Soviet of Chechen-Ingushetia, who met my colleague Natalya Pochenina. Our colleague Vugar Khalilov from the BBC Russian Service spoke to Dzhokhar Dudayev by telephone. The BBC kindly gave us a recording of the telephone conversation to acquaint you with the position of the still influential Dudayev who leads some of the armed people in Chechnya from his mountain hideaways.

[Khalilov] Dzhokhar Musaveyich, what do you think of Yeltsin introducing by decree a state of emergency in Chechnya?

[Dudayev] Theater of the absurd. To introduce a state of emergency in territory occupied by Russian troops where a regime of occupation has been established — it is feebleness, feebleness. First, Russian power there, the Russian regime, is one of occupation. Whatever is done there to assume responsibility for sabotage, for acts of provocation — acts that they themselves commit to eliminate witnesses and those directly involved in military crimes — if they could have done so, Vugar, they would have already done this a year ago; they can do nothing in this matter, they can do nothing.

[Pochenina] How will a decision by Moscow to introduce a state of emergency in Chechnya be taken in the republic?

[Zavgayev] The people of our republic, and especially the Chechens, are weary of this anarchy, weary of this vandalism.

[Pochenina] Where is danger expected, where may it spring from?

[Zavgayev] It could come from anywhere because there is no authority, there is legal chaos, everyone is armed, everyone suspects one another, no one is responsible for anything, not a single crime has been solved, not a major or minor one, that is the state of things.

[Pochenina] If a state of emergency is introduced, then Chechnya will welcome this decision, yes?

[Zavgayev] I would like to answer your question in a slightly different way. There is no need to introduce anything in the majority of villages and districts. The internal affairs bodies need to work more actively there and at the same time the efforts of the local authorities need to be mobilized, such as the young people there, what we used to call the people's patrols [narodnoy druzhinoy]. That is, life in these villages needs to become more active so normal life will be guaranteed. The situation in Groznyy is difficult, gunfire, machine-gun fire can be heard constantly, there is no peace at night, and of course additional measures are needed there. What should these measures be? They should proceed from the problem that we want to resolve and the aims of the tasks, what needs to be done needs to be specific. If the patrols and posts of some service need to be reinforced, then this must be said clearly; if a curfew needs to be introduced there — there is essentially one now — it arose spontaneously from the curfew. What do I mean? After five in the evening there are practically no people on the streets of Groznyy, so is a curfew needed? If it needs to be formally called a curfew, then that is all that remains to be done. Everything is basically there.

To be brief, when there is talk of introducing a state of emergency, on the one hand people must not be frightened by this; it must be said clearly what this will be, what it entails, and people should be told. This must be clearly emphasized and must be observed so people feel that their personal interests are protected, in addition to their life, their dignity, their honor. [passage omitted on Dorenko noting that the Federation Council will have to approve introduction of a state of emergency]

[Dudayev] I have never sunk to terrorism and will not sink to it to my dying day. I am fully convinced that an internal struggle is under way there now. Russia wants to foist upon us an internal Chechen struggle and is getting an internal Russian struggle instead. The regime that they brought there, a regime of occupation, this is what it is doing. Above all it is paying its debts to the Chechen people, and second, holding on to the Russian troops as much as possible.

For example, Romanov was in whose way? He was not in our way, he is a figure who signed the agreement. In whose way was [Oleg] Lobov? He was not in our way, he is the president's representative. [passage omitted]

[Dudayev] They took criminals, brought them together from all prisons and camps, released them early, dressed them in military uniforms, gave them weapons and let them loose to commit serious crimes against the civilian population. Their contracts have come to an end, they do not really want to die. So they are now going back to Russia with these weapons, they are allowed in, and a war is going on among them.

[Zavgayev] These people, if they do this, are basically Dudayev's people. He released them, he armed them, Dudayev seized the Army's weapons, distributed these weapons; that is, Dudayev began the criminalization of our republic's population. [passage omitted]

[Dudayev] Military actions have not been stopped for a minute. The Russian side — this farce, this farce that is apparently aimed at calming the world community — does not admit observers from the United Nations, the European Parliament, the parliamentary assembly, which was specially created. They closed the road here and continued their provocations and carried out rocket and bomb attacks every hour, every day, every hour. They have not stopped. We are patient, hoping that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its representatives will evaluate this situation. We have waited patiently, not provoking the situation, although the delegation and the special monitoring commission from the Chechen republic have repeatedly demanded that I make a decision to cut off all relations, as this cannot be implemented with the Russian side. [passage omitted on Zavgayev's remarks that the situation should be depoliticized]

[Dudayev] We will endure any trial. It will not be better in Russia, I can assure you. The embittered Chechens, who early on saw the real situation, manage to act appropriately in response to Russia's actions even though the international community does not see the behavior of the Russian leadership and its armed forces. [passage omitted]

Zorin, Lobov Discuss Terrorism Potential

LD1110153295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — A statement by the Dudayev side circulated Wednesday will help people understand who stands for peaceful settlement of the Chechen conflict and who has other goals, First Deputy Head of the Territorial Department of Federal Executive Power Bodies in Chechnya Vladimir Zorin said when commenting on the statement by the so-called State Committee for Defense headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The document announced suspension of the Dudayev side's fulfillment of the military agreements and negotiations till the arrival of international observers and UN security forces in Chechnya.

Zorin stressed that the strategy of political settlement in Chechnya will remain unchanged. Under this strategy, the crisis in the Chechen Republic can be settled exclusively by peaceful means. The military agreement must be strictly fulfilled, the inter-Chechen dialogue on settlement must develop, elections must be held and peculiarities of the status of the Chechen Republic must be outlined.

However, the tactics will certainly be changed because of the recent developments and difficulties in preparations for winter, he said.

Zorin met Presidential Representative in Chechnya Oleg Lobov Wednesday to inform him on measures taken in connection with the reports on possible terrorist acts in Groznyy on October 12 and 17. "We must be vigilant and prevent new provocations and acts of sabotage," stressed Zorin.

Several hundreds of Dudayev supporters held a rally near the Territorial Department's building in Groznyy Wednesday. The rally supported Dzhokhar Dudayev and demanded withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya.

Rebels Continue Actions Against Russians

LD1210122895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1212 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Nikolay Zagnoiko and Olga Semyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 12 (ITAR-TASS) — Sources in the press service of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya report growing activity of Chechen rebels over the past few days.

Russian army units and checkpoints of the federal forces in Chechnya came under fire 24 times since midday on Wednesday, three people were wounded but, fortunately, no one was killed due to the measures taken to ensure "the safety of the servicemen of the federal forces," the press centre reported.

The fire was most intensive in the Leninskiy, Staropromyslovskiy and Zavodskoy districts of the capital, the press centre said.

Attacks and threats of attacks have increased against headquarters of the republic's government and federal authorities. Twice last night, automatic gun fire was opened on the operational headquarters of the Russian Interior Ministry in Chechnya.

Today, all people were told to vacate the government building in central Groznyy at 13.30, after an unidentified person phoned to say that "an explosive device" had been planted in one of the rooms of the building.

Although the room indicated by the unknown individual had been strictly guarded, it was decided to get all the staffers and visitors out of the building, to be on the safe side.

Groups of specialists began looking for the bomb.

In Gudermes, a riot policeman from Penza was wounded in a gun attack on the police checkpoint at the railway station and had to be hospitalised.

In the village of Urush-Nichu, a Chechen sharp shooter opened fire on a Russian unit located on the northern outskirts of the village. The fire was returned and the attacker was killed.

Sources in Moscow believe that Dudayev's statement on Wednesday about his unilateral rejection of the military agreement with Moscow has shaken the vulnerable balance between war and peace in Chechnya. Rumours are circulating in Groznyy about new acts of terror prepared by rebels.

Even if no bomb is found in the government building in Groznyy, the aim of the threat will be as good as achieved. The threat has sent a new wave of anxiety through the city, just as intended by the forces interested in destabilising the situation in the republic.

Russian Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS today that a serious threat of new acts of terror and subversion by Dudayev supporters remained in place. "Dudayev does not have sufficient potential for resuming full-scale combat activities against the federal forces in the Chechen republic, but war can be extended by guerilla methods and by new acts of subversion and terror on the part of Dudayev," the Minister said.

Kulikov said the task of the federal forces consisted in "averting this latter option."

As concerns threats from the rebels concerning new acts of terror in the nearest future, including on predetermined and announced dates, Kulikov said "the recent record points to the possibility of their execution. Specific measures are being taken to eliminate the possibility."

Sources in the press centre of the federal forces in Groznyy told TASS that some of the measures taken have already yielded "positive results."

Kulikov: Dudayev's Terrorism Threat Real

LD1210110995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1035 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — There is still a serious threat of new sabotage or acts of terrorism by supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev, in the opinion of Russian Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov. In an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS today, the minister said that "Dudayev does not have the necessary potential to resume full scale military action against federal force groups in the Chechen republic." However, Anatoliy Kulikov added, "it might be continued by partisan methods as well as sabotage and acts of terrorism by Dudayev's side."

The head of the Russian Interior Ministry said that the Federal Forces' task now is to insure that "this possibility is prevented."

Touching on the threat from Dudayev's side that acts of terrorism would be prepared in the near future, even indicating specific dates, Anatoliy Kulikov said: "The chronology of recent events suggests they may be carried out. Specific measures are also being taken to avert this possibility."

The minister gave ITAR-TASS this interview today during a break in the Russian Government's meeting.

Chechens Forsee 'Repeat' of Budennovsk

LD1110150795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Some Chechen negotiators in talks in Groznyy say they do not rule out a repeat of the Budennovsk-style hostage crisis which broke out in southern Russia four months ago.

Nothing short of renewed hostage taking can force Russia to respond accordingly to the rebels' position in the negotiating process and hold talks on the basis of dialogue not dictated terms, one Chechen negotiator told INTERFAX speaking on condition of anonymity in Groznyy on Wednesday.

More than 100 people died after a rebel unit led by field commander Shamil Basayev broke into the southern town of Budennovsk taking large numbers of people hostage there.

The negotiator said several such actions were being planned at the moment, but "we are unable to prevent them even if we wish to do so."

"It would be stupid to resent being bitten by a scorpion or a snake after intruding into their territory," he said.

In the meantime, chief Chechen negotiator Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov demanded that the OSCE mission in Groznyy and UN and Council of Europe representatives act as guarantors of the military accords.

In an interview with INTERFAX on Wednesday, he reaffirmed that the rebels had formally declared suspending implementation of the accords signed on June 30. They also suspended any consultations with the Russian side on the level of working groups.

Yarikhanov said the rebels handed over about 2,000 units of firearms, six units of armor, 4 air defense units and other weaponry before the talks were broken off.

Russia's Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov in a televised interview on Sunday denied any decommissioning of weapons by the rebels.

OSCE Seeks To Reduce Staff After Violence

AU1110152795 Paris AFP in English
1458 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Oct 11 (AFP) — The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) wants to pull out staff from its mission in the Chechen capital Groznyy following increased tension in recent days in the southern Russian republic, a statement said Wednesday [11 October].

"The recent incidents in Groznyy pose a threat to the safety of members of the (OSCE) mission," the statement said, in a reference to a grenade attack on the OSCE building Saturday, which itself came just a day after a bomb attack on Russian military chief in the region General Anatoliy Romanov.

The OSCE chief representative in Groznyy moreover recommended the organisation send mediators to the Russian and Chechen capitals to speed up the peace process, after a demilitarisation accord was frozen by both sides following the attack on Romanov and recent violence.

OSCE 'Concerned' by Groznyy Tensions

LD1110212695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1911 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is deeply concerned about mounting tensions in Groznyy and other parts of Chechnya, Sandor Meszaros, head of the OSCE military observers mission in Groznyy, said in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX Wednesday.

He said that an OSCE Permanent Council resolution condemns terrorist acts against Anatoliy Romanov, commander of federal troops in Chechnya, and against the OSCE mission in Groznyy.

According to Meszaros, the resolution calls on all political forces involved in talks on a peaceful settlement in Chechnya to "show restraint and to continue with efforts aimed at a peaceful and democratic resolution of the crisis."

Meszaros disagreed with the decision to suspend the activities of the Special Supervising Commission the Russian side had taken after an assassination attempt against Romanov. We think that it is very important to resume the work of the commission, he said.

He also stressed that both sides must take concrete steps to implement the July 30 military agreement, to which the OSCE mission is "prepared to contribute in every way possible."

Meszaros said that the number of OSCE military observers in Groznyy will be temporarily reduced. "Some of my colleagues who are currently on vacation will just not return to Groznyy for the time being," he said.

Filatov Opposes State of Emergency

LD1110190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1733 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey Filatov has spoken against the declaration of a state of emergency either in Groznyy or in Chechnya as a whole because of "psychological unpreparedness by all government bodies to work under such conditions."

In an interview with INTERFAX on Wednesday [11 October], he said that neither the authorities nor the law enforcement structures had the skill of working in state of emergency conditions.

Filatov said that even the little experience gained in the area of conflict between North Ossetia and Ingushetia could "bring both positive and negative results." Emergency regulations, he said, affect the activities not only of federal, but also local government structures while there is no unity of political forces in Chechnya.

He said the state of emergency was needed to bring peace and calm to Chechnya rather than widen Russia's military presence or build up pressure, let alone carry out terrorism, in the region.

Volskiy on Chechen Side Leaving Talks

LD1110203095 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian
1800 GMT 11 Oct 95

[Video report by Aleksandr Barkhatov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the one hand, Dzhokhar Dudayev's statement today [to suspend participation in peace talks] confirms Pavel Grachev's version that his military enemy has just won time and preserved armaments. We can also add they have even managed to replenish their strategic food reserves for the winter from the new crops that have been harvested. Following this logic, the supreme council could support the introduction of a state of emergency. But what will the law on a state of emergency change, may we ask? It will probably only help to dissolve parties and public organizations and introduce censorship for journalists. In addition, one could forget about the elections promised in Chechnya. In this case, nothing lies ahead but war and its everlasting consequences.

[Begin recording] [Arkadiy Volskiy, deputy head of the delegation of the Russian Federation Government to the talks in Chechnya] You know, Dudayev has made so many statements before that one must not believe all of them. Therefore, if I were in the Russian leaders' place, I would propose that the two plenipotentiary delegations should now hold a meeting to discuss the situation that has emerged, because more than once we have come across a situation when members of the delegation representing the Dudayev side repeatedly said during the talks: Do not listen to these statements and so on and so forth.

If this approach is accepted, I think a brief round of talks should be held at the beginning of next week. If the delegation confirms these conditions, which are unacceptable to Russia, indeed the talks should be stopped and armed formations should be disarmed by force, all of them. I mean here the so-called Islamic battalions subordinate to Aslan Maskhadov. I also mean the forces under Beslan Gantemirov and others.

[Barkhatov] Can one already today, this evening, foresee the Russian Government's reaction along the lines we are talking about?

[Volskiy] I would foresee it exactly along these lines. [end recording]

Avturkhanov on Dudayev's Negotiation Role

LD1110151195 Moscow INFORMATSIONNOYE AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Dudayev side has not been fulfilling this agreement for a long time now," Umar Avturkhanov, chairman of the Chechnya Committee of National Accord, said in an interview to Ekho Moskvy radio station, and added "and now they have to blame someone for something or other yet again, and completely break off fulfilling the package of military agreements."

In Umar Avturkhanov's view, the Dudayev supporters "never intended to fulfill the package, but simply played the Russians along. There have already been many differences of opinion between Romanov and Maskhadov because of this."

"Instead of disarming, Dudayev's supporters handed in from 10 to 15 useless automatic rifles and demanded detachments be set up with weapons and pay to guard villages," Avturkhanov stressed. "Under this agreement, they fixed up fighters who fought on their side in jobs."

"The negotiations should not be conducted between the Russian federal authorities and Dudayev's supporters, but between Dudayev's supporters and us," Umar Avturkhanov stated. "Then they would not deceive us on anything, and if they start making accusations, then we will sort things out among ourselves."

Russia, in Avturkhanov's view, should carry out the role of arbitrator. "If they disarmed, then troops should be withdrawn or garrisoned where they are deployed, and we should see that there is no mutual feuding, no spreading of the conflict and civil war, and that constitutional order is restored."

Yarikhanov on Azerbaijani Oil Transport

LD1110202995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — If the international consortium fails to coordinate the decision on transporting Azerbaijani oil through Chechnya with "the republic's legitimate authorities," or "the decision will be invalid," Chechen chief negotiator at talks with Russia on a peace settlement in Chechnya Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov told INTERFAX today.

"However, this does not mean that we will blow up the oil pipeline," he said.

Yarikhanov said the consortium's decision on oil transportation through Chechen territory was important for Chechnya. He said this would bring Chechnya "hundreds of millions of dollars." "Why should we object?" he wondered.

"We are the legitimate government and we are capable of ensuring stable oil transportation and protecting the oil pipeline," Yarikhanov said.

Yeltsin Discusses Finances With Novgorod Governor

LD1110212795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov said Wednesday that his meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow earlier this afternoon focused on the protection of people from financial con companies.

According to Nemtsov, Yeltsin was "enthused" by his scheme to redeem people's investments lost as a result of financial speculations.

Nemtsov told INTERFAX that his scheme works as follows: privatization revenues are invested in the charter funds of "strong" banks which will redeem people their lost money "as a sign of gratitude."

Yeltsin reiterated his intention to "be tough" with those who delay pensions, Nemtsov said.

As for "purely Nizhniy Novgorod affairs," Yeltsin agreed to order the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to return its reserve positions to the Nizhegorodsky Kredit bank, which collapsed a week ago. As a result, about 100,000 small investors in the Nizhniy Novgorod region were affected. Now there is a real possibility of using the CBR capacities to redeem people's lost deposits, Nemtsov said.

The governor said his meeting with Yeltsin also touched on the future parliamentary elections.

"If nothing extraordinary happens," Yeltsin will attend the introduction of a new minivan line at the Nizhniy Novgorod car-making plant, invited to do so by Nemtsov.

Chernomyrdin Addresses Bashkir Leaders on Economy

LD1110193295 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin went to a meeting with Yeltsin immediately on his return from the capital of Bashkiria, where celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the republic's independence are continuing. [video shows Chernomyrdin planting a tree]

[Correspondent Igor Demin] Early this morning representatives of the official delegations each planted a tree in front of Bashkiria's Government House. After this Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held a meeting with the heads of the administrations of the republic's towns and districts.

[Begin Chernomyrdin recording] No other country lives like this. The richest countries today, the United States, Canada, and all the European countries live in a normal civilized manner, using a normal system; an international currency and financial system has been set up and is functioning. We are the only ones outside this system. Why? How are we harming everyone? This must be changed. That is the first part, the political part.

The second part, which is no less important, is the legislative part. We must have normal laws. We must live under normal laws. [end recording]

[Demin] In order to resolve the problem of nonpayments, the prime minister recommended that active use should be made of the procedure of reciprocal payments. Replying to many complaints about the excessive increases in the prices of railway services and energy carriers, Chernomyrdin stated that on the previous day at his meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, it was agreed that increases in the price of gas, electricity, and transport fares would be frozen until next January.

Before leaving by air for Moscow the Russian prime minister was able to find time to go to the festivities in the city, to meet people and talk to them.

Perm Mayor Takes 'Radical Steps' Against Corruption

MM1210130195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Perm Mayor Fighting Corruption"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perm Mayor Vladimir Fil has taken radical steps to fight corruption in the bureaucracy. He has banned close relatives from working in the same municipal enterprise, establishment, or local self-government body. Municipal employees are forbidden to receive royalties for articles and speeches or rewards for passing information regarding the activity of local self-government bodies and other official information to other corporate entities, including the mass media. EAN reports that Perm journalists are afraid that an information famine may set in as a result.

Accord With Udmurtia Drafted During Shakhray Visit

LD1110155795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — A draft power-sharing agreement was coordinated by the federal authorities and the leaders of the Republic of Udmurtia (Russia's constituent republic) during Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray's visit to Izhevsk, the capital of Udmurtia, which ended Wednesday, Shakhray's press service told INTERFAX.

This unique document, which makes Udmurtia much more independent in running its budget, is expected to be signed in the Kremlin on October 17.

During his visit to the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant, Shakhray said that state support must be given to defense enterprises.

He also said that the Finance Ministry will extend defense enterprises a $300 million credit.

Sverdlovsk Oblast Municipal Elections Authorized

MK1110151695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Irina Vladykina from Yekaterinburg: "Sverdlovsk Duma Has Authorized Elections for the Heads of Municipal Entities "]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma has fulfilled the requests of the administration heads of major Sverdlovsk Oblast cities — Yekaterinburg, Nizhniy Tagil, and Kamensk-Uralskiy — who favored the election of the heads of municipal entities, and authorized local administration bodies to schedule elections for 17 December 1995 jointly with the State Duma elections. Where the government bodies have not yet been formed, the Oblast Duma recommended that referendums and gatherings be held to find out local residents' opinions and to hold elections on 12 April 1996.

It has been recommended to all local self-administration bodies that they hammer out and adopt their statutes before 1 January 1996. The work on the city statute in Yekaterinburg is nearing completion. Therefore, Yekaterinburg Mayor Arkadiy Chernetskiy insists on holding elections on 17 December this year.

Tuva Passes Law To Hold Elections in Dec

LD1110122195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0312 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Sobetskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kyzyl, 11 Oct (ITAR-TASS) — The parliament of the South Siberian republic of Tuva, which today is celebrating the 51st anniversary of joining the Russian Federation, passed today the last law of a package of laws on the Great Khural (congress) of the Tuva people — a law on elections to this important constitutional body.

The Great Khural has the functions of a particular small referendum. It is the only body to which the constitution of the republic has granted the exclusive right to introduce changes and amendments to it. But at the same time this congress cannot pass decisions on issues relating to the powers of state bodies. After the Tuva president signs the document it will be possible to hold elections of participants to the congress, but there is a preliminary arrangement for these elections to be held on 17 December, at the same time as the elections to the Russian Federation State Duma.

Lapshin Hails Agrarians' Success in Mordvinia

MM1210131495 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Elections" rubric: "Russia Has Begun To Feel the Need for Doers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] leader Mikhail Lapshin regards Nikolay Merkushkin's election as head of the Republic of Mordvinia and Valeriy Kechkin's election as chairman of the State Assembly as a major success for the Agrarian Party on the eve of the parliamentary elections. Both are active APR members: V. Kechkin leads the APR's republic organization in Mordvinia and N. Merkushkin is a member of its board.

"The consolidation of the Agrarians' positions in Mordvinia and the communists' victory in the elections in Volgograd are links in a single chain. The leftist forces' success is only to be expected today. Russia no longer believes the political windbags and Russians have begun to feel the need for doers," Mikhail Lapshin stated.

Economic Issues

Energy Industry Warns of Possible Power Cuts

LD1110202095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Russia's energy industry facilities have almost no fuel and are on the brink of shutting down, creating a "real threat" that electricity and heat supplies will be cut to various Russian regions and autonomies, Viktor Kudryavy, first deputy head of the Russia's Single Power Engineering System (RSPES) joint-stock company, said at a meeting in the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry (Mintopenergo) Wednesday [11 October].

He said that the situation is especially serious in central Russia, where about 70% of energy industry facilities use gas. According to Kudryavy, the amount of gas supplied by the Gazprom joint-stock company to the energy industry enterprises in January-September of 1995 was six billion cubic meters less than for the same period last year.

Gas supplies have been cut 50% to Russia's major electric power plants: Konakovskaya, Kostromskaya, Permskaya, Pecherskaya and Ryazanskaya. If gas supplies are cut further, the plants will have to stop supplying electricity and heat to consumers regardless of whether they pay for the supplies or not, stressed Kudryavy.

RSPES experts say the critical situation with fuel owes to the lack of funds for buying it. Consumers' debt to the energy industry reached over 27 trillion rubles by October 1.

At the same time Gazprom representatives told the meeting in Mintopenergo that energy industry's debt for gas supplies reached almost 8.4 trillion rubles by October 1.

A total of 58% of Russia's steam power plants are fuelled with gas.

Exporters Appeal to Government Over Unequal Tariffs

LD1110163795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — Russian exporters — the chemical industry, wood-processing and non-ferrous metallurgy — are growing inefficient and quickly losing their potential against the background of the currency corridor and the lack of similar corridors on tariffs for natural monopolies (power engineering, transport, and the gas industry), says an appeal by members of the Russian Agrokhim-Soyuz Association passed to the Russian government. The association includes major Russian producers of mineral fertilizers.

The appeal drafters cited as an example the situation at one of the largest Russian producers of mineral fertilizers — the Novgorod Akron joint stock company — which exports over 70% of its products. Since the start of the year the efficiency of the company exports has dropped by 26.8%. The main reason is the permanent and unjustified price increases of natural gas (the main raw material for production of mineral fertilizers) against the background of a stable and even decreasing dollar exchange rate.

They suggested completely cancelling export dues and taxes on imports of equipment for enterprises, over 50% of whose capacities are working for exports.

They suggested lowering to the January 1995 level and leaving unchanged for 1996 the prices and tariffs of monopolists: The Railroad Ministry, Gazprom and the Russian United Energy System. The appeal drafters called for spreading the corridor principle of tariff regulation to monopoly services.

Foreign Companies To Bid on Telecom Company

LD1110163995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (INTERFAX) — The Russian government plans to invite international telecommunications companies to take part in an investment tender on the sale of 49% of shares of the country's leading Svyazinvest telecommunications stock company, Svyazinvest general director Aleksandr Lipatov told INTERFAX on Wednesday.

He said the terms of the tender for 7.7 million company shares would be unveiled to representatives of foreign investment companies during a meeting with Russian government officials. The company's nominal capital was formed by the consolidation of government packages of 85 regional branches this year.

In the first stage, a would-be strategic investor is expected to acquire a package of some 3.8 million shares (24% of assets) at the nominal cost of 1 million rubles with an investment component (additional start-up cost) being set at $400 per share.

Lipatov said the highest bidder in the first stage would be bound to ensure "a fixed volume of investment" in the next two years to be spent on refurbishing regional branches and setting up an advanced communications network of general use in Russia (50 x 50 project).

The remaining 25% of shares is to be sold at special cash auctions to portfolio investors and individuals at the next stage to be completed by the end of 1997. The government is to hold to 51% of the company's registered capital.

Part of profits from auctions is also to be remitted to the federal budget.

The sale of shares and drafting of an investment program is to be carried out by an international consortium led by the British investment bank, NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd., chosen as Svyazinvest's financial consultant following a tender by the Russian Privatization Center, a body responsible for post-investment support for enterprises. Other consortium members include Britain's Barings investment company, U.S. and British consulting firms MC Securities, KPMG and Squire Saunders & Dempsey\Kheifets Binetsky as well as Russia's Inkom-capital investment company, an Inkombank subsidiary.

Russia comes third in the world in telecommunications market growth, according to Barings. The total capacity of its telephone network is 25.5 million numbers (17.1 lines per 100 people).

Decree on Privatization of Siberian Oil Company

MM1110192095 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Russian Federation Government Decree No. 972 "On the Formation of the 'Siberian Oil Company' Joint-Stock Company," signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and dated 29 September 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1403 of 17 November 1992 "On the Special Features of Privatizing and Transforming State Enterprises, Production and Science-and-Production Associations Involved in the Oil and Oil Refining Industries and Petroleum Product Supplies into Joint-Stock Companies (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1992, No. 22, p 1878) and No. 872 of 24 August 1995 "On the Establishment of the 'Siberian Oil Company' Open Joint-Stock Company" the Russian Federation Government decrees that:

1. The "Siberian Oil Company"-"Sibneft" Joint-Stock Company (hereinafter the company) is to be founded and the appended company charter (Footnote) (Not published) ratified.

2. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property is to:

— provide for the formation, in accordance with prescribed procedure, of the company's incorporation capital by including therein blocks of shares assigned to federal ownership in open joint-stock companies in accordance with Appendix No. 1 (Footnote) (Not published);

— ratify the composite plan for the privatization of the company, making provision for the following placement of the first issue of company shares:

51 percent of the shares are to be assigned to federal ownership for three years with five percent apiece of the said shares being transferred as agreed to the control of the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug and to Omsk and Tyumen Oblasts;

49 percent of the shares are to be sold by investment and commercial tender and at auctions;

it is established that the proportion of shares sold to foreign investors should not exceed 15 percent of the company's shares.

3. Viktor Andreyevich Gorodilov is to be appointed president of the company and at the same time chairman of the board of directors.

4. The initial membership of the company's board of directors and auditing commission is to be ratified according to Appendix No. 2 (Footnote) (Not published).

5. The president of the company is to submit company registration documents within a month in accordance with prescribed procedure to the body implementing the state registration of enterprises in accordance with Russian Federation legislation.

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy is to conclude a production contract for 1995-1997 with the company.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government
[Dated] Moscow, 29 September 1995
No. 972

Miners Cancel Nationwide Strike Planned for 12 Oct

LD1110183595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1543 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Igor Ivantsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 11 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian miners will not go out on a nationwide strike scheduled for October 12, Ivan Mokhnachuk, deputy head of the Russian union of coal miners, told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday.

According to Mokhnachuk, the strike was canceled due to "the increased attention from the government" to problems facing miners. He said the government had taken steps to ease the social tension. The miner cited the government decision to provide housing in Russian central regions to all the pensioners, disabled persons and families of the miners killed in industrial accidents, who worked at the Promyshlennaya mine. All the workers of the mine will also be provided with housing in a 72-flat building in Vorkuta.

The Promyshlennya mine in Russia's coal-mining site of Vorkuta was closed down as unpromising and the dismissed workers demanding social guarantees staged a strike beginning last September.

Mokhnachuk said it was unclear yet whether miners of Vorkuta would go on strike on Thursday. A delegation of the miners was to arrive in Moscow later on Wednesday.

According to reports from Slantsy, Leningrad region, miners of the Leningradslanets company are planning no walkouts. The leader of the company's trade union, Mikhail Ryabkov, said the enterprise with a workforce of 5,000 was optimistic over its future after it had struck a deal on fuel deliveries from Slantsy to the Narva hydroelectric station till the year of 2000.

Workers of the Rostovugol company, the biggest in the Don coal-mining region, are supporting the idea to stage a one-day warning strike but are not planning to strike themselves, the leader of the local union, Vladimir Katalnikov, said.

According to Katalnikov, miners of the region receive back pays and now the payments are delayed no longer than for two weeks. And nobody needs a strike for the sake of a strike itself, Katalnikov noted.

Glazyev Analyzes Economic Situation at Forum

MM1110115395 Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksey Merezhkov: "New Economic Policy Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The possible resignation of the Chernomyrdin cabinet has again been a matter of discussion in the corridors of the State Duma since the start of the fall session. Some organs of the mass media attribute this to deputies' short-term election interests. But the premier's position has also ceased to be shared by economists responsible for drafting numerous state programs who were previously regarded as loyal.

The participation of a whole constellation of economists in the scientific practical conference recently held in Moscow under the title "Goals of Future Economic Policy: What Is the Interest of Commodity Producers and Entrepreneurs?" was regarded as a real demarche in the White House. The conference was convened by Sergey Glazyev, the third person on the Congress of Russian Communities [KRO] list, with the participation of the Federation of Commodity Producers, the Entrepreneurs for a New Russia association, the Association of Russian Banks, and the State Duma Committee for Economic Policy. Unexpectedly for the government experts, such prominent figures as the following also took part in the conference: L. Abalkin, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics; S. Shatalin, president of the Reform Foundation; and Academicians S. Sitaryan, D. Lvov, and others.

Moreover, the participants in the conference openly supported the goals and tasks of socioeconomic policy proclaimed in the KRO program and adopted a joint statement on the results of the conference.

They regard the creation of conditions conducive to the revitalization of production activity and economic growth as the priority task. It is essential to carry out tax reform, which must transfer the burden of taxation from income derived from labor and investment activity to differentiated taxation of property, including natural resources. Protecting the interests of the country's commodity producers with a reliance above all on internal reserves is the key factor here, Glazyev stressed.

Glazyev's report provided an analysis of the economic situation and announced the CRC's economic strategy, which contains specific measures to redress the dangerous trends in the economy. The present time abounds in all manner of economic forecasts and blueprints. But it should be noted that the forecasts made by Glazyev a year ago are fully borne out by the figures relating to the current state of the country's economy. Whereas the government never tires of talking about the fact that a slowdown in the rate of decline of output and signs of economic stabilization were observable in the first half of 1995, according to Glazyev's figures, which have been corroborated by research carried out by the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for National Economic Forecasting, the decline in output has worsened. During the first quarter of the current year it was notably 5 percent down on the preceding quarter. And yet 1994 saw a catastrophic slump in industry equivalent to 23 percent.

Sergey Glazyev does not deny that a certain stabilization has been achieved, but only in sectors geared toward the export of Russian raw materials. Meanwhile, in the processing industries, particularly science-intensive sectors, which form the basis of Russian scientific and technical potential, the decline remains very great. Glazyev now forecasts inflation of 7-8 percent per month if current economic policy is maintained. And this is more than double the yardstick which the government never tires of repeating. Radical measures are needed if the situation is to be redressed.

In his report Glazyev stresses that a range of measures are needed, measures which are not confined to controlling the growth in money supply but which include the improvement of its structure, the development of the circulation of bills, and the destruction of organized monopolies, which inflate prices and hinder the movement of goods from producer to consumer. The regulation of prices on goods from sectors with a high degree of monopoly, particularly natural monopolies, and the rationalization of budget expenditure and state purchases are necessary here. An economic upturn requires, in Glazyev's opinion, the operation of mechanisms of free competition. Every citizen and enterprise should be guaranteed free access to the market and protection against highhandedness and racketeering. This requires the improvement of civil legislation and the development of specific laws, the judicial system for resolving economic disputes, and antimonopoly regulation.

In foreign economic activity the state must stick to the principle of sensible protectionism, using tariff and nontariff measures to protect the home market. A predictable and stable ruble exchange rate policy designed to maintain the competitiveness of Russian goods is also essential. Conditions conducive to the introduction of full internal and foreign convertibility of Russian currency must be created.

But all these measures can be implemented only if there is national and political accord. Such accord is only possible if you have the constructive force of a mass sociopolitical association whose task is to organize the process of overcoming the country's crisis, absorbing and combining different pieces of knowledge and opinions and putting the best experience to work for the country's benefit.

The approval of the KRO's economic strategy by representatives of the economic elite who are not members of this electoral association indicates not only the growing authority of the KRO, which has joined the lead group in the runup to the State Duma elections, but also the fate that the government seems to have lost the initiative in the development and promotion of economic reforms.

Daily Views Government's Inflation Policy

MM1110161395 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 10 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by Yevgeniy Vasilchuk: "Government and Budget Becoming Destroyers of Economy"]

FBIS Translated Text] The authorities' pained reaction to the changes in the report figures and forecast for inflation betray the government's uncertainty. The proclaimed financial stabilization has every chance of turning out to be a myth. In particular the optimism of the Russian delegation at the routine meeting of G-7 finances ministers and central bank leaders in Washington 7 October was received rather skeptically.

In the period 26 September through 2 October consumer prices rose 0.8 percent. That is substantially lower than the 1.2 percent rise in inflation in the preceding week. But the increase in prices for services, 2.1 percent, considerably outstrips the overall dynamic of inflation.

The short-term easing of inflation has enabled the government to return to its initial assessment of September inflation — 4.5 percent. Before that in preparing for Viktor Chernomyrdin's forthcoming speech in the State Duma official experts used an assessment of 5 percent for the increase in consumer prices in September.

The downward review of inflation indicators compelled the economic departments' specialists urgently to rework the premier's draft Duma report. Nonetheless, according to the information of official experts, this was done under pressure from the government rather than as a result of the true easing of inflation.

The overall state of the real economy does not give rise to great fears, at least in the short term. Stabilization in industry, according to the Ministry of the Economy forecast, will continue through the end of the year. The rise in prices will hardly exceed 6-7 percent a month in October-November. Only then is the more intensive rise of inflation or, if the Central Bank keeps to its tough monetary course, even a reduction in its pace, possible. Although the fact that the government intends actively to put into operation administrative levers for curbing the growth of prices promises nothing good. The hasty repeal of export duty and the introduction of internal excise on fuel and raw material will also substantially intensify the inflationary avenue in the economy.

The state of the financial sector is disquieting. The government is continuing to add to the pyramid of the state debt. The free resources of the population and the money market are being mobilized on a "compulsory voluntary" basis for the budget system for nonproductive consumption. While tough monetary restrictions are retained this could lead to a series of bankruptcies for banks and the enterprises of the real sector connected with them. On the other hand the acceleration of monetary privatization promised in the fourth quarter would destabilize stock markets.

Then under the blow of the monetary restrictions the Bank of Russia is experiencing state finances will inevitably decline. When the Russian finances minister states that the rapid inflation rates in 1996 will lead to a large budget deficit then that is not entirely the case. The level of inflation depends not so much on the size of the fiscal gap and ways of financing it as on the effectiveness with which the tax and budget and credit and financial systems and the country's real production apparatus are working. The suppression of inflation to 1 percent a month will put the economy on monetary starvation rations in 1996. The level of revenue for the main types of tax could easily decline to 20-30 percent. At any rate there is scarcely anyone now who will give reliable guarantees that this will not happen. The constriction of the tax base will make the forecast of a budget deficit of 4 percent of GDP unfeasible.

The execution of the 1995 budget shows the joy with which the government uses additional inflation revenue. In the 1995 draft budget inflation for the year was initially set at 30 percent then the ceiling was raise to 70 percent with a budget deficit of 7-8 percent of GDP.

In actual fact in January-September 1995 alone inflation was 4.6 times higher than the level planned for the entire yea while the budget deficit against the GDP was half what was planned. That is the law of macroeconomics which so far is working in the government's favor. Next year the authorities run the risk of experiencing the unpleasant aspects of its operation.

Even the IMF cannot repeal the laws of economics. The refusal to use foreign loans to cover the budget deficit will result for the Russian economy in an additional inflation rate of 1-2 percent a month at the most. Investments in the budget can only can from this turn of events. If, of course, political stability is successfully preserved and agreement is reached with our creditors on our debts.

Targeted Program Funds Dissipated, Wasted

MM1110194995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (Departmental Supplement Section) in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 9

[Article by Boris Logubenko under "Budget-96" rubric: "Targeted Programs for 'Other Needs'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal targeted programs will be an obstacle to the adoption of the 1996 budget on first reading. Planned funds — around 36 trillion rubles [R] — could once again go on all kinds of "other needs."

There were 14 innovational, social, ecological, and production federal targeted programs planned in 1994, 49 are planned for 1995, and the draft federal budget for 1996 includes 29 programs consisting of almost 50 subprograms and another 13 "top priority" programs. Most of them migrate from budget to budget without being implemented. As a rule the Finance Ministry does not issue funds in full for a good reason: The amount of money promised in the budget law is not available and there is no prospect of its being available.

Consequently most programs are being funded at 40-50 percent and, not uncommonly, at 0.5 percent.

The funding of research and development under the "Energy-Saving Electrical Technology" program has suffered the following reverses: The Ministry of Science and Technical Policy requested R56.5 billion, the government released R16 billion, thanks to the Finance and Economy Ministries the federal budget received... R800 million, and in 1995 the Finance Ministry allocated the grand total of... R370 million, that is to say 150 times less "from beginning to end." All that can be done for such peanuts is to recycle waste paper in the form of "scientific energy-saving" and simultaneously bury the idea itself.

Three trillion rubles were requested to support metallurgy; it is proposed to allocate R130 billion to 26 enterprises — an average of R5 billion each. And so on. Russian forestry was lucky with an allocation of R1.4 trillion, of which R1.3 trillion went on "other needs" (that is to say current needs). It was easier to achieve this gobbling up of treasury funds on public items.

Of course, we can talk about the Soviet tradition and practice of obtaining reserves: "Ask for more and you will get less." And yet, yet....

Even if a program is 50-percent funded, that is not enough to get the show on the road: The deal is not completed, the taxpayer does not see even one-tenth of the end results, and the money has gone (vanished, disappeared). But programs are being accepted. Those taking the money, dissatisfied with the amount of it, cadge willy-nilly, guided by the philistine rule: "Take what you are given, otherwise you will not even get that." It is a good thing that squandering it has become an age-old tradition, so that it is not classed as a crime. Maybe on account of the miserly amounts involved.

Penniless programs are useless programs. Their result is eternally unfinished work in the capital and social spheres.

Matters are reaching a point whereby resources are being stolen from a program by reorientation. Therefore we cannot be surprised if the programs' essence does not correspond to their names.

For example, funds were allocated for the leasing of agricultural equipment, but two-thirds of the money went on supporting agricultural machine building. Funds for the "Increasing Soil Fertility" federal program went mainly on the production of mineral fertilizers, 80 percent of which are being exported. The remaining funds are enough to reclaim land for four or five medium-sized farms. Two-thirds of funds earmarked for supporting private farms facilitated an increase in the prosperity of "private farmers" who cultivate kitchen gardens on balconies inside the capital's Garden Ring. And so on. So did the peasants eventually receive the peanuts needed and allocated under the law (!)? Are the arguments deliberately inflamed in the mass media to the effect that the agro-industrial complex is a "bottomless pit" correct?

Of the R34 trillion planned for programs in 1996, 2 percent is for programs of a social nature, 23 percent for programs of a production nature, and 44 percent to support base sectors, that is to say effectively for their funding.

There are also "mixed" programs — for example, the "Children's Food Industry." This would seem to be a socially oriented program, as well as a production-oriented program. But no, do not guess. Purchasing activity — that is more accurate. The selfsame reorientation of funds. Of R270 billion, R70 billion has been earmarked for import purchases of this type of food.

In 1996 it is proposed to use 54 percent of funds for programs for capital investment (the Economy Ministry's prerogative), 13 percent for research and development (Science Ministry), and 33 percent for other (for which read current) expenditure (ministries and departments).

If the proportion of current expenditure is great, why should it be carried out in the budget through programs? Is it not simpler, without indulging in sharp practice, to do so through ministries' and departments' current expenditure? But it must be accounted for, albeit not strictly.

It is to be regretted that State Duma deputies were unable to take the draft law "On Federal Targeted Programs" to the adoption stage, which could have put an end to the organizational and financial chaos.

International Affairs

Udovenko Plays Down 'Difficulties' in Russian Relations

AU1110120395 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 7 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Ukraine's Supreme Council Press Service: "Even Though It Is Fall, 'There Is No Cooling Down'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Russia — H. Udovenko and A. Kozyrev — will hold official negotiations in Moscow. An accord on this was reached during their meeting in New York, where they took part in the 50th session of the UN General Assembly.

Hennadiy Udovenko does not think that "a cooling down has taken shape" in relations between our states. According to him, there is a series of indications of a constructive dialogue between the two external political departments. Among these indications, H. Udovenko has listed the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the work of the Conference of CIS Foreign Ministers. He also gave a positive assessment to the response by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the note in which Kiev expressed its concern about the operations in the Dniester Region on eliminating obsolete ammunitions that may do ecological harm to adjacent Ukrainian areas.

In our minister's opinion, the difficulties in Ukrainian-Russian relations "are being exaggerated by the press, but this does not conform to our intentions." At the same time, H. Udovenko pointed out that Ukraine "certainly takes into account the factor of preparations for the elections in Russia."

The minister called upon the Russian side "to give up the old mentality and recognize historic realities." "Russia must realize that Ukraine is an independent state and that there can be no going back," he said.

Deputy Views Conference of Ukrainian, Russian Legislators

WS1110124795 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 13-26 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with People's Deputy Taras Stetskiv, by Viktor Tymoshenko; place and date not given: "Taras Stetskiv: 'We Are United With the 'Russia's Choice' Faction By an Idea'"; first two paragraphs are POST-POSTUP introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second meeting between delegations comprised of the Ukrainian Supreme Council deputies and the Russian State Duma deputies was held on 8-10 September in Moscow. The meeting was organized from the Ukrainian side by the "Reforms" faction, and from the Russian side by the "Russia's Choice" faction. Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk arrived in Moscow with the people's deputies delegation.

The Russian-Ukrainian conference, held in the State Duma building, addressed issues concerning the development of the economic and political situation in Russia and Ukraine, as well as the two parliaments' legislative activities. Such issues as the situation of Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language in Russia, and of Russians and the Russian language in Ukraine were thoroughly discussed. Ukraine's People's Deputy Taras Stetskiv gave an interview to our correspondent in Moscow.

[Tymoshenko] Mr. Stetskiv, what is the reason behind your legislators' arrival in Moscow?

[Stetskiv] This is already the second meeting between people's deputies from the "Reforms" and "Russia's Choice" factions. The first one was held in May 1995 in Kiev. We are united by the idea of a constant dialogue between the Russian and Ukrainian legislators on the resolution of economic and political problems in our countries. Our factions are close to each other in spirit and programs. In addition, we, the Ukrainian legislators should look for allies in the State Duma. Aware of the fact that an election campaign is currently under way in Russia, we regard our arrival as an act of support for people with a truly democratic and civilized point of view — the "Russia's Choice" faction. However, our arrival has also a somewhat pragmatic nature. The problem of economic reform in Ukraine is already very similar to that in Russia. We can use the experience of the Russian privatization policy. At the same time, however, we can avoid the mistakes which Russia has made. We understand very well how dangerous it is to abandon the policy of financial stabilization.

[Tymoshenko] What is your standpoint on the unfriendly statements made by Boris Yeltsin on 7 September? According to Yeltsin, Ukraine is fully responsible for the problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations. What is more, Kuchma is personally responsible, since he allegedly remains under the influence of his nationalistic retinue, and is unable to implement the agreements signed earlier between Russia and Ukraine.

[Stetskiv] Those were made-up, untrue, and biased statements, which obviously had been prompted to Yeltsin by Ukraine's enemies. In reality, the problem lies in the fact that the two sides are unable to agree on the status and conditions regarding the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Russia protects its own interests. It does not want to agree to the status of "foreign troops on a foreign territory" for its portion of the Black Sea Fleet, given that it would have to pay [for the stationing of its troops]. Russian bureaucrats are accustomed to getting everything for nothing. We are dealing here with an imperial mentality, the "older brother" policy, and not with the wish to understand, and what is more, to accept entirely the legal conditions posed by the Ukrainian side.

Navy Officer on Current State of BSF Division

WS1110155295 Sevastopol FLOT UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 30 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with First Rank Captain Yevhen Lupakov, the Ukrainian Navy Officers Association head, by V. Prytula and H. Slavskyy; place and date not given: "Russian Leadership Has No Wish To Resolve the Black Sea Fleet's Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Russian President Boris Yeltsin's recent pitiless demarche, which in very sharp form and groundlessly blamed the Ukrainian leadership for abandoning the agreements reached earlier on the Black Sea Fleet, and cooperative (or simply saying — positive) reaction to this on the part of the so-called Coordinating Council of the Black Sea Fleet Officers Assembly — the organization which is not registered or envisaged by any regulations — indicate that the Russian side has no real wish to resolve the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet. First Rank Captain Yevhen Lupakov, the Ukrainian Navy Officers Association head, has been asked to provide a commentary on the situation which developed around the Fleet problem. He also believes that official Moscow purposely torpedoes the negotiatory process.**

[Lupakov] The resolution of the Black Sea Fleet problem has been purposely delayed by the Russian leadership, and its representatives currently staying in Crimea, including the Black Sea Fleet Coordination Council. Russia is not interested in resolving this complicated problem, because as long as the problem exists, and as long as the Black Sea Fleet's status is undetermined, Russian servicemen have plenty of opportunities to loot everything that can be shipped out of Ukraine through this "little black hole." Incidentally, literally a couple of days ago, another Black Sea Fleet landing ship, fully loaded with property and other things, not further specified (though, I think the Russians know what kind of things those are, since they do not ship out rubbish) left Sevastopol for one of the Russian ports. However, the most important thing is that these are the battleships which are not controlled by the Ukrainian Security Service and customs officers. This is exactly the thing in which Russian admirals and generals with Moscow's visa are most interested. Moscow officials are also interested in another thing: they do not want Ukraine to have its own fleet.

[FLOT UKRAYINY] What is your standpoint on the theses which are being drawn by the Black Sea Fleet's leadership to the effect that Ukraine does not need its own fleet, given that the Russian Black Sea Fleet can protect Ukraine's interests in the Black Sea region?

[Lupakov] Those theses have not been drawn solely by admirals. Those are Boris Yeltsin's proposals included in his letter to Leonid Kuchma two months ago. Precisely in this letter Yeltsin proposed the protection of Ukraine on Ukrainian territory for Ukrainian money, but by Russian servicemen. In my opinion, this is nonsense. There has never been such a situation in the world. It is possible only when during a war a country is conquered by foreign troops. However, fortunately Ukraine is currently an independent state.

[FLOT UKRAYINY] Still, Captain, on what conditions, in your opinion — which is the opinion of an officer and a deputy — could the Russian portion of the Black Sea Fleet be stationed on Ukrainian territory?

[Lupakov] In accordance with the Supreme Council's resolution of 1991, the law on the status of foreign troops deployed on Ukrainian territory was to have been drafted. We managed to succeed in the fact that this issue has been raised, and currently the Supreme Council is drafting such a law, which will be discussed in October 1995.

Currently, only the Black Sea Fleet's status on Ukrainian territory remains undetermined. However, undoubtedly, the Black Sea Fleet's status should be determined as a foreign force, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet ships can be deployed only on a limited scale, similar to that on which ships of the former Soviet Union were based in the Mediterranean Sea and other states. A flotilla will be deployed at the base, while its personnel will be stationed onboard. Russia will pay for the lease of the base and this deep- water port in accordance with international calculations, and that is all.

Russia has plenty of soil. Siberia is very large, therefore, everything which is based on the ground should be instantly shipped out beyond the Ukrainian border. As for the stationing of the Ukrainian Navy Staff and other units in Sevastopol, the very issue of their possible redeployment is simply inadmissible! Only an enemy of the Ukrainian nation can sign an agreement on the redeployment of Ukrainian Navy Staff from Sevastopol. In this case, the young Ukrainian Fleet will not be able to rise from its knees even in 10 years, and its rebirth will cost the Ukrainian nation hundreds of millions of dollars or maybe even more.

[FLOT UKRAYINY] As far as we know, the Black Sea Fleet formally remains under double subordination — Ukrainian and Russian — until 31 December 1995. However, after that date, its status will become even more undetermined. What is going to happen? Russia is delaying the negotiations, thus the Black Sea Fleet's problem will not be fully resolved by 31 December anyway?

[Lupakov] This is exactly why a group of national-democratic deputies insisted that Ukraine's Supreme Council will resume the discussion of this issue. This issue will be discussed some time in October, and we are simply obligated to pass the law by 31 December 1995, which will stipulate the final determination on the Black Sea Fleet's status: What kind of units there are, to whom they belong, and on what conditions they are deployed on our territory. Ukraine itself should determine what is deployed on its territory. We should not wait for anyone — Russia or anyone else — to teach us. This is our territory, and we ourselves will determine the status, conditions, and all the rest which concerns the Russian Black Sea Fleet units on Ukrainian territory. Good riddance to them if they do not want to cooperate.

[FLOT UKRAYINY] Thank you for the conversation.

Government, Russia Agree on New Gas Payment Method

LD1010151395 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian
1240 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — An agreement has been reached on a substantially different approach for Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine and payment methods during a meeting between a delegation from the Russian joint stock company "Gazprom," headed by board member Aleksandr Pushkin, and Pavlo Lazarenko, first deputy prime minister of Ukraine.

Mykhaylo Holyshev, the press secretary of the first deputy prime minister, told a UNIAR correspondent that the talks focused mainly on the delimitation of the mechanism for paying for the transit of gas and the direct payment by Ukrainian enterprises for gas consumed. Treaties will be concluded between Russia's "Gazprom" and "Ukrhazprom" solely for the payment of gas transits. Direct treaties will be concluded separately with Ukrainian commercial organizations on the responsibility for paying and supplying the fuel to Ukraine. Since the state is not able to continue bearing the burden of guaranteeing the industry's debts, decisions will be made through commercial organizations, with the exception of people's problems and state financed organizations.

Energy sources will be distributed through the Ukrainian energy exchange and will be bought by enterprises that can afford to pay for them.

The list of enterprises that will be in charge of this issue is not yet known. Only the main approaches are at issue for the moment.

The draft agreement to supply gas to Ukraine for 1996 is for 50- 52 billion cubic meters of gas.

Russia Hands Over Control of Satellite Sich-1

LD1110205795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1830 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — On 11 October the control over the first Ukrainian satellite Sich-1, launched on 31 August, was transferred to the Yevpatoriya space vehicle control center. The news agency UNIAN learned this at the National Space Agency of Ukraine [NSAU].

Until then, the flight of Sich-1 was controlled by the military space forces of the Russian Federation.

From today information will be received and processed entirely by the specialists of the Yevpatoriya center.

As UNIAN was told at the NSAU, a program covering the period until the end of 1995 has been developed. This program provides for the use of the information received from the satellite Sich-1 by ministries and departments of Ukraine and also envisages that certain tasks will be carried out for the Russian Federation.

Last Tank To Be Destroyed Under CFE Treaty by 31 Oct

LD1110185795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1548 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Oct 11 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine will destroy the last tank under the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) by October 31, the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry told Interfax - Ukraine on Wednesday.

The tank will be scrapped at the Armory Maintenance Plant in Kiev.

Under the CFE treaty, Ukraine has to destroy 1,974 tanks, 1,545 armored vehicles and 550 warplanes by November 16.

In addition, Ukraine has pledged to scrap additionally 271 tanks, 749 armored vehicles and 208 artillery systems which previously belonged to the 126th Coast Guard Division and the 810th Marine Brigade of the Soviet Black Sea fleet.

In accordance with the CFE treaty and an agreement signed by the CIS states in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992, no more than 4,080 tanks, 5,050 armored vehicles, 1,090 warplanes and 330 combat helicopters should be left in Ukraine by the end of 1995.

The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty signed by 30 European countries on November 19, 1990, came into force on July 17, 1992.

By November 19, 1995, the deadline for the implementation of the first stage of the treaty, Ukraine will reach the level of disarmament provided for in the treaty, the press service said.

National Affairs

Parliament Approves Government's Economic Program

LD1110201495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1945 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 11 Oct — The Ukrainian Supreme Council has approved the Cabinet of Ministers' action program presented by Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk at the session of parliament this morning. Of the 323 deputies present, 234 four voted in favor, 61 against, and 17 abstained.

In the final resolution, deputies instructed the government to sum up proposals put forward during the debate and make relevant amendments to the program.

Only 65 deputies voted to support the Supreme Council presidium's motion to reject the program and instruct the Cabinet to submit an amended version for the 1996 budget debate.

Parliament Considers President, Supreme Council Treaty

LD1110124395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0940 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Factions and groups of the Ukrainian parliament whose members had signed the constitutional treaty between the president and the Supreme Council have held governmental meetings about their joint actions, according to sources in the Statehood group.

According to a preliminary agreement, the Statehood, Rukh, Reforms, Unity, Interregional Deputies Group and Independence factions and groups will support the program in full but will make some observations.

There is another proposal: to approve the program in its first reading and then to finalize it jointly with the government.

Udovenko Regrets 'Confidential Letter' Publication

AU1110120195 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 7 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko expressed regret in connection with the publication in the press of his confidential letter to Ukrainian President L. Kuchma in which he analyzes "the strategic course in the attitude toward the CIS countries" that was recently adopted in Russia.

At his meeting with journalists on 5 October, he underscored that Ukraine had not received an official text of that document and that his letter had been written "within the framework of previous work." The minister said he will conduct a strict investigation at the Foreign Ministry apparatus on the fact of the publication.

Marchuk: Socialists' Alternative Program 'Provocation'

LD1110172395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1230 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — After Nataliya Vitrenko presented the socialist faction's alternative program to the government's actions, Yevheniy Marchuk, prime minister of Ukraine, made a statement on the government's behalf.

The statement says the government considers Vitrenko's speech "a pre-planned provocation against the government." Marchuk pointed out that Nataliya Vitrenko did not attempt to participate in drafting the Cabinet of Ministers' program.

He requested the parliament consider the statement "according to a law prescribed procedure."

The head of the Supreme Council, Oleksandr Moroz, said that, in accordance with the procedure, a deputy may, in the allocated time, "express any point of view" which is exactly what Nataliya Vitrenko did.

Oleksandr Moroz instructed the Supreme Council for Procedures, Deputy Ethics and Safeguards of Deputy Activities commission to study the government's statement and to report back to the session.

New Justice Minister on Plans, Political Activities

WS1110131395 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3

[Interview with Ukraine's newly appointed Justice Minister Serhiy Holovatyy, by VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI correspondents Iryna Desyatnykova and

Olha Chorna; place and date not given: "I Agree To Commit Political Suicide"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

There Will Be No Revolution in the Ministry of Justice

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] Mr. Holovatyy, when you became minister of justice you laid down the office of the president of the "Jurists Foundation," the head of the Association of Ukrainian lawyers, and abandoned the Jurist Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Are you going to resign from work in the Supreme Council?

[Holovatyy] This is for the Supreme Council to decide. In similar cases one principle is applied. However, I am asking myself who will gain from the fact that I will be deprived of a deputy's mandate. Do I need it to protect myself from punishment for a committed crime? Or perhaps, as a deputy I caused a lot of damage to the state? Who will suffer if, despite the fact that I will not get paid from the state budget, I will continue to fulfill my obligation by protecting the interests of my voters?

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] You have earned the reputation of a brave politician who, as a rule, stubbornly defends his point of view, which often differs from the official one. Will the appointment to such a high post have an impact on your principled character?

[Holovatyy] Yes, this is true, up to this time I have been a political activist, a peoples' deputy who had an independent political position. I was head of public organizations which were in opposition to the state leadership in cases when they disagreed with the authorities. However, now I am part of the establishment, of the Ukrainian Government. The Ministry of Justice is not a public organization. Its aim is to implement the state's legal policy. Thus, after becoming a state official I shall work for the official authority.

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] What is the first thing which you are going to do in your new job?

[Holovatyy] I will begin by meeting people who work in the ministry, and familiarizing myself with their opinions on the situation in the ministry. I would like to find out what they planned and how we are going to work further. We will need plenty of time for this. After all, I do not even know how many employees there are in the Ministry of Justice. One thing I can promise — there will be no revolution.

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] Many people are interested in how the new minister of justice is going to resolve the problem of the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self Defense [UNA-UNSO].

[Holovatyy] With full regard to the existing law, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights. I, as minister of justice, can assure you that neither the former nor the latter will be violated.

Yevhen Marchuk Put Forward My Candidature

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] You were in the group of people's deputies who protested against setting up the Constitutional Court in Ukraine. Do you still have the same opinion?

[Holovatyy] Recently, the "Democracy Through Law" commission from Venice, which became familiar with the constitutional procedure in our state after signing the Constitutional Accord, accomplished its work. Five experts from European countries came to the following conclusion: the absence of a full-fledged Basic Law will not allow the Constitutional Court — if such is formed — to perform its functions fully and in an appropriate manner. This means that it is not worthwhile to form it before the new constitution is passed.

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] Your opponents assess your appointment to the post of justice minister as a sign of gratitude from the president for your preparation and active participation in reaching the Constitutional Accord.

[Holovatyy] The prime minister proposed my candidature. He, not the president, invited me into the government. This can be proven by more than one person. Therefore, we cannot talk about any kind of gratitude. The more so since Leonid Kuchma proposed that we should cooperate before he became president. Even afterwards he asked me to work in his team on more than one occasion. I did not agree.

[VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI] What influenced your decision this time?

[Holovatyy] The fact that the prime minister chose me and that the president agreed on this decision finally convinced me that I should give up my personal interests. Even if it is going to be — according to my friends — a political suicide. I had other personal plans, as well as political ones. However, when one is shown such confidence, one can give them up. If it is really necessary for the state, the government, and the president, I am obligated to agree to head the ministry. If I win — our state and nation will gain from it. If I fail — that was my fate. This is a choice, a challenge. This is exactly the kind of a situation in which we are chosen by others. Therefore, we should work for elevated goals and ideals for the state's future, even if it means personal losses.

UNIAN Reports Dispute in Crimean Parliament Over Flags

LD1110151095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1230 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol — Deputies in the Crimean parliament failed to make a final decision on the question of the presence of the Russian state flag and the national flag of the Crimean Tatars in the session hall of the Crimean Supreme Council. This was reported by a UNIAN correspondent in Crimea.

After a number of failed attempts to vote on a resolution to withdraw the state flag of the Russian Federation and the national flag of the Crimean Tatars from the session hall the resolution was not passed. The resolution to place the state flag of Russia alongside the state symbols of Ukraine and Crimea was not passed either.

Crimean Parliament Considers Future of Premier, Prosecutor

LD1110162695 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1300 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol — "Crimean Prime Minister Anatoliy Franchuk and his son, by standing for the Ukrainian parliament, are trying to escape their responsibility for the fact that the Crimean economy is not prepared for winter and that the sowing campaign has been effectively frustrated," stated Vasyl Kyselyov, head of the provisional parliament commission set up to consider the address to the Crimean parliament of Valentyn Kuptsov, prosecutor of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, at the session of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

Vasyl Kyselyov proposed that the issue of Valentyn Kuptsov's address should be considered immediately arguing that "already today he was directly threatened by Anatoliy Franchuk."

He also stated that the head of the Supreme Council of Crimea, Yevheniy Suprunyuk, had violated the law of Ukraine on the Prosecutor's Office by sending to the prosecutor general of Ukraine a letter on releasing Valentyn Kuptsov, from his office and on appointing in his place Bronyslav Yevstafyev.

Vasyl Kyselyov has also suggested considering the issue of termination of the term in office of Anatoliy Franchuk, due to his turning 60 years of age, in accordance with the law of Ukraine on state service.

The parliament has voted to consider the issue, proposed by Vasyl Kyselyov, today, 11 October.

Crimea Parliament Asks For Change in Edict

964F0011A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 30 Sep 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "On Edict No. 759 of the President of Ukraine of 19 August 1995 'On Organs of State Executive Power of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 19 August 1995 the president of Ukraine issued the edict "On Organs of State Executive Power of the Autonomous Republic Of Crimea," which, until the adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine, establishes the procedure for the formation of the Government of Crimea, creates rayon state administrations in Crimea, and places them under the jurisdiction of the Government of Crimea, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the president of Ukraine.

In compliance with Directive No. 209/954-rp of 14 September 1995 "On the Appointment of Chairmen of Rayon State Administrations of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," chairmen of rayon state administrations were appointed in 12 rayons of Crimea.

Edict No. 759 of the president of Ukraine of 19 August 1995 and Directive No. 209/95-rp of the president of Ukraine of 14 September 1995 were issued in violation of existing legislation of Ukraine.

Thus the president of Ukraine established the procedure for appointment to the position and dismissal from the position of prime minister of the Government of Crimea and the positions of other members of the Government of Crimea during the period until the adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine.

But the procedure for the formation and the activity of the Government of Crimea are regulated by the law of the Republic of Crimea of 29 September 1994 "On the Government of Crimea," which is in effect.

In compliance with OSCE recommendations and Decree No. 179/95-VR of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 25 May 1995, a draft of the new Constitution of the Republic of Crimea has been developed and adopted as a basis. In it the procedure for the formation of the Government of the Republic of Crimea complies with the law of the Republic of Crimea "On the Government of Crimea." The draft of the new Constitution of Ukraine has not been discussed yet.

Article 59 of the constitutional treaty between the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the president of Ukraine of 8 June 1995 gave the Republic of Crimea as an autonomous formation the right to independently resolve problems placed within its jurisdiction by the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine.

The Constitution of Ukraine establishes the right of the Government of Crimea to independently resolve problems placed within its jurisdiction, including those related to the procedure for organization, the authority, and the activity of local and republic organs of power.

In compliance with Point 1 of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine of 17 March 1995 "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," it is within the republic's jurisdiction to determine the authority and policy for the activity of the republic organs and the organs of local power (local self-government).

The Republic of Crimea was also granted this authority by the law of Ukraine of 30 June 1992 "On Division of Authority Between Organs of State Power of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea," on the basis of which the republic constitution was drawn up.

At the present time the activity of organs of power and local self-government in Crimea is being carried out on the basis of the laws of Ukraine of 26 June 1994 "On the Formation of Local Organs of Power and Self-Government" and 16 March 1993 "On Local Councils of People's Deputies and Local and Regional Self-Governments," with the subsequent amendments.

Consequently Edict No. 759 of the president of Ukraine of 19 August 1995 and his directive No. 209/95-rp of 14 September 1995 were published in violation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the constitutional amendments between the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the president of Ukraine, as well as the laws of Ukraine and Crimea.

The Supreme Council of Crimea decrees:

1. The following proposals shall be made to the president of Ukraine:

1.1. To make changes to Edict No. 759 of the president of Ukraine of 19 August 5 "On Organs of State Executive Power of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" (the Draft of the corresponding edict is appended.)

1.2. To rescind Directive No. 209/95-rp of the president of Ukraine of 14 September 1995 "On the Appointment of Chairmen of Rayon State Administrations of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea."

2. Until the adoption by the president of Ukraine of a decision regarding the present decree, the chairmen of rayon councils of Crimea shall not implement measures related to the elimination of executive committees of the rayon councils.

3. Control of the implementation of the given decree shall be the responsibility of the presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Crimea Ye. Suprunyuk
Simferopol
21 September 1995
No. 559-1

Economic Issues

Deputy Prime Minister on Economic Problems

WS1210111595 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 3 Oct 95 pp 1,3

[Interview with Anatoliy Kinakh, Ukrainian deputy prime minister for issues of industrial policy, by Olena Hubina; place and date not given: "The State Must Strive for Such Relations That Will Render It an Economically Worthwhile Partner" — first paragraph is MOLOD UKRAYINY introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will soon discuss the Program of Actions by the new Ukrainian Government. Public opinion has so far been concentrating not so much on the program itself as separate quotations taken out of it. Most controversy seems to be caused by the state's increased influence on management of economic processes. We asked Anatoliy Kinakh, Ukrainian deputy prime minister for issues of industrial policy, to explain the situation.

[Kinakh] According to the Constitutional Agreement [between the president and parliament], a draft of the government's Program of Actions was officially submitted to the Supreme Council on 22 September. I will primarily raise a set of issues related to industrial policy, which is one of the program's most significant parts. Its prime goal is to continue a pretty tough monetary- financial policy intended to reduce inflation — a major factor determining the future of our economy. At the same time, we need to create flexible economic conditions allowing Ukrainian enterprises to adapt themselves to the complicated process of establishing market structures.

By the term "management" of all economic processes, the government does not mean returning to the central-command economy, but management primarily through economic methods. At present, we achieved a number of positive results in our efforts to stabilize the financial system. They include lower inflation and quite a stable exchange rate of the karbovanets, although there are some problems here.

If you were to analyze microeconomic figures in general, particularly those covering eight months of this year, they are alarming. The overall production decline reached 14.1 percent. Even though it is half what it was in the past year, this figure is pretty high. The production decline in the machine-building industry amounted to 26 percent, and in light industry — 40 percent. In other words, the biggest decline was in the industries which manufacture science-intensive and high-technology products. In light industry, these are products that ensure fast capital turnover and more money for the budget, shape the consumer market, and determine the standards of living.

Another alarming factor, which was also examined during the works on the program and during a process of adjustment of economic policies, is the growing share of energy-consuming, raw-material, and mining industries in the overall production structure. A share of the metallurgical industry in Ukrainian production over eight months of this year amounts to 21 percent, compared with 11 percent in 1990. In 1990, the machine-building industry share was 30 percent, slumping to only 14 percent this year. At present, however, we cannot afford to develop energy-consuming industries.

There is a threat that we may lose some ground in those industries that determine the scientific and technical potential of our state.

This is why we need to combine the positive results achieved at the macro level, and apply all the possible flexible economic tools to boost the production of competitive products and services.

[Hubina] But what does the "strengthening of the state sector" mean in this situation?

[Kinakh] The program does not contain such a phrase. Its main idea is that all structural transformations in the economy and industry cannot be carried out only through self-regulative market processes. Unfortunately, we still do not have a healthy and active market environment in our country that is regulated by supply and demand. While forging market structures (a market self-regulation mechanism can also be engaged here), we need to concentrate on priorities that determine the economic and defensive security of our state and ensure its industrial and technological development.

Let us take the structural transformations, for example. As is known, more than 70 percent of industrial enterprises in our country belong to the "A" group, that is, they manufacture means of production, working for themselves. And only 20 percent belong to industries manufacturing consumer products. All across the world, this proportion is the reverse.

Should the state pay attention to structural changes that are about to happen? Of course, it should. The structural changes should be carried out in the military- industrial complex, as well. The state must clearly determine its position in this sphere. And it is not enough to ban privatization — you know that there is a list of enterprises whose privatization is not allowed. When the state bans privatization of a particular enterprise, it at the same time assumes serious responsibility regarding this enterprise. We had situations where hundreds of enterprises belonging to the military-industrial complex, which have been excluded from privatization plans, were left without state orders and deteriorated. If the state does clearly determine its position and name enterprises that will work for the sake of national priorities, all other enterprises should be oriented toward making consumer products. Go ahead — form joint-stock partnerships, privatize yourselves, and work.

Here is another example: There are many good national programs. Really good programs. They are devoted to the development of transportation, power engineering, space programs, and so on. They are called "state investment programs," and they should remain in the focus of the government, which must use them as guidelines.

Speaking about state management and regulation, it is impossible to overlook the problem of bankruptcy. At present, we do not go any further than mere declarations in this sphere.

[Hubina] You have mentioned a proportion of 70 to 20 percent. At a time of structural transformations, how long will it take us a to put things back from their topsy-turvy position?

[Kinakh] Quite long. No miracles should be expected here. In my opinion, the process of restructuring in Ukraine will take at least seven to 10 years. But to make it succeed, we need a clear and consistent policy, as well as an appropriate level of legislative and normative support.

The government's Program of Actions devoted much attention to industrial restructuring. We have already made the first steps in this direction. We are developing a system of normative documents that would allow us to conduct purposeful state policy aimed at resolving industrial restructuring problems.

[Hubina] What do you mean?

[Kinakh] We need to set up an Agency for Bankruptcy Issues. We have already drafted a relevant presidential edict. According to our proposal, this agency will be part of the Cabinet of Ministers. It will have the following responsibilities: Analysis of the financial condition of insolvent enterprises — and we have such enterprises;

reviewing economic recovery and restructuring plans of those enterprises; making decisions on specific measures regarding a particular enterprise and deciding its fate; maintaining a list of insolvent enterprises that are not capable of conducting economic activities. If a company is put on this list, the Agency will take over its management functions.

If an enterprise is explicitly uncompetitive, one of the possible measures that could be applied to it may be privatization. If there is no doubt that this company is bankrupt, it would be liquidated.

Restructuring requires very precise work regarding all economic entities. I would say sanitary work.

Simultaneously, we need to seriously attend to small and medium business. The program addresses this issue, as well. These companies are an inseparable part of the market economy. In many countries, including Japan, some 40 to 60 percent of GDP is produced by small and medium businesses. It is important that we combine structural changes with the powerful development of private initiative.

[Hubina] Restructuring entails a sweeping privatization process. What do you think the proportion between the state and private sector in Ukraine should be, given the fact that we have a high concentration of large enterprises?

[Kinakh] This proportion will be changing dynamically, along with the progress of structural transformations. In my opinion, the state sector should not represent more than 15-20 percent. No more. In the future, its share may be even a little smaller.

[Hubina] There is another term frequently cited from the Program, "public enterprises" [kazenni pidpryyemstva]. State property consists of those and corporatized [korporatyzovani] enterprises. What is the government's policy toward them?

[Kinakh] Let me express my personal point of view. Enterprises of all ownership types, no matter whether they are public, corporatized, or private, should operate in equal conditions regarding competition, economy, taxes, finances, credits, customers, etc.

Many people believe that public enterprises will receive large credits and enjoy energy sources or tax benefits. This should not happen. We are talking about something else. If it is a public enterprise, it should maintain relevant — first of all, legal — relations with the state. A public enterprise should have a somewhat different mechanism regulating its consumption fund. The state, too, should have somewhat more powers to influence economic activities of such enterprises. They include certain issues related to financing some of their programs or various types of products that they manufacture, which are a national priority; issues connected with relations with the manager of those enterprises and setting contract conditions with him; and the state's commitments regarding state orders sent to this enterprise. In other words, we are talking here about a very special legal field.

For this purpose, the Supreme Council is preparing a draft law on public enterprises. It will also be accompanied with another important law on management of state property.

Looking into the future, the state should seek such relations with economic entities, regardless of their ownership type, so that those entities will consider it one of the most economically beneficial partners. In the United States, for example, private companies are eager to fill state orders for manufacturing military equipment. They even "fight" for such orders.

[Hubina] This would be a prospect for us, indeed, because our enterprises seem to be dreaming more about state support. What is currently understood by such support, and on what condition would it be provided?

[Kinakh] This is a serious question. When we talk about state support, we should always add "that should be repaid." It is not going to be a subsidy but a credit.

Now, let us talk about priorities. This is exactly the reason why a government commission has been set up to handle enterprise recovery, restructuring, and bankruptcy.

[Hubina] And you lead this commission.

[Kinakh] Yes. It should be well-furnished with analytical information on recovery plans so that it can, based on priorities and efficiency of extending long-term credits to enterprises, approve economically grounded decisions.

The recovery mechanism should be used primarily by commercial banks. It should not be financed through the budget. But it is another thing that when we talk about long-term crediting as part of the recovery programs — we urgently need to create economic incentives — not only for those who receive credits, but also for investors. This will stimulate long-term crediting.

There are many methods here. First of all, we need to create relevant normative mechanisms and legislative amendments. It is possible to work flexibly with the requirement for mandatory reserves in banks and with a system of taxing long-term credits [sentence as published].

[Hubina] But bankers themselves say that no long-term credits will be possible before the ownership issue is resolved and before you can mortgage land, property...

[Kinakh] You have brought up an important topic connected with property and the property market, which Ukraine, unfortunately, does not have yet. We are in desperate need of clear normative and legislative mechanisms of converting financial liabilities into responsibility for one's property. We desperately need to devise and implement legislative mechanisms regulating the use of bills [vekseli]. The two recent cancellations of mutual debts showed that bills have become simply an inventory instrument, failing to spur creation of the securities market. We urgently need to create a system of mortgaging property in return for credits.

[Hubina] Bills do not operate properly in Ukraine. Instead, the problem of mutual non-payments is growing by leaps and bounds. They are now measured in quadrillions...

[Kinakh] Mutual non-payments — accounts payable and accounts receivable — have already exceeded 3 quadrillion karbovantsi. This is a serious problem because it may affect financial stabilization. It paralyzes the Ukrainian economy in many respects, negatively impacting investments.

The problem of non-payments is very serious and complex. It cannot be resolved simply by indexating working capital.

[Hubina] So, what measures are proposed by the government's program?

[Kinakh] One chapter of the program is devoted to the payments crisis. We will have to grapple with this program for quite a while yet. We should create the kind of working conditions that would allow enterprises that manufacture competitive products to replenish their working capital via their own economic activities.

We should make a clear analysis of the structure of non-payments. Their nature and reasons are different. Based on this, we could get down to restructuring non-payments themselves. If an enterprise produces competitive products, why should we not give it an opportunity to "take a rest" to get off the ground, repay all its debts, and develop its business operations? However, a variable approach should be adopted here. There can be no general forgiveness in this sphere.

Until now, two significant documents have been issued — one is the president's directive introducing the notion of "hopeless indebtedness for interest on credits received." This directive has ordered a review of the situation of every entity, demanding that some decision be made on it — regarding, for example, cancellation of interest paid on the credit; not the credit itself, because it must be repaid. Interest was sometimes jacked up due to the high inflation rate, allowing certain banks to cash in on such operations.

Also approved was the presidential edict emphasizing the need to solve the indebtedness problem and impose fines for failure to pay money to the state budget. Thus, it is economically proven that restructuring should be carried out where it is possible.

This is a complex problem, and it should have a corresponding solution.

[Hubina] Every new program is supposed to induce more optimism. But we know better: A lot of programs have already been adopted, but the results were meager. Can you say that this time there are grounds to believe that the government's Plan of Actions will be implemented?

[Kinakh] Yes, there were many programs. And I would not like to say that they were worse devised or prepared. Looking back, however, I can say that we failed to display enough consistency and a systematic approach while conducting reforms specified by those programs. All the time, we were dashing in one direction or another, changing governments, concepts, approaches, domestic and foreign aspects, and so forth. Implementation of programs requires a tough and consistent policy.

And the second thing: We need to adopt an analytical approach to assess what has been done. This would allow us to make timely corrections without renouncing the main goal — radical economic reform.

It is very important that the program be supported by a reliable implementation reliable mechanism — both in terms of legislation, at the level of the Supreme Council, and normative acts, at the executive power level. This is why the draft program contains an entire chapter containing a list of the legislative acts, resolutions, and presidential edicts that will be adopted in the process of its implementation.

Another thing that we undoubtedly need is political will, an efficient presidential chain of command, as well as the basics of social stability, civil tranquility, and national accord.

Belarus

Prime Minister Estimates Cost of Arms Destruction

WS1210101995 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0748 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The resumption of the reduction of conventional arms will cost the Republican Budget 5 billion rubles (about 435 thousand U.S. dollars). In order to give an impulse to the process of destruction of military equipment in excess of the limits stipulated by the CFE [Conventional Forces Europe] Treaty, which is to recommence on October 15, the government allocated 2.5 billion rubles to the Ministry of Defence from the Republican Budget to pay off its debts to the 140th repair works in Barysaw. In addition, almost the same amount was extended to the Barysaw works for the replenishment of its working assets. This was announced by Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir at the last government press conference. According to the premier, the government cherishes hopes that other Member States of the CFE Treaty will assist to Belarus in the reduction of conventional arms. Mr. Chyhir did not give any specific amount of the support Belarus expects to receive from the West, and did not inform the press with which states agreements in this regard had been reached.

Russia Promises Fuel Through Winter Months

WS1210101795 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0748 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The situation with payment for Russian fuel and energy resources does not satisfy the Belarusian government. Indebtedness was on a growing trend even during the summer months. As Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir said at the October 9 government press conference, the increase in debts to Russia for gas and oil was provoked above all by the necessity to repay Western credits from the state budget. At the present time, according to Mr. Chyhir, the situation is being improved and the debts are not expected to continue growing. Mr. Chyhir also informed the press that the problem of debts had been discussed at the Sochi meeting of [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka and President of Russia Boris Yeltsin. The Russian leader promised that even if the debts for gas increase through unforeseen circumstances, Russia will continue to provide Belarus with it during the cold season. On these grounds the Prime Minister promised that it would be warm in apartments this winter.

Constitutional Court Confirms Old Parliament's Legitimacy

WS1210101595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 11 October, during the examination of certain normative acts' compliance with the Belarusian Constitution and Law, the Constitutional Court made a ruling which in essence confirmed the legitimacy of the 12th Supreme Soviet. According to this ruling, all articles of the temporary regulations included in the Law on the Supreme Soviet comply with the Constitution.

Constitutional Court: No Grounds To Impeach Lukashenka

WS1110145095 Minsk BTK Television Network in Belarusian 1900 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The media recently carried all kinds of commentaries about the fact that certain tenets of Edict No. 267 issued by the Belarusian president to amend the Republic's 1995 budget have been declared as running counter to the Constitution. For instance, a group of the 12th Supreme Soviet deputies believe that this gives grounds to initiate the president's impeachment. However, the Belarusian Constitutional Court press center states that those kinds of claims are not based on the existing legislation. In accordance with Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus, the court has the right to make a conclusion about violations of the Constitution by the president provided that those violations are not related to the issuance of edicts.

Columnist Ridicules Lukashenka's Search for Enemies

WS1110124695 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Oct 95 p 3

[Commentary by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "If There Is No Enemy It Should Be Invented"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Ryhoravich [Lukashenka] has had his own way: Demoralized and threatened deputies did not manage to get down to work in parliament on 3 October. It is doubtful whether it will be possible to convene the required quorum in the future. It is hardly worth pinning one's hopes on civic feelings of the people, who have frequently demonstrated a lack of moral principles, all the more so, since the president openly warns that disobedience is fraught with his overbearing discontent.

The president's dreams have thus come true. The old parliament no longer gets in his way, and it is actually unable to hinder any of his undertakings, even the most arbitrary ones.

So what? Who needs this other and, perhaps, final victory? Most likely, it is senseless even for Alyaksandr Lukashenka himself. After all, with the disappearance of this infamous parliament, the circle of politicians who may be associated with the camp of genuine and staunch enemies of the president has shrunk to an unseemly number. Who will put spokes in his wheels now? Whom will he have to fight against? Who will take the blame for the fact that the people grow poor, and there is no light at the end of this dead-end tunnel?

Alyaksandr Ryhoravich's two-hour narrative about state affairs televised on 2 October proved to be unexpectedly pale and unconvincing, because it basically lacked the pathos characteristic of a battle against enemies. Without this element, in which the president feels in his own element and looks like a zealous tribune, unmasker, and martyr, a significant portion of the nationwide fascination for him will completely disappear. Alyaksandr Ryhoravich is not born to read factual reports on economic achievements and failures. In this role, he resembles a speaker from a rayon branch of the "Knowledge" society, and is evidently not quite himself.

Plus, there is a catastrophic shortage of respectable full-fledged enemies.

Many people took notice that the president uttered not a single word against the hotbed of conspiracy and treachery — the oppositional Popular Front [BNF]. His vocabulary concerning BNF members has become softer. Not long ago Alyaksandr Ryhoravich would have dubbed them "national-fascists;" now he has suddenly switched to the almost neutral "national-radicals."

Alyaksandr Lukashenka is evidently aware that an overwhelming victory over BNF will not save him from another attack — a red one. It is still unknown which enemy is more evil and dangerous. So he replaced wrath with mercy to not set the public against the defeated BNF on the eve of the [parliamentary] elections. It would be much more convenient to have BNF members and Communists bicker with one another in the new parliament than to have a united brown-red enemy.

Incidentally, the president did not miss the opportunity to mention in unkind words the newly elected deputies, claiming that they lie idle and wait instead of getting down to business. This image of an enemy has not yet been formed in full — it has just taken the first undefined shapes. It will play its role in the near future.

Generally, the president had to repeat himself and recall things he had frequently addressed before, which remained unconvincing. He deemed the disintegration of the great country [Soviet Union] the primary reason behind all of our miseries. He also cast several traditional threats against the free press and intractable young journalists, claiming that they destabilize the situation, distort the facts, and, generally, do not know how to write because of their young age.

The worn-out record about the USSR's collapse is no longer heard, and it only sometimes plays in the souls of hardcore Leninists. At least, it is and will be impossible to blame our current difficulties on this event. As for the press, it does not require great efforts to defeat it completely and finally. Threats may be carried out any time. But, again, what will be next? The press is much more convenient as a permanent enemy, and the president himself must read something apart from official reports and like-minded state newspapers.

Moreover, the masses should know who hampers the president, who has prevented him from carrying out his undertakings and keeping promises, and who is the reason behind all woes. In this sense, the old parliament was very convenient. Because it ceased to exist, a search for a full-blown enemy will come next.

Moldova

President Snegur Leaves for Germany

LD1010150895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1312 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, Oct 10 (Interfax) — As President Mircea Snegur said at Chisinau Airport Tuesday before his departure for Bonn, the official four-day visit to Germany by Moldova's delegation led by the president has a particularly great importance for the republic; it conforms to its plans for integration with Europe and for the establishment of mutually beneficial relations with European nations.

Moldova must adopt the German economic model in order to use German experience to conclude its transition to market economy successfully, he said.

Close economic, commercial and cultural ties have already been established between Moldova and Germany, he pointed out.

39 joint Moldovan-German ventures are registered in the republic today. This year their turnover reached $60 million.

During the visit Snegur will meet with President Roman Herzog, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel; the two sides will sign a joint statement on the principles of bilateral relations, agreements on cooperation in transport and culture, and accords on tending the graves of German soldiers buried in Moldova.

This is the first Moldovan-German summit, and it will give a fresh impetus to relations between the two countries, Snegur said.

Dniester Gathers 'Incriminating' Data on Lebed

MK1210081095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Igor Korotchenko: "Incriminating Information Is Being Gathered Against Lebed. Documents Bearing His Signature Have Been Turned Over to Dniester Republic's Security Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moldovan Dniester Republic Security Ministry [MDR SM] officers have direct access to the office of the commander of the Russian Forces Operational Group in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has learned this from a well-informed source in Tiraspol. MDR SM head Vadim Shevtsov and the MDR president's military adviser Stefan Kitsak and persons accompanying them are now frequent visitors to Lieutenant General Yevnevich. They access the strictly guarded territory with the help of the chief of the special department of the Operational Group, Colonel Nikolay Novikov, who initiated such an association. The military intelligence service has at its disposal a special checkpoint, which members of the Dniester special services and local RF FSB [Russian Federation Federal Security Service] agents can use to gain concealed access to the Russian group's staff.

Frequent trips have been noted by Valeriy Yevnevich from the compound for a locality called Zatoki, where the MDR SM has a specially-equipped government dacha. Repeated instances have been recorded where officers on duty found strangers in the commander's office in the evening who said they were awaiting the arrival of Gen. Yevnevich.

Such an abnormal situation prompts bewilderment among Russian officers, to put it mildly, and spawns many rumors and guesses. Among the main ones is a version that incriminating information is being gathered against former 14th Army commander Aleksandr Lebed. There are facts supporting the theory. For example, the MDR SM has obtained the originals of some official documents bearing Lebed's own signature. In exchange, Yevnevich was offered audiocassettes with texts of Lebed's intercepted conversations from his chauffeured car using onboard radio, as well as tapes of his telephone conversations.

Furthermore, Yevnevich expressed the wish to obtain documents attesting to the alleged financial relationship of some of the Dniester region's commercial structures with the Congress of Russian Communities.

Most likely, fabricated incriminating information will be downloaded to the mass media two or three weeks before the State Duma elections.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Supports Common CIS Defense Space, Borders

LD1110202595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Oct 11 (Interfax) — Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev speaking on Wednesday [11 October] said he was supportive of the idea of creating a common CIS defense space and common CIS borders.

At a news conference in Bishkek he said President Boris Yeltsin's recent decree on Russia's longer range CIS policy was an indication that Moscow "has at last determined" its attitude to other CIS member states. Akayev links Russia's drive for intensifying integration with its CIS counterparts with "NATO's firm position" in Europe.

He spoke of Russia driving a special policy towards Turkmenistan and Belarus in recent years which had a negative effect on its contacts with other CIS member states.

Akayev said his country had always considered Russia to be its main political, economic and military partner.

Akayev Stresses National Unity in Presidential Platform

LD1110203895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Oct 11 (Interfax) — Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev plans to consolidate the unity of the people of Kyrgyzstan and prevent a split of the country along regional lines if re-elected, according to the president's election platform released in Bishkek Wednesday. Akayev will run for president in the elections of December 24, 1995.

Akayev promised greater support for inter-ethnic stability. He stressed the importance of curbed migration of Russian-speaking persons from the republic.

He promised an active social policy, including measures to create 100,000-150,000 more jobs in 1996-1997.

Another priority is measures against crime. Akayev thinks that protection of human rights and freedoms and measures against economic crimes are most important in this respect.

The program provides for transition from macroeconomic stabilization to stable economic growth in 1996. He said "six large projects with an overall value of $600 million will help this."

A chief slogan of foreign policy is "the most friendly relations with the near and far abroad," said the President.

In response to correspondents' questions, Akayev said he will reshuffle the government and change its structure if re-elected. He also plans to finalize an administrative reform in the republic. The President thinks it is possible to finalize the reform already this year.

In the opinion of Akayev, the shadow capital will inevitably try to influence the election results. However, the President does not dramatize this circumstance. "The elections will be objective. Certain individuals can be bought, the whole people can't," he stressed.

Tajikistan

Government Protests to Afghanistan Over Border Shelling

LD1110111995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1033 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, Oct 11 (Interfax) — The Tajik government launched a protest to the Afghan authorities Wednesday in connection with the shelling of a vehicle of Russian border guards from Afghan territory on October 10.

The shelling killed 7 servicemen and wounded 5. The vehicle was transporting food for a border post of the Khorog border unit when it came under fire from Afghan territory. According to preliminary information, the shelling was done by an armed group, which is in opposition to Dushanbe and under control of field commander Said Afzal. His unit is stationed in the Afghan village of Barchid.

"The action of the opposition aims to break the fifth round of inter-Tajik talks," says a statement of the Tajik government.

Tajik leaders called on the opposition heads to listen to the common sense, stop senseless bloodshed and start negotiations.

Opposition Fails To Observe Cease-Fire Agreement

LD1110195895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, Oct 11 (Interfax) — Tajik Opposition has failed to observe the cease-fire agreement and is sliding into armed terror, deputy chief of the Tajik Foreign Ministry's information department Igor Sattarov said at a briefing on Wednesday.

He said that Tajik militants had stepped up armed attacks in Tajikistan lately.

Two Russian border guards were killed and two others seriously injured in Dushanbe on September 28. Four Tajik police were taken hostage in the Tajikabad district on October 9 and their plight is still unknown.

"Provocative actions by the Opposition on the Tajik-Afghan border continue," Sattarov said.

At the same time Sattarov said that the Tajik authorities were prepared to continue negotiations with the Opposition and were inviting it to the negotiating table.

The Tajik government on October 11 lodged a protest with the Afghan authorities over last Tuesday's fire attack against Russian border guards' vehicle.

Russian Commander: Opposition Preparing New Offensive

LD1110200695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1811 GMT 11 Oct 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE October 11 (Itar-Tass) — A Russian military commander warned on Wednesday [11 October] that the Afghan-based Tajik opposition is intensively preparing for a new cross-border offensive and has accumulated upto 1,500 militants on the frontier.

Pavel Tarasenko, the commander of the Russian troops in Tajikistan, told a press conference that "border guards possess information about the concentration of militants of the Movement of Islamic revival of Tajikistan on the whole of the Tajik-Afghan frontier and, mostly, on its Pamir section".

"A total of some 1,500 armed supporters of the movement have been accumulated on the Tajik-Afghan border", he said adding that "after a short lull the armed Tajik opposition is conducting large-scale preparations for combat activities".

One of the proofs of the preparations is the Tuesday attack on a Russian convoy in Khorog area in which eight border guards were killed and four wounded, according to Tarasenko.

Leadership Protests Opposition's 'Terrorism'

LD1110114995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1126 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, October 11 (Itar-Tass) — The Tajik leadership is indignant at a perfidious violation by the opposition of the reached understandings, Igor Sattarov, deputy chief of the information directorate of the Tajik Foreign Ministry, told reporters on Wednesday at a briefing in connection with the death of five Russian borderguards on Tuesday.

A truck with Russian borderguards was fired on with a grenade launcher from Afghanistan on the evening of October 10 at the Khorog section of the Tajik- Afghan border. Five Russian borderguards were killed and four wounded.

The diplomat said that armed provocations by Tajik gunmen became more frequent in the republic in the recent past. As a result of such actions, two Russian servicemen died and another two were wounded in Dushanbe on September 28.

On October 9, four policemen were taken hostage in the Tajikabad district. Their destiny is unknown up to this time. Provocations continue on the Tajik-Afghan border.

According to Sattarov, the above facts show that the irreconcilable wing of the Tajik opposition, despite the reached understandings between the Tajik government and the opposition leadership, is increasingly switching from the position of political dialogue to methods of armed terrorism.

Interior Ministry Issues Statement on Kurgan-Tyube Area

LD1110143295 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In order to prevent the dissemination of false rumors, the press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan has prepared reliable information, which we are bringing to your attention.

From February 1994 in Kurgan-Tyube and the Bokhtar District in Khatlon Region, two criminal groups started to take shape. One of them operated under the cover of some servicemen of military unit 07017 of the Tajikistan Defense Ministry and the other under the guise of some servicemen of military unit 08001 of the Tajikistan Defense Ministry. They obstructed the efforts of the law-enforcement bodies to carry out comprehensive, objective work and to make the guilty answerable.

A number of grave crimes were committed by the criminal groups over this period. Arrogance and a spirit of vengeance were behind these attacks. As a result of the activities of members of these groups, Isomiddin Hoshimov and Miramir Sobirov, former members of the People's Front, and Mirzo Sobirov, head of the headquarters of military unit 07017 of the defense minister of Tajikistan, were killed. On 11 June, Khayriddin Asoyev and Abdulaziz Nabiyev, head of the security group of the meat processing and packing factory, were killed. On 12 June, as a result of a terrorist act, Izzatullo Kuganov, commander of military unit 07017 of the Defense Ministry of Tajikistan, was murdered. On 26 June, Akobir Odinayev, deputy chairman of Khatlon Region, disappeared without trace, and his fate is unknown to this day.

There have been instances of attempts on people's lives, as a result of which several people received bullet wounds. All these criminal illegal actions culminated in two armed attacks committed by military unit 08001 against military unit 07017. As a result, both military units lost many soldiers, while military unit 07017 suffered great material damage, the extent of which is being established. Civilians, including two women, died.

With the aim of preventing a further increase in disorder and making the guilty answerable, a decree of President Emomali Rakhmanov of 17 September set up a state commission, which included the leaders of the prosecutor's office and the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Security, and Defense of Tajikistan. [passage omitted]

By the joint order of the heads of these departments, an investigation team was formed from among the most experienced investigators. [passage omitted]

Operational investigations are being carried out into the main actions of the aforementioned brigades, and in the very near future all guilty people will be prosecuted.

The following preventive measures have been taken to maintain public order. With the aim of ensuring calm for the population of Kurgan-Tyube and the Bokhtar District, finding illegal arms and detaining wanted persons, 1,200 extra militia employees have been brought in from other parts of the republic. With the help of the internal affairs directorate of Khatlon Region and militia personnel, 11 checkpoints have been set up to supervise entry and exit from Kurgan-Tyube and the Bokhtar District. Vital installations are being strictly guarded. In addition, two mobile groups have been created for patrolling at night, in order to react promptly and prevent crime and to provide protection at night.

At present the situation in Kurgan-Tyube and the Bokhtar District is under the full control of the law enforcement and other state bodies. All the most important enterprises and organizations are working normally, according to the established plan. Cotton and other agricultural crop harvesting is continuing actively on the collective and state farms of the region. The life of the population is proceeding calmly.

Rebels Say Ministry Brigade Causing Trouble

LD1010164095 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0300 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The dispatch of criminal groups, as the president of the regime Emomali Rakhmonov calls them, to the Karategin valley has caused aggravation and threatens the semi-tranquil situation in this area. The defeated units of the 11th Brigade of the regime's Defense Ministry are busy with the persecution and intimidation of civilians as well as with theft and robbery in the Karategin valley. That is why the armed groups of the Tajik opposition in the Karategin valley have adopted a state of readiness.

Yesterday a joint cease-fire observation delegation under the auspices of the UN went to that area in order to investigate the situation in the Karategin valley.

Emomali Rakhmonov's regime has violated the cease-fire agreement in moving its forces — which have an ominous nature — because according to this document, changes in the location of forces are ruled out.

Armenia

British Envoys Visit Karabakh, Discuss Economic Reforms

NC1110213595 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1624 GMT 10 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Late on October 8 a delegation of Christian Solidarity International (CSI) headed by Vice-Speaker of the British Parliament's House of Lords Baroness Caroline Cox arrived in Mountainous Karabakh.

On October 9 morning the delegation was received by Deputy Chairman of the Karabakh Parliament Lavrenti Gabrielyan. On occasion of Caroline Cox's 25th visit to Karabakh she was awarded a "We and Our Mountains" medal. During the meeting the sides discussed work of the Karabakh Parliament as well as issues concerning lawmaking activities in conditions of economic reforms that are being implemented in the Republic.

On the same day Baroness Cox and and her delegation were received by Karabakh Prime Minister Leonard Petrosyan. He briefed guests on political and economic situation in the Republic and outlined a program of economic reforms worked out by the Karabakh Government. Speaking on the process of privatization that started in the Republic, Prime Minister underlined that Government of Karabakh Republic plans to complete it in 1995-1996. At the same time Leonard Petrosian noted that since the Republic of Mountainous Karabakh is living in conditions of a fragile peace, the leadership of the Republic will further pay serious attention to strengthening of the Karabakh army. Leonard Petrosyan also said that the Republic of Mountainous Karabakh, being unrecognized and having no opportunity to get assistance from foreign countries, relies on its own resources and support of Armenia and diaspora. He voiced hope that international community will assist Karabakh in implementing economic reforms.

For her part Caroline Cox pointed out to great changes that, according to her, have taken place in Karabakh in the sphere of social and economic development. She said that she was proud of the fact that Christian Solidarity International had made certain contribution to this achievement. "Today I can state that Mountainous Karabakh does not need humanitarian assistance as badly as Burma and Sudan do. However, that does not imply that we will stop making friends. Christian Solidarity International is ready to help Mountainous Karabakh to implement economic reforms and pass smoothly to market relations",- Baroness Cox said. She stressed that they would always support the Karabakh leadership, since it is committed to principles of peaceful settlement of the Karabakh dispute. Leonard Petrosyan announced Caroline Cox that in compliance with Karabakh Government's resolution, the Stepanakert Orthopedic Center will be named after her.

The meeting was attended by Karabakh Vice-Prime Minister Zhirayr Poghosyan and famous writer and well-known public figure Zoriy Balayan. Caroline Cox delivered with her two ambulances for military hospital and orthopedic center. A part of the assistance, which includes, construction and other supplies for these two medical establishments are on the way to Karabakh.

Vice President Receives Iranian Islamic Culture Minister

NC1110221795 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1950 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vice President Gagik Harutyunyan today received Iranian Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister (?Mustali). The presidential press service reported that the vice president expressed satisfaction at the opening of Iranian cultural days in Yerevan and stressed that besides their informative value, such events will contribute to the consolidation of cooperation between the two peoples. Gagik Harutyunyan pointed out the role of culture in the development of Armenian-Iranian ties. The vice president said bilateral ties are developing with new speed following Armenia's independence and noted that the first practical steps have already been taken. They should now be coordinated and given direction.

In briefing the minister on the program of celebrations to mark the 1700th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity as a state religion in Armenia, the vice president noted that Armenia and Iran [words indistinct] within the framework of the celebrations.

During the conversation both sides specifically stressed the importance of cooperation between the two countries in the spheres of science, art, and tourism.

The Iranian culture minister also noted the important role played by Armenians in Iran in invigorating Armenian-Iranian cultural relations.

Anelka Grigoryan, first deputy minister of culture, youth, and sports, Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Hamid Reza Negar-Esfahani, and other officials attended the meeting.

Azerbaijan

Defense Ministry Rejects Claim on Training Chechen Pilots

NC1110202195 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 11 Oct 95

[Statement by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry; place and date not given — read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian television's Vesti program reported on 10 October that Chechen pilots are allegedly being trained in an airfield in northwest Azerbaijan.

In this connection, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry announces that no pilot of any foreign state is being trained on the territory of Azerbaijan, and any report to this effect is nothing but a fabrication.

The Defense Ministry resolutely rejects this fabricated report concocted by Russian television and believes that the report fabricated by Vesti is a provocation aimed at undermining the traditional ties between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Gasanov Denies Planes Attacked Chechen Village

NC1110202895 Baku TURAN in English 1324 GMT 9 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku 09.10.95/TURAN — "Today's information in the 'Vesti' program by Russian television that two planes on the side of Azerbaijan violated air space of Chechnya and bombed villages of that republic is a provocation", journalists were told by the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Gasan Gasanov. "I state with full responsibility that such information has nothing in common with reality," the Minister noted.

Aliyev Repeats Commitment To Settling Karabakh Conflict

LD1110205695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 11 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovsky; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Azerbaijan is committed to a negotiated settlement of the Karabakh conflict but it will never put up with Armenian occupation of its territory, President Geydar Aliyev told parliament on Tuesday in the presence of his Pakistani counterpart Farooq Ahmad Khan Legari.

He reiterated that "Armenian aggression is the main problem to us at the moment."

Addressing his guest, Aliyev said Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize Azeri independence and thanked Islamabad, "the people and the government of that country," for taking a firm and just position on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He also spoke of Pakistani support for his country on a regional level and internationally.

On other regional conflicts including the dispute over Kashmir, Aliyev pledged Baku's continued support for Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

He spoke of accepting the Pakistani government's invitation to visit Islamabad and reaffirmed invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to visit Azerbaijan at any time she finds convenient.

In a return speech, Legari spoke of Islamabad's condemnation of aggression against Azerbaijan. He said Baku was heroically confronting Armenian aggression despite the imbalance of forces. He described as great injustice that 20% of Azeri territory was under foreign occupation and more than one million Azeris had to flee their homes. Legari demanded that the aggressor pull out from the occupied territories.

On the regional truce, now into its second year, Legari described it as an indication of the Azeris' wish for a peaceful solution to the conflict with Armenia. But he also called for immediate implementation of UN resolutions on the regional conflict.

Legari said regional conflicts were hampering the development of countries involved pointing by way of example to Tajikistan and Afghanistan as well as the Kashmir issue. He thanked Baku for its support of the Pakistani position on the problem.

Turkish Embassy Issues Statement on Oil Pipeline

NC1110222295 Baku TURAN in English 1223 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku/11.10.95/TURAN—Today the Embassy of Turkey in Baku issued a statement which reads: "This is a significant day for Turkey. The decision by the AIOC [Azerbaijan International Operations Company] and the Azeri government in favor of two pipelines to the north and to the west to export early oil will allow Turkey to play a prominent role in transporting Caspian sea oil and in linking this important region to the West. Next year we hope for the adoption of the main export pipeline across Turkey to Ceyhan. This will provide a very important contribution to Turkey's economy.

"We are grateful to President Aliyev for his approval, to President Shevardnadze for joining us in this project and to our partners in the AIOC for their confidence, President Clinton and the U.S. government have provided sustained and forceful support for which I am deeply appreciative.

"The Turkish team led by pipeline coordinator Emre Gonensay has worked tirelessly and skillfully. I am grateful to them and the many others who helped our effort, first and foremost to president Demirel.

"This decision is an important beginning, we look forward to working closely with our neighbours, our AIOC partners and Russia in a co-operative regional effort that can help bring peace, stability and prosperity to all the participating nations."

'Big-Time Politics' Seen Behind Caspian Oil Deal

MK1210081195 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 8

[Report by Arif Useynov: "Pipeline Routes Run Across Big-Time Politics. The Fight for Control of Oil Transportation Has Only Begun"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is noteworthy that President Geydar Aliyev, while welcoming on 9 October the decision on the oil pipeline routes made by the steering committee of the international oil consortium, did not say a word about the political significance of this extremely important event. Heads of oil companies, who spoke at a press conference, also avoided giving any political assessments and chose to mention only production figures. No one discussed the passions that have continued to seethe in the governments of some Western countries because Russia could not be barred from transporting the Caspian oil and, hence, from controlling the oil-bearing region. The main argument was in the end voiced, albeit not very loudly, in favor of the decision made: The choice of the double-variant route was made after this issue had been coordinated between Presidents Bill Clinton and Geydar Aliyev.

Interested U.S. circles had to admit that the countries whose oil companies are participating in the consortium found themselves largely dependent on the participation of Russia in the implementation of the "contract of the century:" The companies can take care of the production of the Caspian oil themselves well enough, but they have and will continue to have considerable problems with its transportation. An agreement has been reached that the first 5 million tonnes of so-called early oil will be delivered to the Black Sea by the Russian pipeline, since it will require many months to put the Georgian branch in order. On 1 November, an agreement is expected to be signed between the Russian Federation Government and the consortium. In a conversation with your SEGODNYA correspondent, a Western diplomat commented on this event in a very laconic way: "But tell us, what can we do?" The West has to reconcile itself to the stance of President Geydar Aliyev, who could not be driven to engage in an open confrontation with Russia.

Incidentally, Dudayev's envoys, who came to Baku in connection with the important decision on the oil pipeline routes to be made by the consortium, were also displeased with the same thing. Independent information agencies of Azerbaijan made public a statement by an adviser to General Dudayev that the Chechen patriots will not allow Caspian oil to be pumped across Chechen territory. In the opinion of observers, the aggravation of the situation in Groznyy is directly linked to the issue of the Russian oil pipeline. Foreign diplomats are expressing concern over the fact that there are sure to be opponents to the Georgian route in the region as well.

Georgia

Communist Party Leader Warns of Renewed Civil War

AU1110155495 Tbilisi AKHALI TAOBA in Georgian 6 Oct 95 p 1,5

[Interview with Panteleimon Giorgadze, chairman of the United Georgian Communist Party of Georgia, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Panteleimon Giorgadze Says That He Did Not Commit Any Crime" — postscript attributed to BGI]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Can you comment on the statement made by the head of state that all the terrorist acts were planned in your apartment?

[Giorgadze] This is an absolute lie. All the accusations leveled against me are groundless. If they behave like this toward others as well, this is simply our misfortune. This kind of thing did not happen even during the harsh times under Stalin.

[Correspondent] Have any representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Procurator's Office spoken to you?

[Giorgadze] Not at all. No one has spoken to me. I am an old soldier [retired general] and firmly state that I am not involved in anything. I cannot answer for others. However, the way they are treating me gives me the right to state that misfortune has befallen Georgia. I am 70 years old and they are accusing me of such sins that I would not even dream of. What will they do then to young people? Could they not have spoken to me like a human being? This is a violation of the law. The six presidential candidates and the head of state are allowing themselves to punch below the belt.

[Correspondent] Who should speak to you?

[Giorgadze] At least Eduard Shevardnadze himself or his representative. I draw the conclusion that Eduard Shevardnadze should be removed. Such an accusation has been leveled against me and he has just ignored it. What kind of unification of Georgia can one talk about under him?

[Correspondent] Do you think that such a policy will have negative consequences?

[Giorgadze] Yes, I do. I am certain that the Georgian nation will split apart. Civil war in Georgia will not die out. Moreover, the Georgian Government cannot unite. They all have their different interests and cannot stand one another. All this is Shevardnadze's fault. He has set Kviraia [interior minister] against Giorgadze [former Security Service chief], Kviraia against Nadibaidze [defense minister], Nadibaidze against Margiani [deputy prime minister], Margiani against Giorgadze, ad infinitum. I repeat this is our misfortune.

[Correspondent] There were rumors going around that you would not return from Moscow.

[Giorgadze] What do I have to hide? I have not committed any crime. They thought I would not come back. I was in Moscow attending a congress of fellow Communists. I met Communists from countries of the former Soviet Union.

[Correspondent] How would you assess the results of this meeting?

[Giorgadze] Russia's Communists are acting in a very convincing manner. Communists have already returned to power in Tajikistan. However, it is clear that everything cannot be done suddenly. Moreover, we also cannot promise people that, once we come to power, everything will be fine: Free education, health care, and so forth. I have never promised anyone anything. Our party does not make empty promises. We have a very difficult path, but everything will be done for the people. Everyone will feel this.

[Correspondent] You are a presidential candidate and enjoy immunity. Do you think this protection is bad?

[Giorgadze] According to the law, no one has the right to touch me, but no one upholds the law here. According to the law, it was not possible to declare everyone a criminal without their first being brought to trial. However, they did so.

[Correspondent] What grounds are there for the accusation that all the terrorist acts were planned in your apartment?

[Giorgadze] They probably thought that my son also lived there. They cannot imagine that father and son can have their own separate circles. Even my wife has her own circle. I do not listen in to what they are saying.

[Correspondent] What can you say about the warrant that has been issued for the arrest of your son?

[Giorgadze] I cannot comment on this. It resembles more an advertising campaign. They are stating that they have sent an operational group to Moscow and have announced to the whole of Moscow that Georgians will be arriving from Tbilisi to arrest a Georgian. Georgians anyway are not allowed to do what they want in Moscow. If they have sent a group, they should be quiet about it and not publicize the fact for all to hear. I, as Igor's father, cannot say anything regarding what crime he has supposedly committed. It is the legal investigation that should speak about this. However, there can now be no honesty here.

[Correspondent] Do you think that Moscow will support Shevardnadze?

[Giorgadze] I am certain that it will not. I felt this precisely in Moscow.

[Correspondent] Are you prepared to continue the struggle?

[Giorgadze] Yes. I will fight to the end.

Postscript. Panteleimon Giorgadze has addressed an open letter to Archil Gogelia, chairman of the Georgian Television and Radio Corporation:

During my absence from Tbilisi, television and radio broadcast information claiming that I, Panteleimon Giorgadze, participated in the preparation of terrorist acts, including that against the head of state.

I would like to state that certain people, knowing that they are not answerable to anyone, allow themselves to do anything.

I say to my people with all responsibility that I have never taken part in the preparation of terrorist acts and it has never even entered my mind to do this kind of thing.

How is it that certain people are demanding my arrest as well? This action is aimed at discrediting the United Communist Party of Georgia and distracting people's attention and clearing the path toward power. Every sensible person can figure out that this is a very simple method.

We have never supported confrontation. We have told people this many times. We have stated that it is impermissible to carry out an attack on the head of state.

I condemn the insulting remarks directed against me and demand that the heads of the Television and Radio

Corporation grant me air time so that I have the chance to prove my innocence before the people.

Abkhaz Military Preparations May Trigger Georgian Response

MM1110141195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

[Report by Vitaliy Denisov: "No Shots Being Fired From Inguri But Lines of Defense Are Being Built"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Military sources in Tbilisi report that the Abkhazian side is massing manpower in Galskiy Rayon. Around 800 servicemen and two artillery batteries have been sited near the villages of Pirveli, Gali, and Gudavi. Heavy combat equipment has been moved up to all hydroelectric power stations and industrial installations in the rayon. The area around Achigvar and Shesheleti is being provided with combat engineers' equipment, and defensive structures are being built. According to some reports, the Abkhazian military leadership intends to organize two powerful lines of defense. The first will run along the Eris-Tskali River, the second along the Galizga River.

Abkhazia seems to be seriously concerned at the possibility of the resumption of Georgian military operations, although official Tbilisi is still advocating the continuation of peaceful dialogue. But Sukhumi and Gudauta are in all probability not ruling out the possibility that elections in Georgia may bring to power people who, when it comes to a settlement, will place the emphasis on strong-arm means of resolving the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. However, it must be taken into consideration that, in making a show of their own military preparations, the Abkhazian side may provoke commensurate actions from Georgia, which would result in even greater tension in the border area.

Right now Tbilisi is refraining from retaliation and showing restraint. But after the elections and in the event of revanchists coming to power and their refusal to extend the "blue helmets" mandate (it expires 31 December) the situation around Abkhazia may change radically.

Ardzinba Bans Activities of Jehovah's Witnesses

LD1110152695 Sukhumi Republic of Abkhazia Radio in Russian 0446 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladislav Ardzinba, president of the Republic of Abkhazia, issued an edict banning the activity of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The edict reads:

In accordance with Articles 18, 30, and 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, and in connection with the unlawful activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, which is conducting propaganda aimed at undermining state security, inflaming religious discord, and thwarting the development of personality which is having a negative effect on the upbringing of the younger generation, I decree that:

A. The activity of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect on the territory of Abkhazia be banned;

B. [Anri] Jergenia, prosecutor-general of the Republic of Abkhazia, and [Astamur] Tarba, chairman of the Security Service of the Republic of Abkhazia, take the necessary measures to implement this edict and, if necessary, bring the appropriate criminal charges against persons engaged in the propaganda of Jehovist ideas.

Estonia

Prime Minister Vahi, Government Resign 11 Oct

LD1110132595 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi submitted his written resignation to President Lennart Meri today. According to the Constitution, together with the prime minister the whole government has to resign automatically.

According to the law on government of the republic, the prime minister has to make a statement about giving up the government's duties in front of the Riigikogu. The resignation of the prime minister and government are completed only after a resolution by parliament. [passage omitted]

Says 'No Crisis of Democracy'

LD1110192595 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Correspondent Anne Osvet has returned from Prime Minister Tiit Vahi's news conference and is in our studio. I will hand you over to her.

[Osvet] Late tonight Tiit Vahi, who is prime minister perhaps for the last day, began a news conference convinced as before that there is no crisis of democracy in Estonia. [passage omitted]

The crisis which arose over the minister of internal affairs [Edgar Savisaar] is not characteristic of a law-governed state, but does not constitute a crisis of democracy, either. This is how the prime minister put it. [passage omitted] Here is Prime Minister Tiit Vahi.

[Begin Vahi recording] This crisis affects, first and foremost, the former minister of internal affairs, Edgar Savisaar; definitely a section of Center Party members and its board members; and definitely the prime minister of the Republic of Estonia, which is myself, who is responsible for the reputations of both the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Republic of Estonia.

In this connection I spoke to Mr. President [Lennart Meri] and informed him also in writing that under Article 29 of the Law on the Government of the Republic I will speak on 12 October of this year before the Riigikogu with a statement on resignation and on relinquishing the mandate of the government of the republic. [end recording]

[Osvet] Why is the government stepping down in fact? Here is Tiit Vahi again with an explanation.

[Begin Vahi recording] We step down because we are tied to a coalition agreement and since the Center Party failed to release its minister [Savisaar] and failed to seek or find a normal solution, then today the board of the alliance between the KMU, Party of Consolidation, and the Rural People's Party decided to withdraw from the coalition. Today a sitting of the extended coalition council took place and we decided that the mandate of the coalition council has ended and so has the activity of the coalition and the coalition agreement has expired. Since the coalition agreement contains a point that should one coalition partner withdraw from the coalition, the prime minister will resign, this is what I will be doing tomorrow. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Gives Reason for Resignation

LD1110174295 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Russian 1645 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I will begin with the main news item of the day: The head of the government, Tiit Vahi, has informed President Lennart Meri of his plan to resign. After his meeting with the president Tiit Vahi was interviewed by this program's correspondent.

[Begin Vahi recording in Estonian with Russian subtitles] In principle I am of the opinion that what has taken place regarding the minister of internal affairs has no place in a state governed by law. As prime minister, I am responsible for the whole government and the reputation of the whole government. In this connection I find that I must step down but I have to discuss this with my partners. This is not a decision I can take on my own. I will begin talks and let you know later. [end recording]

Informs Riigikogu

LD1210100495 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi today informed the Riigikogu of his resignation as prime minister, and also that of his government.

At the prime minister's request, the members of the Riigikogu did not ask him questions because the government will continue to carry out its duties until a new government takes office.

The incident with the private security firm SIA and its connection with the former interior minister [Edgar Savisaar] are impermissible in a democratic law-governed state, Tiit Vahi said. I wish to assure you that, as prime minister, I am responsible for the government's policy and good image, and I insist that events in the state have been under my control, and that of the government, at all times. Vahi said there was no threat to statehood, or to the development of democracy. He said he would do everything possible to resolve this incident in a manner appropriate for a law-governed state.

The president of the republic has 14 days to nominate a candidate for prime minister, who will need the authorization of the Riigikogu when forming a new government.

Assumes Internal Affairs Post

LD1110171895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1600 GMT 11 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Prime Minister Tiit Vahi who expressed his wish to resign also said that he had proposed that until a new minister of internal affairs is appointed the posts of prime minister and minister of internal affairs should be combined.

President Lennart Meri has accepted this proposal and confirmed with his resolution that Prime Minister Tiit Vahi's post has been combined with that of minister of internal affairs, until a minister of internal affairs is appointed.

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